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Introduction: Youth Employment 
and the Private Sector in Africa*
Seife Ayele,1 Marjoke Oosterom2 and Dominic Glover3
Abstract This introductory article of the IDS Bulletin maps out the African 
youth employment challenge from a policy perspective. While policymakers 
have endorsed the role of the private sector as a job generator, it remains 
unclear whether, and under what conditions, the formal private sector 
generates enough and decent jobs. This IDS Bulletin begins to fill that gap. 
Contributors address questions including: to what extent do formal private 
enterprises create decent, secure jobs for young people? What obstacles do 
young adults face when trying to access jobs in the formal private sector? 
What additional difficulties are present in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings? And, how can policies ensure the formal private sector does not 
reproduce and entrench insecure and vulnerable employment? The articles 
in this issue demonstrate the importance of effective policy measures to 
ensure that private sector growth creates sufficient numbers of decent, 
secure jobs to provide employment to African youth.
Keywords: unemployment, underemployment, formal and informal jobs.
1 Introduction
Around the world, policy actors worry about youth unemployment 
and underemployment4 (e.g. World Bank 2015; ILO 2012; OECD 
2013). Almost 43 per cent of  the global youth labour workforce is 
either unemployed, or working but nonetheless living in poverty. On 
the African continent, 12 million young people enter the labour force 
each year, while annually only 3 million new jobs are created (AfDB 
2017). Especially in sub-Saharan Africa, the challenge is not so much 
youth unemployment as it is underemployment.5 Few young people in 
Africa can afford to remain idle and the vast majority are working very 
hard, maintaining several livelihood activities (Munive 2010; Mwaura 
2017). They are, however, mainly engaged in informal employment and 
entrepreneurship, with low productivity, insecure incomes, and low rates 
of  pay (AfDB et al. 2012). Policymakers express a sense of  urgency about 
getting youth into productive work, and preferably into formal jobs, in 
order to seize the potential ‘demographic dividend’ of  a comparatively 
young population (Canning, Raja and Yazbeck 2015). Policymakers 
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outside Africa are also eager to see young Africans enter employment, 
based on the assumed linkages between youth unemployment, regional 
instability, and out-migration, particularly to Europe (Oosterom 2018).
A dominant policy approach to youth unemployment and 
underemployment has been the funding of  skills-building programmes 
that seek to enhance the employability of  young jobseekers (AfDB 2016, 
2017; Blattman and Ralston 2015; Fox and Kaul 2017). This approach 
implies that Africa’s youth employment challenge is primarily a problem 
stemming from the unemployability of  young people, rather than a 
problem of  too few jobs. Economic growth to date has, however, not 
contributed significantly to the creation of  formal jobs in the private 
sector. In the low- and lower-middle-income countries of  sub-Saharan 
Africa, 50 per cent of  formal wage jobs are still in the public sector 
(Filmer and Fox 2014). The outlook for the region is uncertain. Even 
if  sub-Saharan African countries continue to experience sustained 
economic growth, most of  them start from such a low base that they will 
struggle to absorb the rapidly growing labour force (ibid.).
The private sector has an important role to play in economic transformation, 
and there is an emerging shift within donors and institutions such as the 
African Development Bank Group (AfDB) to involve the private sector 
in addressing youth unemployment (AfDB 2016). In fact, in 2013, the 
AfDB stated that ‘A vibrant private sector is the engine of  growth which 
generates decent jobs…’ (AfDB 2013b: 1). However, it is unclear to what 
extent private sector growth generates jobs for youth; whether youth have 
any specific disadvantages when it comes to accessing formal employment 
in the private sector; and to what extent the private sector will generate 
decent jobs (Blattman and Dercon 2016; Filmer and Fox 2014: 44).6 
These are issues addressed by the contributors to this IDS Bulletin.
The articles in this issue have been authored by the second cohort of  
young African scholars who are part of  the Matasa Fellows Network, 
convened by the Institute of  Development Studies (IDS) in collaboration 
with Mastercard Foundation.7 The first group of  Matasa Fellows 
examined the youth employment challenge in Africa from several 
perspectives, including critically engaging with the policy focus on 
youth entrepreneurship (IDS Bulletin 48.3, 20178). In this round, seven 
early-career academics from Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, 
and Zimbabwe were selected from a strong field of  applicants to consider 
the role that could be played by the formal private sector in job creation. 
They have unpacked and interrogated a range of  conceptual and 
practical issues that policy actors will need to be aware of  when aiming 
to support the private sector for the purpose of  creating jobs for youth.
The rest of  this article is organised as follows. The next section explains the 
policy environment of  current youth employment interventions, especially 
for Africa. Section 3 examines the potential and actual role of  the private 
sector in addressing youth unemployment and underemployment, and 
Section 4 introduces the individual articles in this IDS Bulletin.
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2 From a ‘crisis of youth’ to a ‘crisis of jobs’
Globally, governments, development agencies, and inter-governmental 
institutions such as the development banks have spent millions of  
dollars on youth-oriented programmes, particularly skills-building 
interventions that seek to enhance the employability of  youths, or 
build their entrepreneurial capabilities. For instance, the World Bank 
Group and its recipient governments invested nearly US$9 billion in 
over 90 skills-training projects between 2002 and 2012 (Blattman and 
Ralston 2015). Such programmes are relatively easy to design and 
implement, and their ‘impacts’ can be measured in terms of  a tally 
of  youths who participated in training.9 However, the majority of  
skills-building programmes have failed to create employment or increase 
earnings, particularly in the medium and longer term (Blattman and 
Dercon 2016; Blattman and Ralston 2015; Fox and Kaul 2017).
Matasa Fellows have highlighted other problems: many African youths 
face barriers to access such programmes; the programmes often fail 
to meet young adults’ aspirations; and programme implementation 
is frequently disrupted by corruption and ‘micropolitics’ (Mgumia 
2017; Sikenyi 2017). Furthermore, there is little evidence that youth 
employment interventions have a ‘spillover effect’ in reducing violence in 
fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCAS) (Brück et al. 2016). Typically, 
youth employment interventions do not integrate the challenging 
political and institutional factors that characterise fragile settings, and 
lack an adequate theory of  change (ibid.; Cheema 2017).
Policy actors are becoming more aware of  the shortcomings of  
skills-building interventions and efforts are underway to shift the 
attention to focusing on how to promote productivity, boost the private 
sector, and generate the kind of  growth that could create jobs (Flynn 
et al. 2016). This raises new questions. One immediate challenge relates 
to the architecture of  governments and donor agencies, as departments 
and agencies dealing with youth issues need to engage with those 
focusing on trade, private sector development, and economic growth. 
Since there is little evidence on specific issues and needs of  youth in 
relation to the private sector, it is unclear how private sector growth 
strategies can respond to youth-specific challenges. To our knowledge, 
only a few studies have systematically compared employment outcomes 
for youths recruited into formal employment and those that were not 
offered jobs (Blattman and Dercon 2016).
One study, which focused on expanding new industries in Ethiopia, 
showed that youth recruited into jobs with firms were likely to leave 
formal employment within a matter of  months, due to low wages and 
hazardous working conditions. Many of  the youths who had pursued 
other options were better off than those who had spent more time 
in employment with firms, and some explicitly preferred to take up 
informal, entrepreneurial activities that offered them greater flexibility 
and, in some cases, better money (ibid.). A fundamental question is 
thus whether the private sector will generate jobs of  sufficient quantity, 
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security, and quality. The next section will contextualise the role of  the 
private sector in job generation in Africa.
3 The private sector and youth employment
In many African countries, the private sector started to grow shortly 
after independence, while some African governments promoted 
state-owned and state-led enterprise (AfDB 2011; Page 2017). In 
Ethiopia, for example, nationalisation of  land and relatively large-scale 
manufacturing and service enterprises by the 1974–91 socialist 
government left a diminutive formal private sector, with a large informal 
sector running alongside it (Ayele et al. 2016). This experience was 
echoed across a large part of  Africa (Page 2017). However, improved 
macroeconomic conditions and private sector liberalisation since the 
late 1980s are said to have contributed to the new growth of  private 
sector enterprises (AfDB 2011; Page 2017). Rapid economic growth in 
Africa, in combination with poverty reduction, over the period 2000–14, 
fuelled optimism that Africa would emerge as a prosperous continent 
and enjoy the fruits of  development (see e.g. Filmer and Fox 2014). 
However, rates of  unemployment and underemployment, particularly 
among youth, remain high.
The private sector evidently has a key role to play in the eventual 
structural transformation of  African economies (Fox and Thomas 
2016). It is also widely accepted that private enterprises play an 
important role in job creation (ILO 2017b). However, there is a lack 
of  data on the size and characteristics of  the private sector, both at 
national and continental levels. One of  the few continental-level studies 
shows that the informal and formal private sectors combined account 
for over three-quarters of  the continent’s production, two-thirds of  its 
investment, and 90 per cent of  its employment (AfDB 2011). In 2011, 
Kenya had around 11 million people employed in the private and public 
sector, but only 2 million of  these were in formal employment, of  which 
some 68 per cent (or 1.4 million jobs) were within the formal private 
sector (AfDB 2013a). The great majority of  private sector activities 
in Africa are, however, informal, of  which household enterprises of  
various kinds constitute a large part (Filmer and Fox 2014: 15).
The International Labour Organization’s (ILO) most recent report 
identifies enterprise size as a key factor determining the private sector’s 
contributions to the generation of  jobs (ILO 2017b). This is not 
surprising, as size is an important factor in shaping a firm’s internal and 
external strategy – its organisation of  inputs and production, including 
its human resource strategies. However, criteria and thresholds for 
enterprise size vary by country (and within countries, by sector), and 
different classifications are used by different international organisations 
(ILO 2017b; AfDB 2017). Often, enterprises are categorised as micro, 
small, medium and large (and sometimes as compounds of  two or three 
sizes, such as the commonly used category ‘small- and medium-sized 
enterprises’ (SMEs).
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For the purposes of  this IDS Bulletin, we do not endorse any particular 
system of  size classification; however, to take an example, the ILO’s 
definition is that micro-enterprises are firms with fewer than five 
employees, small enterprises are firms with between five and 19 
employees, medium-sized enterprises are firms with between 20 and 99 
employees, and large enterprises are those with 100 or more employees 
(ILO 2017b). Most of  the youths employed in Africa are working in 
family businesses, whether formal or informal, which are typically in 
the micro and small enterprise range. Some workers in such enterprises 
are paid wages, while others receive payment in-kind or no payment at 
all (ibid.). Labour-intensive manufactured exports, which can potentially 
drive employment creation and economic transformation, are typically 
not significant in most parts of  Africa (Fox and Kaul 2017; Fox, Senbet 
and Simbagenavi 2016).
In low- and lower-middle-income countries of  Africa, formal 
employment exists primarily in the public sector; it is mainly in 
middle-income countries that the private sector produces more than 
half  of  the wage jobs (Filmer and Fox 2014). Filmer and Fox write that: 
‘over the next 10 years, at best only one in four of  sub-Saharan Africa’s 
youth will find a wage job, and only a small fraction of  those jobs will 
be “formal” jobs in modern enterprises. Most young people will end 
up working where their parents do – in family farms and household 
enterprises’ (2014: 5).
A more recent development is the introduction of  digital platforms by 
private companies, which are transforming how youth are engaging 
in the private sector. In East African countries such as Kenya and 
Uganda, private sector transport companies such as Uber and Taxify 
have become involved in a large sector that was previously almost 
wholly informal: motorcycle taxis (Rosen 2017). While policy actors 
are enthusiastic about this formalisation of  an informal sector of  the 
economy, the implications for the young workers typically employed in 
the motorbike taxi industry are unclear. Often, the contractual terms 
and conditions of  these companies and platforms do not meet the 
criteria for ‘decent work’ (ILO 2017a; Graham, Hjorth and Lehdonvirta 
2017). These facts offer a sobering perspective on emerging policy 
narratives that promote private sector growth as the key to addressing 
the youth employment challenge. It is important to specify which sectors 
of  private enterprise activity, in which economic contexts, are likely to 
generate secure and decent jobs for youth.
Analysts believe that investments in agricultural productivity (in 
smallholder farms and rural household enterprises) could enable the 
formal private sector to grow (Filmer and Fox 2014). A majority of  
African youths find themselves working in the agricultural sector in 
some capacity, while growing up and as adults. As with other sectors 
of  the economy, interventions are often based on the assumption that 
fixing problems among youths is central to addressing the employment 
challenge. This is to ignore structural constraints that impede agricultural 
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transformation, including the lack of  policies and investments that can 
drive innovation and productivity improvements in rural areas (Sumberg 
et al. 2015; Sumberg and Okali 2013). There is also limited evidence on 
the long-term impacts of  interventions that offer access to skills training 
and loans for rural youth (Sumberg et al. 2012).
Rarely are youth employment strategies linked to a discussion of  
political context. Youth employment challenges often look different in 
lower-income countries compared to resource-rich and middle-income 
countries (Filmer and Fox 2014; Fox and Kaul 2017). In middle-income 
countries where structural transformation of  the economy is underway, 
the demand for labour (including youth labour) can be stimulated by 
policies and projects that increase enterprise growth and productivity. 
However, countries that are classified as ‘fragile’ and those with rentier 
economies are unlikely to develop formal enterprises at scale, and here 
it may be futile to offer skills trainings to young people for wage jobs 
that are unlikely to emerge (Fox and Kaul 2017). Especially in FCAS, 
uncertainty due to political instability and the absence of  strong state 
regulation discourages private sector investment, except for those actors 
who possess economic and political power (Blattman and Ralston 
2015). This politicisation of  economic life in FCAS shapes access to 
employment opportunities by youth, who are often at the mercy of  
rent-seeking behaviour by more powerful economic actors (Enria 2015; 
Utas 2012). In countries where dominant parties control economic 
resources and access to government schemes, including those earmarked 
for youth, young people have limited freedom to grow their businesses 
independently from politically linked patronage systems (Gebremariam 
2017; Hansen 2010; Oosterom forthcoming, 2019).
4 Introduction to the articles
Empirical research on youth employment in the private sector is sparse 
(Filmer and Fox 2014). The contributors to this IDS Bulletin explore 
the scope of  the research and policy challenges in three specific areas: 
agribusiness and youth employment; skills gaps and youth employability; 
and youth employment in fragile and conflict-affected settings, 
discussing case studies from Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, 
and Zimbabwe. While some aspects of  the youth employment challenge 
are common to all six countries, the local contexts and situations are 
unique. In particular, the dynamics of  youth employment are sectoral.
Three of  the articles deal with agribusinesses and agricultural value 
chains. Agricultural and other livelihoods in rural areas have received 
relatively less attention (Sumberg and Okali 2013). However, the fact 
remains that a majority of  young people in Africa find themselves 
working in agriculture at some point and in some capacity. Tesfamicheal 
Wossen and Seife Ayele (this IDS Bulletin) use macroeconomic evidence 
to explore the growth of  the agribusiness sector and its links to youth 
employment in Ethiopia. The article tracks the movement of  labour 
from subsistence or small-scale family farming into agribusiness 
enterprises, as well as into the manufacturing and service sectors. 
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Emerging agribusinesses are generating more jobs for youth, but a 
number of  challenges such as low wages, skills gaps, and inflexible 
systems of  land ownership and transfer put a brake on growth and job 
creation. Targeted policy reforms could incentivise private agribusiness 
investments, address sectoral constraints, target skills and wage gaps, 
and improve institutions that govern land ownership and tenure.
Gertrude Dzifa Torvikey (this IDS Bulletin) uses a case study of  the Blue 
Skies company, a processor and exporter of  fruit products, to consider 
the connections between private sector growth, youth employment, and 
labour casualisation in Ghana. The casualisation of  formal employment 
is in tension with the assumption that private sector growth is likely to 
generate decent jobs, encompassing aspects such as health and safety, 
job security, autonomy, and fair wages, which young people seek from 
paid work (Blattman and Dercon 2016; Filmer and Fox 2014: 44). 
Torvikey shows that, in spite of  the company’s success in creating jobs 
for youths, particularly for young women, global competition in fruit 
production and export has undermined the company’s ability to sustain 
secure jobs for the bulk of  its workforce.
The article by Rita Makumbi (this IDS Bulletin) scrutinises Uganda’s 
Youth Livelihood Programme and Youth Livelihood Fund, which are 
intended to support youth enterprise and job creation by extending 
grants to small groups of  young entrepreneurs, to start small businesses 
that are expected to grow and provide employment. Makumbi 
focuses particularly on the maize value chain in Uganda, and shows 
that the Programme and Fund have fallen short of  their goals in 
various respects, due largely to design problems and weaknesses in the 
administration of  the scheme. She recommends that the Ugandan 
government be more proactive in identifying opportunities within 
the maize value chain to create higher skilled and more remunerative 
employment for youth. Additional measures are needed in a range 
of  areas, such as raising awareness of  job opportunities in the maize 
value chain; enhancing vocational and entrepreneurial skills; and also 
improving the functioning of  higher-level actors in the chain.
The next two articles in this IDS Bulletin examine the skills gaps that 
limit the employability of  university graduates and school leavers, but 
in ways that move beyond the assumption that young people need to 
be targeted with employability skills-building programmes. Jerusalem 
Yibeltal Yizengaw (this IDS Bulletin) investigates the causes and 
consequences of  skills gaps and skills mismatches among engineering 
graduates in the private construction sector in Ethiopia. Sustained 
growth in the Ethiopian economy has created demand for jobs in the 
construction sector, yet despite the number of  engineering graduates 
seeking employment, employers complain about skills gaps that hinder 
their employability. Rather than argue that a special skills programme 
is needed, Yizengaw suggests that the problem should be solved by 
correcting weaknesses in the design and delivery of  technical and 
engineering disciplines in higher education, which focus on theoretical 
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knowledge. She also points out that macroeconomic instability 
contributes to precarity in the Ethiopian construction sector, which 
further limits graduate employment opportunities in that industry. 
Yizengaw recommends that education providers collaborate with 
employers to make the engineering curriculum fit for purpose.
John Muchira (this IDS Bulletin) makes a similar argument in relation 
to high school leavers in rural parts of  Kenya. In that country, a lack 
of  formal wage opportunities pushes school leavers into precarious and 
informal entrepreneurial activities, rather than formal employment. 
The principal problem is not that the job seekers lack skills, but that the 
jobs do not exist. As acquiring employable skills is a key factor for youth 
to progress, either as an employee or entrepreneur, Muchira argues for 
building partnerships between secondary schools in rural Kenya and 
agribusinesses to foster skills-building that will enable young people to 
start entrepreneurial activities in the agricultural sector.
The last two articles in this collection address youth employment 
in FCAS. Simbarashe Gukurume (this IDS Bulletin) outlines how 
Zimbabwe’s protracted socioeconomic and political crisis over two 
decades has led to company closures, retrenchments, unemployment, 
and informalisation. Drawing on his studies of  the experiences 
of  youths working in SMEs in the retail and clothing sector in 
Harare, Gukurume argues that young people depend on their own 
resourcefulness and ingenuity to ‘get by’ in a context of  highly insecure 
and precarious employment. Gukurume’s analysis highlights the 
politically sensitive nature of  the SME sector in Zimbabwe, which 
requires young people to navigate partisan politics as well.
Finally, Tarila Marclint Ebiede (this IDS Bulletin) examines the potential 
of  Nigeria’s Post Amnesty Programme (PAP) to support the employment 
of  ex-combatants in the oil-rich Niger Delta region. Generating 
sustainable employment is an important part of  the disarmament, 
demobilisation, and reintegration of  young ex-combatants. Ebiede 
explains how the PAP has focused on training and skills development, 
while the design and implementation of  the programme have allowed 
it to become an open-ended subsidy to support the incomes of  
unemployed and underemployed youth. Ebiede argues that the design 
and implementation of  the programme were not informed by an 
adequate understanding of  the local private sector in the Niger Delta, 
which has created a mismatch between the kind of  training provided 
and the types of  jobs actually available locally.
Overall, the articles in this IDS Bulletin underline the complexities of  
each country, reminding us that claims about the private sector’s role in 
job creation are never straightforward, and that discussions need to be 
based on specific and contextualised understandings of  what the private 
sector is, the nature of  the jobs it creates, and its potential contribution 
to the economy and the livelihood opportunities of  young people.
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In memoriam
Matasa Fellow Clementina Ajayi passed away suddenly in May 2018, 
due to complications during childbirth. We dedicate this IDS Bulletin to 
her memory. Readers are invited to read our tribute to Clementina on 
page vii.
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* This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was produced in partnership with 
Mastercard Foundation.
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peer-reviewed the articles in this IDS Bulletin, including 
Justin Flynn, Eyob Balcha Gebremariam, Shittu Ayodele Ibrahim, 
Monica Lambon-Quayefio, Phil Mader, Grace Mwaura, 
Victoria Namuggala, Santiago Ripoll, Patrick Schröder, 
Maurice Sikenyi, Shova Thapa Karki, Jodie Thorpe and 
Thomas Yeboah. We also thank our colleagues Jim Sumberg, 
Vivienne Benson, Beth Richard, and Alison Norwood for their 
support with the Matasa Fellows programme and the production of  
this IDS Bulletin.
1 Institute of  Development Studies, UK.
2 Institute of  Development Studies, UK.
3 Institute of  Development Studies, UK.
4 The definition of  youth varies by country and international 
organisation. Unsurprisingly, contributors to this IDS Bulletin used 
statistical criterion which defines youth as those between 15 and 
35 years. The previous IDS Bulletin on youth employment in Africa 
discussed the different criteria used to define youth, and the notions 
of  unemployment and underemployment (see Ayele, Khan and 
Sumberg 2017).
5 Unemployment rates in sub-Saharan Africa are relatively lower 
than in other regions of  the world, averaging 11.6 per cent across 
the region. Youth unemployment rates are highest in North Africa 
and the Middle East (30.5 per cent and 28.2 per cent respectively), 
and lowest in East and South Asia (10.6 per cent and 9.9 per cent 
respectively) (ILO 2015). Underemployment rates, on the other 
hand, are ‘peak[ing] at just over half  of  youth, excluding students, in 
low income countries’ (AfDB 2016).
6 The ILO definition of  decent work includes a fair income, security in 
the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for 
personal development and social integration, freedom for people to 
express their concerns, organise and participate in the decisions that 
affect their lives, and equality of  opportunity and treatment for all 
women and men.
7 In 2015, Mastercard Foundation and IDS jointly launched the 
Matasa Fellows Network initiative, to build a network of  young 
African researchers with the skills and commitment to engage in 
policy-oriented research around the challenges of  youth employment 
in Africa. The initiative attracts talented researchers under 40 years 
of  age, with recent PhDs or PhDs nearing completion, and supports 
them to develop skills of  communication, policy analysis, and 
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communications that are not covered in a typical PhD training 
programme. See www.matasafn.org/ for further details.
8 See Ayele, S., Khan, S. and Sumberg, J. (eds) (2017) ‘Africa’s Youth 
Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’, IDS Bulletin 48.3, 
May 2017, http://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/idsbo/issue/view/225 (accessed 
15 October 2018).
9 This point was clearly articulated by donor actors at the Wilton Park 
conference on ‘Boosting Youth Employment in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Creating Opportunities and Building Skills’, South Africa, 11–23 July 
2018.
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Ethiopia’s Agricultural 
Transformation: Agribusiness’ 
Contribution to Reducing Youth 
Unemployment*
Tesfamicheal Wossen1 and Seife Ayele2
Abstract This article explores empirical evidence on the relationship 
between agricultural transformation, ownership structure of agribusinesses, 
and employment creation in Ethiopia. It draws on secondary data to present 
evidence of Ethiopia’s agricultural transformation, employment trends, 
and the agribusiness sector’s contribution to employment generation. 
The country’s agricultural sector has shown signs of transformation in the 
form of both labour movement to the more productive manufacturing and 
services sectors, and productivity growth through the commercialisation 
and creation of agribusinesses. The findings suggest that the growing 
number of agribusinesses are generating more jobs for youth but also 
reveal a number of challenges to overcome, such as skills gaps, low pay in 
the private sector, and inflexible land ownership and transfer processes. 
The study suggests targeted policy reforms to incentivise efficient and 
competitive private agribusinesses, and to address agribusiness-related 
constraints, skills and wage gaps, as well as land ownership and rental 
market constraints.
Keywords: agribusiness, private sector, youth, (un)employment, 
agricultural transformation, land ownership, agriculture, labour 
productivity, micro and small enterprises.
1 Introduction
Africa has the largest youth population (15–35 years old) in the world 
(AfDB 2016), representing 35 per cent (approximately 420 million 
individuals) of  the continent’s 1.2 billion population. Each year, 
10–12 million youths join the continent’s labour force (AfDB 2016; Fox 
and Thomas 2016) but only 3 million formal jobs are created annually 
(AfDB 2016). This mismatch between labour demand and supply in 
the formal sector poses a significant challenge to policymakers as the 
youth population is expected to double to over 830 million by 2050, a 
phenomenon commonly referred to as the ‘youth bulge’ (Evoh 2012; 
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AfDB 2016; Ayele, Khan and Sumberg 2017). In fact, in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), youth are three times more likely to be unemployed 
compared to adults (AfDB 2016; Fox and Thomas 2016). Even among 
employed youth, only 17 per cent are in paid employment whereas the 
rest are engaged in vulnerable employment such as unpaid family work 
and self-employment activities (AfDB 2016).
In Ethiopia, youth (persons aged 15–29) unemployment is a major 
concern (CSA 2015a; Gebremariam 2017). Data from the Central 
Statistical Agency also suggest that youth, particularly in urban areas, 
are four times more likely to be unemployed than adults (CSA 2014). 
Seventy per cent of  youth live in rural areas where agriculture forms 
the basis of  livelihoods (Bezu and Holden 2014). In this regard, it is 
critical to examine how the agribusiness sector – which encompasses 
the full range of  activities such as input suppliers, farm producers, 
and agri-processors to wholesalers and retailers – could drive job 
opportunities for youth, given the importance of  Ethiopia’s agricultural 
sector. As the country’s growing number of  agribusinesses are 
generating more jobs, understanding the role of  agribusiness is also vital 
as future employment generation and expansion are expected to be in 
this sector (AfDB 2016; Moller 2015; World Bank 2016).
Prior to 1991, the private sector in Ethiopia played an insignificant role 
in employing youth due to the government’s centralised recruitment 
and deployment of  employees to publicly owned companies (Blattman 
and Dercon 2018). Moreover, nationalisation of  land and large-scale 
manufacturing and service industries by the 1974–91 socialist 
government left a diminutive formal private sector, with a large 
informal sector running alongside it (Ayele et al. 2016). In fact, during 
this time, more than 75 per cent of  the youth in formal wage work 
were employed by the public sector (Krishnan 1996). Since 1991, the 
government has undertaken two main reforms: (1) privatisation of  
state-owned enterprises, and (2) giving special incentives to the private 
sector to promote growth, in the form of  subsidised credit services, tax 
breaks, and preferential land leases (Moller 2015; World Bank 2016; 
Blattman and Dercon 2018). Because of  such incentives and other 
factors, the number of  privately owned agribusinesses has increased; for 
example, the number of  farms in the cut flower sector grew from five 
to over 100 (Schaefer and Abebe 2015; Ayele et al. 2016). However, the 
role that such private enterprises have played in creating employment 
opportunities for youth is not well documented.
This article views agricultural transformation as: (1) within- and 
between-sector productivity growth, and (2) a process that drives 
job creation and economic diversification in agriculture-dependent 
countries such as Ethiopia (Dercon and Gollin 2014; Ligon and 
Sadoulet 2018; Diao, Hazell and Thurlow 2010). While between-sector 
productivity growth, a term commonly referred to as ‘structural 
transformation’, is driven by labour mobility out of  the agricultural 
sector (to high-productivity sectors such as manufacturing and services), 
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within-sector productivity growth is driven by technological changes 
as well as commercialisation of  the agricultural sector (McMillan 
and Rodrik 2011). As a result, productivity growth in the agricultural 
sector is considered as central to development that is based on poverty 
reduction and food security outcomes (see e.g. Irz et al. 2001; Dercon 
and Gollin 2014; Ligon and Sadoulet 2018; Diao et al. 2010; McMillan 
and Rodrik 2011; Gollin, Lagakos and Waugh 2014; Barrett et al. 
2017). In this regard, previous studies (e.g. Christiaensen, Demery 
and Kuhl 2011; Diao et al. 2010) have documented that agricultural 
transformation, especially within-sector productivity growth, is effective 
in reducing poverty since the agricultural sector is the largest employer 
of  the poor. For example, Christiaensen et al. (2011) reported that 
growth in the agricultural sector is two to three times more effective in 
reducing poverty compared to the same magnitude of  growth in other 
sectors of  the economy in SSA.
Besides its role in poverty reduction, we see agricultural transformation 
as the main driver of  job creation for youth in many ways. Higher 
productivity in the agricultural sector increases the supply of  
commodities required by agro-processors; which allows agro-processors 
and other industries to expand production and create additional jobs. 
Since such industries are more labour-intensive, they might offer better 
employment opportunities for the youth. In addition, agricultural 
transformation leads to more diversified value chains and stronger 
integration of  producers into international, regional, and local markets 
(Irz et al. 2001; Moller 2015; World Bank 2016). Further, because of  
agricultural transformation, new institutional arrangements in the 
contracting and marketing of  agricultural products could emerge. The 
emergence of  such institutions along with increased local demand 
creates new activities and consolidates value chains, which are important 
drivers of  job creation (O’Higgins 2017; Losch 2016; Ripoll et al. 
2017). Despite the above theoretical assertions, the empirical evidence 
on the relationship between agricultural transformation and youth 
employment opportunities is very scant. This article therefore explores 
this relationship using empirical data from Ethiopia. Specifically, the 
article examines the extent of  agricultural transformation in Ethiopia, 
and the role the emerging agribusiness sector plays in addressing the 
youth unemployment problem in Ethiopia.
The remainder of  this article is structured in three sections. Section 2 
describes the data sources and methodology used in the study. Section 3 
presents and discusses the main findings. Section 4 concludes and 
suggests some policy recommendations.
2 Methods and data sources
This article employs a quantitative approach that involves analysis of  
agricultural transformation and youth (un)employment data. Main 
sources include: (1) the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) 
database (World Bank 2018), which is used to generate and present 
evidence of  agricultural transformation; (2) the National Labor Force 
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Surveys (NLFS) and Urban Employment Unemployment Surveys 
(UEUS), which show current employment trends in Ethiopia; (3) data 
from the Ethiopian Horticulture Producer Exporters Association, 
and surveys on small-scale manufacturing industries and large- 
and medium-scale manufacturing and electricity industries, which 
examine the relative importance of  the agribusiness sector in terms of  
employment generation; and (4) Ethiopian Socioeconomic Survey (ESS) 
data, which provide micro-level evidence on youth employment and 
agricultural transformation. The ESS data contain detailed information 
about farm and non-farm activities from 5,000 Ethiopian households. 
The approach employed in the article provides correlations and 
associations but not necessarily causal links.
3 Findings and discussion
3.1 Evidence of agricultural transformation in Ethiopia
Between 2005/06 and 2015/16, Ethiopia recorded a real gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rate of  10.3 per cent (Moller 2015). 
During the same period, real agricultural output grew by approximately 
8 per cent and the incidence of  poverty declined from 43 per cent 
to 29.6 per cent (Bachewe et al. 2018). The growth in agricultural 
productivity was largely due to public investments in modern inputs 
such as improved seeds and fertiliser, extension services, and the 
development of  agribusiness (ibid.). As shown in Figure 1, agriculture 
currently contributes roughly 37 per cent to GDP and 68 per cent 
to employment. Between 1991 and 2016, the sector’s contribution 
to GDP declined by 23 percentage points; however, despite this 
significant decline, its employment share remained high, a clear sign 
that the productivity of  the sector is relatively low. Over the same 
period, the employment share of  the manufacturing and service sectors 
increased by 8 percentage and 17 percentage points respectively. 
Figure 1 Structure of the Ethiopian economy
Source Authors’ own, based on WDI data.
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The contributions of  the manufacturing and service sectors to GDP also 
increased during the period, by 15 percentage and 14 percentage points 
respectively. The changes in these two sectors, and the agricultural 
sector’s reduced share of  employment and output, are indicative of  
structural transformation in the country.
Figure 2 shows that real value added per worker, which measures labour 
productivity, increased steadily across all three sectors during the same 
period:3 labour productivity in the three sectors grew by an average 
rate of  5.9 per cent.4 However, labour productivity in the agricultural 
sector is still low compared to other sectors of  the economy, with the 
manufacturing and service sectors showing 3.6 and 4.2 times higher 
productivity respectively in 2016; in the literature this is commonly 
referred to as the agricultural productivity gap (McMillan and Rodrik 
2011; Gollin et al. 2014).5 However, recent evidence (McCullough 2017) 
suggests that the large productivity gap between the agricultural and 
other sectors of  the economy is due to differences in hours worked 
across the sectors. McCullough’s results suggest that agricultural workers 
supply fewer hours of  labour per year than do workers in other sectors, 
underscoring the prevalence of  underemployment in the agricultural 
sector (ibid.). Therefore, efficient agribusiness, that has a potential to 
reduce underemployment, would be as productive as the manufacturing 
and services sectors.
Further breakdown of  the overall labour productivity growth from 
1991 to 2016 by the World Bank suggests that 17 per cent was due to 
structural change (labour mobility from agriculture to other sectors); 
72 per cent was due to rising labour productivity in the agriculture, 
manufacturing, and service sectors; and 11 per cent was due to changes 
in the employment rate and demographic structures (Moller 2015). 
Overall, the results suggest evidence of  both within- and between-sector 
productivity growth.
Source Authors’ own, based on WDI data.
Figure 2 Labour productivity in the agriculture, manufacturing, and service sectors, 
1991–2016
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3.2 Status of general and youth unemployment in Ethiopia
Records show that between 1999 and 2013, the general unemployment 
rate in Ethiopia declined from 9 per cent to approximately 5 per 
cent (CSA 2014). The unemployment rate in rural areas is quite low 
(below 3 per cent as of  2013), due mostly to the prevalence of  unpaid 
family work and self-employment activities; however, CSA (2014) data 
suggest that 27 per cent of  the employed individuals in rural areas are 
underemployed. Urban unemployment is much higher (approximately 
20 per cent in 2013). In Ethiopia, only a very small percentage of  
individuals work in paid employment, particularly in the rural areas. 
Those who are not in paid employment are either self-employed or 
unpaid workers in family ventures. According to CSA (2015a), at the 
national level, only 10 per cent of  people are in paid employment.
This composition is different between urban and rural areas: in 
rural areas, only 4 per cent of  the employed individuals are in paid 
employment whereas this rate is approximately 45 per cent in urban 
areas. While the share of  self-employment is largely similar (40 per 
cent in rural areas and 39 per cent in urban areas), the share of  unpaid 
family work is disproportionately higher in rural areas (55 per cent) 
compared to urban areas (13 per cent). The unemployment problem 
in the country seems to be largely an urban phenomenon, with the 
high urban unemployment rate due mostly to high job-searching 
costs, mismatch between labour demand and supply, high rural–urban 
migration, and skills mismatches (World Bank 2016).
Since the manufacturing and service sectors are more skill-intensive 
than the agricultural sector, the higher rate of  urban unemployment 
might be due to a lack of  skilled job seekers. However, data from CSA 
(2015a) suggest an inverted-U relationship between unemployment and 
education. Unemployment is relatively lower among the less-skilled 
and highly skilled individuals compared to those with primary and 
Figure 3 Youth unemployment rate in Ethiopia, 1999–2013
Source Authors’ own, based on data from CSA (2014).
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secondary school qualifications. In fact, the rate of  unemployment is 
the highest among secondary school certificate holders. Further, most 
urban unemployed individuals (approximately 40 per cent), have been 
unemployed at least for a year (ibid.).
Youth unemployment is very high in urban areas and among women 
(see Figure 3). Between 1999 and 2013, the youth unemployment rate 
in urban areas declined from 32 per cent to approximately 20 per cent. 
In the same period, the rate in rural areas declined from 5 per cent 
to 3 per cent (CSA 2014). Like the general unemployment problem, 
youth unemployment is also an urban phenomenon. In addition to 
unemployment, underemployment is also a major challenge among 
youth;6 in fact, those employed in urban areas are mostly engaged in 
the informal sector. In 2013, 25.8 per cent of  the urban employed 
individuals were in the informal sector, reduced from 50.6 per cent in 
1999, and 38.5 per cent in 2005 (CSA 2014).
3.3 The role of the private sector in addressing the youth unemployment 
challenge
The development of  the private sector can be key in addressing the 
youth employment challenge (Broussar and Tekleselassie 2012). For 
example, of  the urban employees engaged in paid employment, only 
20 per cent are employed in the public sector (World Bank 2016). 
According to CSA (2015a), a comparison of  the skill sets of  employees 
in the private and public sector suggests that the public sector is more 
skill-intensive than the private sector. For example, approximately 62 per 
cent of  the employees of  the public sector hold at least post-secondary 
educational qualifications in comparison to 14 per cent in the private 
sector. The share of  unskilled employees in the public sector is close to 
zero, while this share is approximately 18 per cent in the private sector. 
Further, about 32 per cent of  private employees hold only primary 
education, while this rate is only 12 per cent in the public sector (ibid.).
3.4 Macro-level evidence on agricultural transformation and youth 
employment
In this subsection, we provide macro-level evidence focusing on the 
cut flower sector and micro and small enterprises (MSEs). We focus on 
these two sectors as they represent the agribusiness sector that emerged 
from agricultural transformation. As discussed below, these sectors are 
involved not only in primary production but also in value addition. 
They are also well-integrated into the international market. Besides, the 
jobs created in these sectors are mostly paid and full-time.
3.4.1 The floriculture sector in Ethiopia
An important feature of  agricultural transformation is within-sector 
productivity growth, driven by the agribusiness sector. An example 
of  such transformation is the floriculture sector in Ethiopia, which 
has shown remarkable growth in the last 20 years. Between 2002 and 
2016, the number of  flower farms increased from five to over 100. 
This growth was mostly due to favourable government policies such as 
exemptions from paying income and export taxes and import duties, 
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as well as better access to credit from banks (Schaefer and Abebe 2015; 
EHPEA 2018).7 In addition to local private entrepreneurs, a good 
number of  these farms are owned by foreign companies (mainly from 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Israel, and India).
This sector is largely labour-intensive, especially during the processing 
and post-harvest phases, and mainly requires less-skilled labour 
(Schaefer and Abebe 2015). As a result of  this growth, a significant 
number of  jobs were created for less-skilled individuals. Current 
estimates suggest that, over the past 15 years, the flower farms along 
with fruit and vegetable farming created an employment opportunity 
for more than 180,000 individuals (EHPEA 2018). Approximately 
85 per cent of  the jobs created in the cut flower sector are taken up 
by women, and due to the labour-intensive nature of  these jobs, most 
of  the employees are the youth (ibid.). To put this into context, in 
2016/17, the all-time employment record for the textile sector was only 
49,280 individuals. Another interesting aspect is the striking difference 
in labour–land ratio between these agribusiness and large-scale 
commercial farms in Ethiopia. According to CSA (2017), the average 
household landholding in Ethiopia is 1.38 hectares. Given that the 
average household size in rural Ethiopia is 4.8 persons, a hectare in 
a smallholder system supports at least four people, which is mostly in 
the form of  unpaid family labour. Large-scale farms create only 0.05 
permanent jobs per hectare and 4.9 jobs for temporary workers (Ali, 
Deininger and Harris 2017). However, a hectare in the flower, fruit, 
Table 1 Jobs created by micro and small enterprises in Ethiopia, 2013/14
Industry group No. of establishments No. of employees
Employees permanently 
employed (%)
Food produce (excl. grain mills) 25,430 373,171 41.5
Grain mill 35,430 540,339 35
Textiles 3,416 49,280 47
Wearing apparel, drying of fur 18,199 246,062 40
Leather products 1,113 16,182 44
Wood products (excl. furniture) 1,548 13,348 38
Non-metallic minerals 1,709 29,155 39
Metal products 12,531 182,115 37
Machinery and equipment 58 941 31
Furniture 17,693 289,853 35
Others 182 3,024 38
Total 117,309 1,743,470
Source Authors’ own, based on CSA (2015c).
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and vegetable farming sector supports approximately ten individuals 
through paid employment. This suggests that the floriculture sub-sector 
is playing a significant role in creating paid jobs for youth. It also 
generated US$245 million in export earnings in the 2016/17 fiscal year 
(EHPEA 2018).
While the jobs in this sector are attractive at a managerial level, the 
pay is rather low at the entry level. As of  2013, the average monthly 
salary at the management level was 8,258 Ethiopian birr (approximately 
US$450) while the pay for production workers such as land preparation, 
fertilisation, and harvesting was only 760 Ethiopian birr (US$40) 
(Schaefer and Abebe 2015). Blattman and Dercon (2018) also reported 
that the working conditions in the cut flower sector are unpleasant and 
hazardous to health. In addition, the sector is facing several challenges. 
For example, accessing suitable land close to the airport is a challenge 
(Schaefer and Abebe 2015), and power outages, especially during 
storage, have resulted in significant revenue and job losses (Schaefer and 
Abebe 2015).
3.4.2 The agri-food processing sector
As part of  the so-called ‘micro and small enterprises’ (MSEs), 
the agri-food processing sector has contributed significantly to 
alleviating the unemployment problem in Ethiopia.8 The small-scale 
manufacturing industries survey of  2013/14 shows that 1.7 million 
people were employed in this sector at the time (see Table 1). The 
top three employers were grain mills, food processing industries, and 
manufacturers of  wearing apparel and the drying of  fur. In fact, more 
than 85 per cent of  the jobs in MSEs were created by enterprises related 
to the agribusiness sector.
The data further suggest that from the 117,000 MSEs registered at the 
time, more than 70 per cent were engaged in activities directly related 
Table 2 Ownership structure of agriculture-related MSEs in Ethiopia, 2013/14
Industry group Private (%)
Partnership 
(%)
Share 
company (%)
Limited 
company (%)
Cooperatives 
(%)
Government 
(%)
Food produce (excl. grain mills) 91.24 5.85 0.38 0.19 1.89 0.23
Grain mill 88.04 8.67 0.14 0.11 0.89 0.05
Textiles 83.20 7.99 2.20 0.56 5.80 0.26
Wearing apparel, drying of fur 90.95 4.91 0.31 0.26 2.32 0.36
Leather products 71.16 21.11 1.44 0.72 4.22 0.00
Wood products (excl. furniture) 77.26 11.43 2.58 0.00 7.62 0.00
Furniture 67.07 19.43 0.49 0.76 11.56 0.06
Average 86.1 10.9 0.6 0.3 2.1 0.04
Source Authors’ own, based on data from CSA (2015c).
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to the agricultural sector. In addition, 38 per cent of  the employees in 
this sector were permanent paid workers while 22 per cent were in paid 
apprenticeships (CSA 2015c). Compared to small-scale enterprises, 
large- and medium-scale industries are largely ineffective in creating job 
opportunities (CSA 2015b). For example, in 2013/14, only 0.3 million 
individuals were employed by such industries. Thirty-nine per cent of  
these industries are in the agricultural sector (27 per cent in the food 
products and beverages sector and 12 per cent in the furniture industry), 
again suggesting the important role of  agriculture-related activities.9
Table 2 presents the ownership structure of  agriculture-related MSEs. 
More than 86 per cent of  the small-scale industrial establishments are 
owned by private individuals, whereas government ownership is very 
limited. This suggests that the private sector is the major employer of  
individuals in the MSE sector. Another important driver of  job creation 
is trade in agriculture-related activities: data from CSA (2014) suggest 
that a significant number of  individuals – approximately 5.4 per cent 
of  employed individuals in Ethiopia – are engaged in wholesale and 
retail trades, mostly for cereals. This rate is much higher in urban areas 
(20 per cent) compared to rural areas (2.9 per cent). This suggests that, 
as agricultural transformation intensifies, jobs can be created along the 
value chain.
Improving value addition remains an important area of  intervention. 
For example, while high-income countries have a value addition of  
US$180 per tonne for agricultural products, African countries’ value 
addition is only US$40 per tonne (World Bank 2016). In addition, 
the sector is also facing significant credit, land, and electricity-related 
constraints. The 2013/14 small-scale manufacturing industries survey 
identified the most important obstacles faced by agribusiness and the 
MSE sector to be: access to finance and land, shortage of  electricity and 
water, as well as a lack of  sufficient market information. In this regard, 
re-organising the agribusiness sector into special cluster zones would 
create areas where different types of  agribusiness are agglomerated into 
one area. This would facilitate marketing and distribution and improve 
the supply of  infrastructure and electricity-related services, which are 
critical in increasing productivity. As productivity increases, more jobs 
will be created for the youth in the agribusiness sector.
3.5 Micro-level evidence on the role of the private sector and youth 
employment
Here we provide further evidence on the relationship between 
agricultural transformation and youth employment using ESS data 
(CSA 2017).10 We draw employment rates from microdata, based on 
the following question: ‘At any time over the last 12 months, were 
you employed in any kind of  job, including part-time labour, for 
wage, salary, commission or any payment in kind, for anyone who 
is not a member of  the household?’ This question is mostly about 
paid employment (i.e. excluding self-employment and unpaid family 
work). Our analysis suggests that 8.7 per cent of  the respondents were 
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in paid employment, which is close to the country’s 10 per cent paid 
employment rate (CSA 2014). When the ESS data were disaggregated 
by location, and youth status, we found some interesting results. Only 
2.9 per cent of  the respondents in rural areas were engaged in paid 
employment; however, this rate was 12.5 per cent in small towns and 
24.2 per cent in medium and large towns. According to the survey, 
8.6 per cent of  youths were in paid employment (3.3 per cent in rural 
areas and 18.2 per cent in urban areas). Table 3 shows that for the 
sample as a whole, 48 per cent of  paid employment came from the 
private sector (both companies and individuals) and 47 per cent from 
the public sector (both government and state-owned enterprises). 
Fifty-seven per cent of  the paid youths were employed in the private 
sector, with 44 per cent in rural areas and 62 per cent in urban areas. 
This suggests that the private sector is playing a critical role in reducing 
youth unemployment in Ethiopia.
Despite the importance of  the private sector in terms of  job creation, 
the average wage paid by the private sector is much lower than public 
organisations. According to the ESS data, the average pay per hour in 
the government sector was 32 birr, whereas the rate in the private sector 
was 15 birr. However, public sector employees had a higher level of  
education; for example, 4.5 per cent of  the youth employed in a paid 
government role had only a primary education qualification, whereas 
this rate was 41 per cent in the private sector.
Finally, as the youth population is set to grow, and with 70 per cent of  
the youth living in rural areas, addressing key constraints, especially 
those related to land would be vital. Empirical evidence also suggests 
that landlessness among rural youth is increasing (Kosec et al. 2017; 
Bezu and Holden 2014). In fact, attracting youth into agribusiness 
requires addressing land-related constraints (AfDB 2016; Kosec et al. 
2017; Bezu and Holden 2014). Even though Ethiopia’s land tenure 
and inheritance laws guarantee equal land acquisition and use rights 
for all rural citizens wishing to engage in agriculture, youth typically 
Table 3 Paid employment in Ethiopia by sector, from the 2015/16 ESS data
Type of employer All Youth
Main employers Total (%) Total (%) Rural youth (%) Urban youth (%)
Private company 23.93 25.81 20.90 27.40
Private individual 24.15 31.50 23.30 34.20
Government 43.66 37.40 45.70 34.70
State-owned enterprise 3.21 2.66 5.40 1.80
Church/religious organisation 2.90 1.30 1.50 1.20
Source Authors’ own, based on data from CSA (2017).
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rely on inheritance and informal rental markets to access land (Kosec 
et al. 2017; Bezu and Holden 2014). However, the average farm sizes 
of  smallholders have declined over the last decade and relying on 
inheritance is becoming less feasible. In fact, only 3 per cent of  young 
women in Ethiopia have access to land (Bezu and Holden 2014). Due 
to limited formal land market opportunities, the youth can neither 
buy nor rent land on a long-term basis from other farmers. Therefore, 
there is a vital need to address land market-related constraints. In 
fact, previous studies (e.g. Bezu and Holden 2014) have suggested 
that young people in Ethiopia abandon agriculture due to limited 
access to agricultural land. Similarly, Kosec et al. (2017) documented 
that youth’s high expectation of  land inheritance negatively affects 
rural–urban migration and employment in the non-agricultural 
sector. In particular, their results suggest that a 10 per cent increase in 
inheritance size reduces rural-to-urban migration and employment in 
the non-agricultural sector by 4.8 and 4.1 per cent respectively. Table 4 
shows land ownership in Ethiopia by age group, based on the ESS data 
(CSA 2017). The data show that only 4.2 per cent of  the youth own 
land. Therefore, institutional arrangements and land market reforms 
that improve youth’s access to land are crucial, if  youth are to be the 
drivers of  agribusiness.
4 Conclusion and policy recommendations
The evidence presented in this article suggests signs of  agricultural 
transformation in Ethiopia, in the form of  both labour movement 
to more productive sectors such as manufacturing and services, 
and productivity growth through the creation of  agribusinesses. 
In particular, labour productivity growth, especially within-sector 
growth, has been strong. However, modernising and improving the 
productivity of  the sector needs to push forward as large productivity 
gaps remain when compared to the manufacturing and service sectors. 
High unemployment remains, despite the emerging transformation, 
especially in urban areas and among youth. The impact of  agribusiness 
development on youth employment outcomes was positive – as 
agribusinesses have expanded and grown, more jobs have been created 
for the youth. However, it was found that the jobs created in such 
private enterprises were low-paying and less skill-intensive. There are 
also major barriers related to access to electricity and suitable land that 
Table 4 Land ownership by age group, from the 2015/16 ESS data
Age group % access to land
<15 0.07
Youth (15–29) 4.2
30–64 46
>64 93
Source Authors’ own, based on data from CSA (2017).
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need to be addressed to ensure, firstly, that agribusinesses can continue 
to create jobs for young people and, secondly, that the youth are in 
a position to take them up. Inflexible land transfer and ownership 
processes have limited youth’s access to land.
Based on these findings, we make the following policy recommendations:
Investment in infrastructure: A considerable number of  jobs are 
being lost in the agribusiness sector due to infrastructure and power 
outages. Improving existing infrastructure and continued investment 
would make agribusinesses more competitive and reliable.
Improve productivity of  existing and new agribusiness: Special 
agricultural cluster zones would create areas where different types 
of  agribusiness are agglomerated into an area. This would facilitate 
marketing and distribution and improve the supply of  infrastructure and 
electricity-related services, which are critical in increasing productivity.
Address the wage and skills gap: Since the jobs created in the 
agribusiness sector are largely low-paying and less skill-intensive, the 
following interventions could help to improve the pay for work in the 
private sector:
 l Introducing minimum wages in the private sector;
 l Unionisation of  the workforce could improve the bargaining power 
of  the youth for better wages;
 l Provision of  employment and skill services could reduce a mismatch 
between job seekers and suppliers. Improving the skill set of  existing 
employees through on-the-job vocational training would also be 
crucial.
Improve the youth’s access to land through policy reforms to 
support them to be drivers of  agribusiness, including mechanisms that:
 l Allow landowners to transfer their land use right to others, especially 
for the youth who wish to engage in agribusiness-related activities, by 
sale or in exchange;
 l Relax restrictions on long-term rental markets.
In conclusion, as Ethiopia moves towards further privatisation, the 
government needs to launch an agribusiness strategy with the aim of  
exploiting the opportunities that may arise from agricultural and value 
chain transformations.
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Notes
* This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was produced in partnership with 
Mastercard Foundation.
1 International Institute of  Tropical Agriculture (IITA), Kenya.
2 Institute of  Development Studies, UK.
3 Since our focus is on employment share, we focus on labour productivity 
instead of  other productivity measures such as land productivity.
4 Calculated by weighting labour productivity in each sector by the 
labour share of  each respective sector.
5 The focus of  this article is not to examine the causes of  this 
productivity gap but to understand the extent to which (1) such 
productivity gaps shape youth unemployment, and (2) labour 
productivity growth within the agricultural sector (however small it 
may be) affects the development of  agribusiness (e.g. textile, flower, 
garment, and brewery companies, etc.).
6 Defined as the proportion of  workers who are available and ready to 
work more hours.
7 http://ehpea.com/GeneralInfo.aspx#medialink.
8 The Ethiopian government designed the Micro and Small Enterprises 
Development Strategy in 2004. MSEs are those industries engaging 
fewer than ten persons and which use power-driven machinery.
9 Another sector that we could have considered would be the input 
supply sector (fertiliser and improved seed), but the public sector is 
still the main player here and data are not available on jobs created 
in this sector. However, as agricultural transformation has intensified 
in the country in the past few years, a significant number of  jobs may 
have been created by the input sector.
10 The ESS data are collected by the Central Statistical Authority (CSA) 
of  Ethiopia and the World Bank Living Standards Measurement 
Study-Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) team. For this 
article, data from the 2015/16 survey round are used. These data 
contain detailed information from approximately 5,000 households. Of  
these, 66 per cent are from rural areas and 9 per cent from small towns.
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Labour Casualisation and Youth 
Employment in Ghana’s Formal 
Private Sector*
Gertrude Dzifa Torvikey1
Abstract This article explores the link between labour casualisation and 
youth employment in Ghana’s formal private sector. It uses the case of 
Blue Skies Holdings Ltd, an agro-processing company in Ghana. The article 
shows the contribution of Blue Skies to youth employment in Ghana. 
However, changes in the global production of the company’s primary export 
commodity and local shocks created new challenges for the company. The 
article explains how local economic realities, global competition, and local 
shocks impact on the company’s ability to maintain permanent employment 
for its workers. It recommends that government must design policies to 
incentivise successful companies to create more jobs but without consigning 
youth to insecure employment conditions.
Keywords: Ghana, youth employment, labour casualisation, private 
sector, Blue Skies Holdings Ltd.
1 Introduction
This article explores casualisation of  youth2 labour and the precarity of  
employment in Ghana’s formal private sector, through a case study of  Blue 
Skies Holdings Ltd, an agro-processing firm. Like many other African 
countries, Ghana is experiencing ‘jobless growth’, where economic growth 
is not matched with job creation in the formal sectors of  the economy 
(Aryeetey and Baah-Boateng 2016). The jobless growth phenomenon 
shows up more in the casualisation of  jobs and their vulnerability to shocks, 
rather than extremely high levels of  general joblessness. Some analysts 
argue that this makes the situation particularly serious, because the insecure 
nature of  jobs in the formal sector hides the gravity of  the country’s youth 
unemployment crisis (Alagidede, Baah-Boateng and Nketiah-Amponsah 
2013). The ‘youth bulge’ compounds the unemployment challenge where 
an estimated 20 per cent of  the population is between 15 and 24 years old 
(Ghana Statistical Service 2014). These interconnected opportunities and 
problems have seen the implementation of  training programmes for youth 
to transition into the job market (Darkwah 2013).
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Since the 1980s, Ghana has implemented economic reforms that have 
transformed the nature of  its economy in significant ways. The World 
Bank-inspired Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), which were 
known in Ghana as Economic Recovery Programmes (ERPs), reduced 
the state’s involvement in direct production, with the expectation that 
the private formal sector would drive economic growth and create jobs. 
Since the 2000s, Ghana’s economy has seen positive growth, especially 
in 2011 when commercial oil production started. Both public and 
private sectors have seen marginal increases in employment, but job 
creation in the formal private sector has been described as negligible 
(Obeng-Odoom 2012; Francis and Honorati 2016). A pattern of  
employment informalisation and labour casualisation has spread from 
the private informal sector to the formal sector as well.
Another significant feature of  Ghana’s economic growth trajectory is 
the decline in the contribution of  the agriculture sector to the national 
economy. In 1998, the agriculture sector contributed 30.72 per cent to 
GDP while in 2015, the figure was 20.28 per cent. Economic growth 
in agriculture was 5.1 per cent in 1998 and 7.4 per cent in 2008, but 
declined to only 2.5 per cent in 2015. There are important linkages 
between growth in the agricultural private sector and job creation, 
especially where companies are linked to industrial production and 
exports (Baah-Boateng 2013; Fox et al. 2013; Hanson and Leautier 
2013; World Bank 2018). Aykut et al. (2017) contend that the agriculture 
sector in Ghana remains highly relevant as an engine of  job creation, 
notwithstanding the government’s tilt towards the extractive sector. 
However, as this article will show, the agricultural sector is susceptible 
to stresses and periodic shocks that are related to a plethora of  factors, 
including land use changes, crop failures, and low rates of  investment, 
among others. These factors have an impact on the employment-
generating capacity of  the agricultural sector, which employs about 
42 per cent of  economically active people in the country (Ghana 
Statistical Service 2013).
This article uses the case of  Blue Skies as a lens to study casualisation 
and youth employment in Ghana. Blue Skies is a formal private sector 
company that employs both skilled and unskilled labour. It processes 
fruits, which are sourced primarily from smallholder growers. The 
company’s products are marketed locally, but principally exported 
to international markets. Blue Skies has expanded considerably 
over the last two decades and has demonstrated the capacity to be 
a key employer of  youth, especially young women. This makes it an 
important case to study how the realities of  private enterprise shape 
youth employment in Ghana.
2 Methods and data sources
Data were drawn from previous research under the Land and 
Agriculture Commercialisation in Africa (LACA) Ghana Country 
Project, which was conducted between 2013 and 2015. This project 
examined different agricultural commercialisation models and their 
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implications for employment, labour, land, and gender relations (see 
Torvikey, Yaro and Teye 2016). During the period, company officials 
and workers were interviewed. Other primary data included statistics 
on employment trends in the company. To bring the research up to 
date and address additional questions, an in-depth interview was 
conducted in July 2018 with a Blue Skies official, to understand recent 
developments in the company’s operations and their implications for 
employment in the company. Secondary data sources included statistics 
on the performance of  various sectors of  the economy obtained from 
the Ghana Statistical Service and a review of  national policy and 
programme documents on agriculture investments, exports, and trade 
regimes in the country.
The structure of  the article is as follows: Section 3 provides a conceptual 
perspective on labour casualisation and Section 4 gives a brief  
description of  Blue Skies, including the historical and macroeconomic 
context of  its growth. This material is then reviewed briefly in Section 5 
to draw out insights relating to the private sector’s role in job creation, 
and the role of  government policy frameworks that enabled the company 
to launch and grow. This is followed by a discussion in Section 6 of  
specific vulnerabilities Blue Skies was exposed to and its response, 
and also an analysis of  its employment trends and patterns. Section 7 
concludes by emphasising lessons and policy insights from the case.
3 Labour casualisation and youth employment
Research on youth employment and unemployment has focused on 
the inability of  youth to find work; limited attention has been paid 
to underemployment (Ayele, Khan and Sumberg 2017), including 
a variety of  casual, outsourced, contract, temporary, and seasonal 
work. Generally, this type of  work is known as nonstandard work, 
in contrast to standard work, which connotes full-time employment 
(ILO 2015). This article focuses particularly on an increasing trend 
towards temporary, casual, and contract work, in order to explore the 
link between job casualisation in the private sector and the prospects for 
youth employment in Ghana.
The trend towards casual and non-permanent employment in the 
private formal sector has been mapped since the late 1970s in developed 
countries such as the USA, when it was yet to be a feature in many 
developing countries. In African countries, precarious employment has 
largely been associated with the informal sector (see Gukurume, this 
IDS Bulletin). In Ghana, the concern about the incidence of  nonstandard 
work has rightly focused on the informal sectors of  the economy. Hart’s 
(1973) seminal work, which examined the relationship between the 
formal and informal sectors in Ghana, is a watershed in the discussion 
of  the features of  different types of  work in the country. Hart (ibid.) 
highlighted the prevalence of  informal work by formal wageworkers, 
which helped them to cope with the low wages paid in the formal sector. 
Yeboah (2017) also explored the expansion of  nonstandard work in the 
informal sector, emphasising the precarity of  migrant youths’ working 
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conditions in urban Ghana. Tsikata (2011) has explained how specific 
sectors of  the informal economy, characterised by nonstandard work 
patterns, are being institutionalised by recruitment agencies.
Theron (2010) has two kinds of  informality in relation to employment. 
‘Informality from below’ is associated with self-employment in the 
informal sector. ‘Informality from above’ refers to the involvement of  
labour contractors in the recruitment and management of  labour for 
and on behalf  of  the formal private sector. In the latter form, while 
the worker provides labour for the principal, such workers do not 
become employees of  the principal. Precarious employment conditions 
are becoming more evident in the formal private sector, where work 
contracts are increasingly being casualised (Aye 2017). This strategy is 
an alternative to the use of  a standard permanent contract to recruit 
youths (Anyidoho and Adomako Ampofo 2015). This trend has been 
observed in the formal private sectors of  developing countries where 
there are weak labour laws. For example, Houeland (2015) has found 
that casualisation of  labour is an increasing trend in Nigeria’s oil 
industry. This has contributed to grievances against private sector 
employers within the industry, often leading to protests and the 
increasing involvement of  labour unions in politics, as they seek to 
improve job security for employees (Lawrence 2018). In this article, 
I argue that informalisation from above is a strategy, adopted by 
companies within the private sector, to cope with economic uncertainty 
and fluctuations in the business cycle.
In Ghana, the trend towards nonstandard work has been traced back to 
the labour layoffs that began in the 1980s on the back of  the SAPs. The 
trend has also been driven by an oversupply of  labour and low rates 
of  growth in the private sector (Fox, Senbet and Simbanegavi 2016). 
Casualisation of  working conditions has become common for both 
skilled and unskilled youth labour. Businesses use casualisation to avoid 
the stringent labour laws that protect permanent employees, which 
helps them to reduce production costs and cope with a challenging 
business environment. This has consequences for youth employees 
in terms of  job insecurity and underemployment, contributing to the 
overall youth unemployment challenge in Ghana.
Casualisation has been observed as a persistent problem in export 
processing zones (EPZs), where governments create special 
regulatory frameworks to stimulate the establishment and growth of  
export-oriented businesses. Obeng, Wrigley-Asante and Teye (2015) 
in a study of  EPZs in Ghana found that while many jobs are created 
in the zones, jobs are also lost at the same rate. Labour casualisation 
as well as contract working are becoming normal in several sectors 
of  the Ghanaian economy, such as the financial, mining, and 
telecommunications sectors (Boampong 2005). This article focuses 
on a firm in the agro-based sector, which is a particularly important 
employer of  youths.
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4 The Blue Skies company
Blue Skies Holdings Ltd was established in 1998 by Anthony Pile, 
a British businessman, and Dei Tumi, a Ghanaian entrepreneur. 
The company was created to process fruits for export. It was one of  
the first private sector enterprises to establish a factory in an EPZ 
in Doboro, near Nsawam in Ghana’s Eastern Region. This was a 
remarkable venture at a time when other companies were exporting 
only unprocessed raw fruits. Blue Skies represented a daring attempt to 
upgrade the performance of  a Ghanaian raw materials producer and 
participate in value addition. Participation in higher links of  the value 
chain of  basic commodities is recognised to have a positive impact on 
employment generation for developing countries (Bammann 2007).
Today, Blue Skies accounts for over 90 per cent of  cut fresh fruit exports 
from Ghana (Gatune et al. 2013). The company supplies freshly-cut fruit 
products to major European retailers such as Spar, Marks and Spencer, 
Carrefour, Ocado, Waitrose, Co-op Food, Sainsbury’s, Asda, and 
Monoprix in destinations in the UK, Switzerland, Sweden, France, Italy, 
and The Netherlands, among others.
The successful establishment and growth of  Blue Skies was enabled 
and facilitated by a number of  policy and regulatory measures. In 
1975, the Lomé Convention granted special concessions allowing 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) producers to export some 
products, including agricultural products, into European Economic 
Community (EEC) markets, at a zero rate of  import duty (Koning 
1995; Laaksonen, Mäki-Fränti and Virolainen 2007). During the 1980s, 
export diversification was identified as a solution to reduce Ghana’s 
exposure to price fluctuations of  commodities such as cocoa, and the 
horticultural sector was a beneficiary of  the new thinking, among 
other sectors (Agyei-Sasu et al. 2013). In 1995, Ghana’s Free Zone Act 
(Act 504) (GoG 1995) established a number of  EPZs across the country, 
which were designed to attract investors to the export processing and 
manufacturing sectors through the provision of  specialised incentives 
such as a ten-year tax exemption, and other concessions, such as the 
freedom to repatriate profits. The entrepreneurs behind Blue Skies were 
direct beneficiaries of  this new dispensation, and the company was 
established just three years after the Act was passed. Between 2004 and 
2010, at least seven donor-sponsored programmes invested a total of  
US$1 billion to boost horticulture production, marketing, and export in 
the country (Jaeger 2011).
The Blue Skies company location, close to the Doboro-Nsawam 
enclave, is also significant for the success of  the new venture. The area 
had become an important pineapple-producing hub after a state-owned 
company (SOC), Nsawam Cannery Ltd, was established there in 1965. 
Nsawam Cannery Ltd was privatised in 1995 as part of  a liberalisation 
policy, and the newly privatised company did not survive long; however, 
the local area continued its active production of  pineapples for the 
local market.
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5 Growth, competition, and crisis in the 2000s
Traditionally, Smooth Cayenne and Sugarloaf  were the major 
pineapple varieties grown in Ghana up to the early 2000s. Smooth 
Cayenne is an export variety that was popular with consumers in 
Europe. Blue Skies exported the Smooth Cayenne variety to Europe 
principally in fresh-cut pieces, which were the company’s most 
important export product. In 1996, the Del Monte Company introduced 
the MD2 or Super Sweet pineapple variety, also known as Del Monte 
Gold, which was designed explicitly to break into the European market. 
MD2 was immediately popular with consumers and processors, with a 
‘uniform bright gold colour, sweeter taste, four times vitamin C content, 
lower fibre, lower acidity, thinner skin, smaller fruits at an average of  
1.5kg each, and longer shelf  life’ (bin Thalip, Tong and Ng 2015: 2). 
While the quality of  MD2 was considered comparable to Smooth 
Cayenne, its extended shelf  life and suitability for sea transport made it 
possible for efficient, industrialised pineapple growers in Costa Rica to 
rapidly seize a significant share of  the European market (Whitfield 2017; 
bin Thalip et al. 2015; Danielou and Ravry 2005).
The effect on Ghanaian pineapple producers and exporters was 
dramatic. Between 1994 and 2004, Ghana’s pineapple exports to the 
European Union (EU) recorded a cumulative growth of  172 per cent, 
reaching an annual volume of  71,000 metric tonnes (MT). Just four 
years later, in 2008, Ghanaian pineapple exports had plummeted to 
35,000MT per annum. Blue Skies was significantly affected. Many of  
the smallholder farmers who were the company’s suppliers were pushed 
out of  business and their lands were acquired by companies engaged 
in large-scale production and export. Since the switch from Smooth 
Cayenne to MD2 involved a capital investment, only resource-endowed 
farmers and pineapple-exporting companies that ran their own farms 
were equipped to adopt the new variety (Achaw 2010; Mensah 2014; 
Whitfield 2017). However, the decline in pineapple production after 
the mid-2000s coincided with an increase in consumer demand for 
mangoes in the EU, especially in the UK and France (CBI 2009; 
Araújo, and Garcia 2012). Blue Skies seized the opportunity to shift 
the bulk of  its production from pineapple to mango. Once again, the 
company’s location in the Eastern Region placed it close to the most 
important mango production hub in Ghana, in the Yilo Krobo District, 
where projects implemented by the Adventist Development and Relief  
Agency (ADRA) and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) had supported farmers to produce mangoes for 
export and the domestic market (Yidu and Dzorgbo 2016).
Having successfully navigated the competitive threat posed by MD2, 
after 12 years of  fluctuating growth, in 2010 Blue Skies experienced a 
series of  shocks that tested its resilience and its capacity for sustained 
growth and employment creation. First, agricultural problems appeared 
in key supply areas. Papaya production in the country was hit by an 
outbreak of  papaya mosaic disease. Meanwhile, mango production 
failed in Senegal, which is one of  the West African regional sources 
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of  the crop when Ghana’s production is off-season. Second, British 
Airways workers went on a three-day strike in May 2010 which affected 
the daily air-freight of  products. The most devastating problem 
occurred when an Icelandic volcano erupted, creating a huge ash 
cloud that disrupted all flights to and from Europe between 15 April 
and 21 April, with severe consequences for exports of  perishable 
goods. Oxford Economics (2010) estimated the loss to countries such 
as Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia as US$65 million in perishable goods 
export revenue. Blue Skies were reported to have lost £100,000 per day 
during the crisis, amounting to an estimated total cost to the company 
of  around £3 million. While the company made profits before tax of  
Ghc 2.37 million in 2008 and Ghc 3.36 million in 2009, in 2010 the 
company incurred a loss of  Ghc 712,431 (see Blue Skies 2011). At the 
height of  the crisis, Blue Skies shut down its processing unit, and 1,500 
of  its workers were temporarily laid off (New Agriculturalist 2010).
6 Coping in times of crisis: the road to labour casualisation in the 
Blue Skies company
Blue Skies started with good prospects for growth and job creation, 
including employment opportunities for youth. The workforce rose from 
35 in 1998 to about 4,000 in June 2018.3 Almost 70 per cent of  the 
firm’s employees work in its production unit, which is the nerve centre 
of  the company.4 Sixty per cent of  Blue Skies workers are women; the 
company’s workforce also has a very youthful structure, with 65 per cent 
of  employees falling within the 18–29 age category and 20 per cent in 
the 30–49 age group, while those above 50 years of  age account for 
15 per cent.5 The company has built an extensive supply chain with 
150 smallholder farmers, from whom it obtains the bulk of  its fruits for 
processing. The inclusion of  smallholder farmers in the supply chain 
also has an impact on youth employment in farming communities 
(Torvikey et al. 2016).
Initially, the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Conventions6 
on workers’ rights governed employment regulations in the Free Zones. 
The conventions called on ratifying member states to ensure job security 
for workers (Demaret 2013). Consequently, companies such as Blue 
Skies signed permanent or fixed contracts with most of  its employees. 
Table 1 Blue Skies personnel statistics for Week 24 (2007–13)
Employment 
type
Production year
2007 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2011 % 2012 % 2013 %
Permanent 600 35 678 34 767 52 701 43 472 28 433 25 420 23
Contract 441 26 1,099 55 22 2 26 2 48 3 76 5 86 5
Casual 678 39 209 11 675 46 887 55 1,145 69 1,193 70 1,313 72
Total 1,719  100 1,986  100 1,464  100 1,614  100 1,665  100 1,702  100 1,819 100
Source Author’s calculations based on personnel data from Blue Skies.
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However, the past decade has seen a decisive shift in the composition 
of  the company’s workforce, which is now predominantly casualised 
(Table 1). Casual employees are hired on short-term contracts of  five 
months while contract workers on the other hand are employed on 
similar pay and conditions as permanent workers, but may be laid off 
when the company needs to cut production. Permanent workers have 
greater job security.
The number of  people employed by Blue Skies fluctuates routinely 
during the year. This is due to fluctuations in the volume of  processing 
and packaging to be done. The company’s production schedule is 
governed by the seasonality of  fruit production in source regions and 
consumption patterns in Europe; for example, mango and pineapple 
production peaks from April to September, while the peak summer 
period for sales in Europe starts in June. Consequently, the workforce 
statistics are usually presented weekly rather than monthly or annually. 
Week 24, in mid-June, is usually the peak period for the company’s 
processing plants, therefore Table 1 presents the one-week snapshot for 
that week in each year from 2007 to 2013.7 The statistics show that the 
number and proportion of  contract workers and permanent employees 
in the workforce has declined substantially, especially in the period 
since 2009.
The trend towards casualisation can be explained with reference to 
policies on economic development and labour laws. Firstly, casualisation 
coincided with the expiration of  the company’s ten-year tax holiday 
allowed under the Free Zone Act. Currently, upon expiration of  the tax 
concession, Free Zone companies pay 25 per cent and 15 per cent on 
incomes earned from foreign and domestic sales respectively (PwC 2017). 
This change in fiscal status reduced the company’s profit margins.
Casualisation was one strategy that the company adopted to cope 
with tighter operating conditions. Part 74(1) of  the Labour Act 2003 
(Act 651) (GoG 2003) stipulates that temporary (contract) workers must 
be made permanent once they have worked for the same employer 
continuously for six months. Part 73(1) of  the same piece of  legislation 
states that ‘an employer may hire a worker on terms that suit the 
operations of  the enterprise’ (GoG 2003: 27). Casual contracts of  
no more than six months’ duration could be synchronised with the 
seasonality of  production, so that workers could be hired to work during 
the annual peak of  production and laid off at the end of  the season. 
This group of  seasonal workers is likely to include many of  the youth 
who constitute the majority of  the Blue Skies workforce.
According to company representatives, the transition to more casual 
terms of  employment was also driven by concerns about worker 
agitation and court action against the company. Over time, the 
company had experienced a gradual change in the educational 
background of  its workers. Youths with university degrees began to 
seek and gain employment with Blue Skies. At the same time, trade 
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unions acted upon the enactment of  the Labour Act 2003 by educating 
workers about their employment rights. Educated youths in the Blue 
Skies workforce began to agitate for permanent employment status. 
To forestall potential court action, the company management decided 
to prioritise casual working arrangements that would suit the seasonal 
nature of  its operations.8
The decline in Ghanaian pineapple production also affected the year-
round availability of  fruits for local processing. A company official 
explained,
We now import MD2 pineapple from Costa Rica into the UK to be processed 
there, since we do not have enough in Ghana. Currently, 60 per cent of  our MD2 
is processed in the UK and the rest in Ghana.9
At the same time, the company had to commit resources to start its own 
farming operations, reversing its previous business plan of  sourcing fruits 
from smallholder farmers. As a result, Blue Skies operates 1,800 acres of  
pineapple production and 100 acres of  mango farms, in various regions. 
Youths are employed on these farms, but only as casual wage labourers.
The Blue Skies case demonstrates two dimensions that affect youth 
employment and casualisation. On the one hand, the fact that 
the company continues to operate, and to employ 4,000 people, 
including a majority of  female youths, suggests a story of  success in 
entrepreneurship, technological upgrading, export market development, 
and job creation. On the other hand, the casualisation trend, in 
response to various structural stresses and shocks, has allowed the 
company to achieve the flexibility it believes it needs to hire and fire 
workers in response to fluctuations in its business cycle. For the many 
workers employed by the company, including many youths, this means 
less job security.
7 Conclusions and policy insights
Employment casualisation is an aspect of  the youth employment 
challenge that is not well handled in policy frameworks and programme 
documents. Demand- and supply-side challenges, such as skills 
mismatches and low rates of  absorption by firms of  unemployed people, 
dominate debates on the youth employment challenge in Ghana and 
across sub-Saharan Africa. The policy prescription is often simplified 
into a call for more jobs for the teeming youth population. Policymakers’ 
focus on unemployment conceals the pervasive problem of  job 
casualisation, which is gradually taking root in the formal private sector.
Blue Skies emerged and sustained itself  by exploiting specific policy 
provisions and opportunities. However, the trend towards casualisation 
ten years after the company’s establishment exposes gaps in policies that 
are intended to create decent and secure jobs. Employment regulations 
that were designed to protect employees from exploitation also created 
an incentive for firms such as Blue Skies to avoid awarding permanent 
or regular contracts to many of  its employees. Blue Skies and other 
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private sector businesses have adopted this strategy to cope with 
internal and external shocks and stresses, and even to manage normal 
fluctuations in their business cycles. This has resulted in the burden of  
flexible employment being transferred onto workers, including large 
numbers of  youth. This problem may also occur in countries where no 
strict laws limit casualisation of  employment.
My analysis of  employment casualisation within Blue Skies has a 
number of  implications for policymakers and other stakeholders. 
Firstly, the Government of  Ghana should consider the creation of  
incentives that would reward companies for employing a proportion 
(such as 50 per cent) of  their workers at all levels, including youths and 
women, on permanent contracts. Secondly, the government should 
support horticultural production in the country, in order to ensure that 
companies like Blue Skies can continue production and processing, 
which would lead to sustained employment for youths. Thirdly, 
vulnerability to shocks in key export markets could be reduced if  
export-oriented businesses expand into regional and larger Africa-wide 
markets. The African Union’s Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) 
and Action Plan on Boosting Intra-African Trade (BIAT) provide 
opportunities for Ghanaian producers and exporters to increase 
horticultural production and diversify their export markets, with the 
potential to create sustainable jobs for youth along the value chain.
Notes
* This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was produced in partnership with 
Mastercard Foundation.
1 Institute of  Statistical, Social and Economic Research, University of  
Ghana.
2 Age-based definitions of  youth, such as the ones used by the United 
Nations Department of  Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) 
(2015) and the African Union Commission (AUC 2006), define youth 
as people between 15 and 35 years of  age. Contextual definitions 
recognise that youth issues transcend age, such as the one used by 
Honwana (2012) who sees youth as ‘people-in-waiting’ or transiting 
to socioeconomic independence.
3 Official communication, Blue Skies official, 16 July 2018.
4 Official communication, Blue Skies official, 5 May 2013.
5 Official communication, Blue Skies official, 16 July 2018.
6 www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-
standards/conventions-and-recommendations/lang--en/index.htm.
7 I was unable to obtain the workforce statistics for the years 1998–2006 
or 2014–18.
8 Official communication, Blue Skies official, 16 July 2018.
9 Official communication, Blue Skies official, 16 July 2018.
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Uganda’s National Youth Policy 
and Job Creation for Youth*
Rita Makumbi1
Abstract Uganda’s Youth Livelihood Programme (YLP) and the consequent 
Youth Livelihood Fund (YLF) are government programmes established 
under the National Youth Policy (NYP), designed to support young people 
to find employment by extending grants and other support to small 
groups of young entrepreneurs, to help them to start small businesses and 
thus create employment for other young jobseekers. Drawing on a study 
involving 177 rural and urban youths, this article discusses the design and 
implementation of the YLP. It argues that the NYP has fallen short in 
several respects. In addition to funding, employment generation requires 
additional support for youth in a range of areas, including awareness-raising 
about employment opportunities, enhancing vocational and entrepreneurial 
skills, and providing advice and guidance on starting up small businesses.
Keywords: youth employment, Africa, Uganda, National Youth Policy, 
value addition.
1 Introduction
Like other countries in Africa, Uganda faces the challenge of  generating 
economic growth and providing employment for youths. Youths make 
up a third of  the global population (World Bank 2015) and Africa 
and Asia share high dependency ratios of  people younger than 15 
and older than 64 (Kilimani 2017). Moreover, Africa has the world’s 
youngest population and accounts for close to half  of  the entire world’s 
unemployed youth (Atinc et al. 2005). A youth in Uganda is a person 
who is aged 18–30 years (UBOS 2017), and the Ugandan Bureau of  
Statistics (UBOS) for 2015 shows that while 74.5 per cent of  the youth 
were employed, the remaining 25.5 per cent were either unemployed 
(4.9 per cent) or inactive (20.6 per cent) (UBOS 2015). Research also 
shows that approximately 400,000 Ugandan youths enter the job 
market annually to compete for approximately 9,000 available jobs 
(Magelah and Ntambirweki-Karugonjo 2014). Urban youth are more 
likely to be unemployed than rural youth, and young women are twice 
as likely to be unemployed as young men (Ahaibwe and Mbowa 2014). 
The prevalent unemployment and underemployment could be a source 
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of  many social, economic, and fiscal problems in the future, placing a 
heavy burden on public revenues (Makumbi 2018).
The Ugandan government has adopted a number of  policies and 
initiatives that are intended to address the youth employment challenge. 
Among the most important is the National Youth Policy (NYP), 
which was adopted in 2001. The NYP has focused on agriculture 
and associated industries (Republic of  Uganda 2001), because that 
sector has been the main source of  livelihood for Ugandans. Out of  a 
national population of  approximately 41 million people, 83.2 per cent 
live in rural areas (Aghasili 2015). Uganda also has a large agricultural 
economy which contributes more than 20 per cent of  the gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth (Dalipagic and Elepu 2014). Small-scale 
agriculture is a major source of  employment (Diao 2010), and several 
analysts still agree that commercial food crops have the potential to 
generate economic opportunities (Kumar and Kalita 2017; Ranum, 
Peña-Rosas and Garcia-Casal 2014; Nabbumba and Bahiigwa 2003).
The Government of  Uganda has identified private enterprise 
development as a critical strategy for economic growth and job creation 
in the country (Vision Reporter 2018). In 1995, the government 
established the Private Sector Foundation Uganda (PSFU) to oversee the 
growth of  the private sector. The role of  PSFU involves encouraging an 
environment that allows creation of  jobs, generation of  revenue, and 
enhancement of  exports. The PSFU is continuously challenged to look 
out for new opportunities in the private sector so as to be able to match 
the dynamics in the economy (ibid.).
The Youth Livelihood Programme (YLP) and Youth Livelihood Fund 
(YLF) were created as vehicles for the promotion of  youth enterprise 
development, through the provision of  entrepreneurship training, 
information services, and microcredit facilities to the youth. Support 
for micro projects was informed by a policy consensus that funding 
for small enterprises could drive job creation and stimulate economic 
growth (Reeg 2015; Edquist 2011; Karnani 2007). However, a decade 
and a half  after the NYP was inaugurated, the youth unemployment 
and underemployment situation remains a pressing problem. 
Drawing on a study involving 177 rural and urban youths, this article 
discusses the design and implementation of  the YLP. It argues that 
the NYP has fallen short in several respects. In addition to funding, 
employment generation requires additional support for youth in a range 
of  areas, including awareness-raising about employment opportunities, 
enhancing vocational and entrepreneurial skills, and providing advice 
and guidance on starting up small businesses. To help focus the analysis, 
the article concentrates particularly on data relating to job creation 
and youth-led enterprises within the maize value chain in Uganda. 
Agricultural value chains have been identified as an important source 
of  employment for large numbers of  young people (Brooks et al. 2013). 
Analysts believe that the maize value chain could generate many jobs 
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for youths, if  they are assisted to engage in value-adding activities 
(Adesugba and Mavrotas 2016; Kluve 2016).
The rest of  the article is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the NYP 
and its core elements, the YLP and the YLF. While Section 3 outlines 
data sources, Section 4 presents the analysis and discussion of  data. 
Section 5 concludes with implications for youth employment policy.
2 Uganda’s National Youth Policy, Youth Livelihood Programme, and 
Youth Livelihood Fund
Uganda adopted the NYP in 2001, with the specific goal of  enhancing 
the economic contributions of  youth. The policy was a reaction to 
worsening youth conditions, where an increase in rural to urban youth 
migration was not accompanied by job creation. A growing number 
of  the youth were dropping out of  school, and there was a lack of  
government funding to support them. The YLP and YLF were created 
to provide funding and other support to small enterprises led by youth. 
The aim was not only to support small business development, but also 
job creation (Republic of  Uganda 2001; Makumbi 2018).
The Government of  Uganda allocated UGX 265 billion 
(US$71.42 million) to the YLP/YLF for the period 2014–18. The 
funds were assigned to support youth-led small enterprise development 
in different sectors, to include grain-milling, metal fabrication, clay 
products, carpentry, bakery, tailoring, soap-making, the manufacture of  
fuel briquettes, fishing, poultry production, arts and crafts, music and 
drama, and beauty. To apply for support from the YLP/YLF, youths 
were invited to form small groups, known as youth interest groups 
(YIGs) and to complete a project interest form (PIF) (Makumbi 2018).
In 2017, it was reported that the YLF had disbursed US$17.38 million, 
representing only 24 per cent of  the approved budget, at an average 
rate of  approximately US$620,000 every month. However, in January 
2017, the government suspended the disbursement of  YLF loans, 
because the Fund was experiencing a large shortfall in the expected 
repayments. The YLF was designed as a revolving fund, so that the 
capacity to make new loans was dependent upon the receipt of  timely 
loan repayments from existing recipients. However, repayments were 
running far behind expectations; for example, recipients in Kampala 
had paid back only US$61,641, leaving US$138,464 outstanding. In 
Mukono District, US$10,740 had been repaid, but US$56,021 was still 
outstanding (Semakula and Kashaka 2017).
Nonetheless, at the time the YLF was suspended, it was claimed that it 
had supported the creation of  114,471 jobs for youth over the preceding 
three years (Table 1). The agricultural sector had received the largest 
share of  YLF loans, amounting to US$7.41 million or 42.7 per cent. 
Thus, 43 per cent of  the reported new jobs were in the agricultural 
sector and a further 3 per cent in agro-industry. Trade and services also 
represented substantial shares of  the jobs that were said to have been 
created (30 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively).
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3 Data sources
This article draws upon data generated as part of  a doctoral study 
into youth employment and job creation in Uganda (Makumbi 2018). 
A survey was carried out with 177 respondents, 43 per cent female 
and 57 per cent male, as well as focus group discussions (FGDs) and 
interviews with key informants. The participants in the research were 
YLF funded recipients involved in youth-led micro projects at various 
stages of  the maize value chain, in both urban and rural areas (the city 
of  Kampala and Mukono District). In total, 21 individual interviews and 
seven FGDs were conducted. The survey was conducted in 2017 (ibid.).
4 Analysis and discussion of data
Some descriptive statistics about the survey respondents are presented in 
Table 2. The majority of  respondents (51 per cent) defined themselves 
as maize growers, and identified this as their major source of  livelihood 
within the maize value chain. Many of  the youths in this category were 
unaware of  other value-adding activities within the maize processing 
chain, including aspects such as livestock feed production. Twenty-one 
per cent of  the respondents identified themselves as transporters, who 
conveyed maize grain from the production villages to central storage 
places or from villages to bigger towns and the city of  Kampala. The 
remaining youths (about 28 per cent) were working as grain processors, 
livestock feed producers, etc. Among the survey respondents, rural 
youths were typically maize producers and were often also involved in 
non-farm livelihood activities, such as small- and medium-scale maize 
processing and livestock feed production and distribution. In Mukono 
District, 79 projects were implemented under the YLP, of  which 
more than half  (53 per cent) were in the agricultural sector, usually in 
Table 1 Jobs created under the National Youth Policy, 2014–17
Sector Number of jobs 
created 
Percentage
1 Agriculture 49,695 43
2 Trade 33,771 30
3 Services 11,979 10
4 Industry 7,028 6
5 Vocational skills 6,071 5
6 Agro-industry 3,981 3
7 Agro-forestry 1,180 1
8 Information Communication Technology 625 <1
9 Creative industry 137 <1
Total 114,467 100
Source Makumbi (2018).
IDS Bulletin Vol. 49 No. 5 November 2018 ‘Youth Employment and the Private Sector in Africa’ 45–54 | 49
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
businesses with less need for high-level skills. Urban youths were more 
likely to be involved in (local) transport, processing, and marketing 
activities. In Kampala, the agriculture-related trade sector was where 
most projects were implemented.
4.1 Problems in the YLP/YLF
A number of  key flaws have come to light, which undermined the 
effectiveness and impact of  the YLP/YLF as a programme for 
enterprise development and job creation. Major problems related to 
the insufficient quality and detail of  the business proposals submitted 
to the programme and awarded funds. For example, a majority of  the 
project proposals prepared by the YIGs, including those represented in 
all six of  the FGDs carried out for this study in Kampala and Mukono 
District, failed to take loan interest into account, as it was assumed by 
both the youths and the government that repayment of  the loan would 
be completed within one year, and would not be subject to repayment 
interest. In reality, repayments typically continued beyond the first year, 
when they would be subject to interest at 5 per cent, but most of  the 
fledgling entrepreneurs had not budgeted for the interest on their YLF 
loan. The programme finances were therefore subject to different cash 
flows than had been projected (Makumbi 2018).
Another problem related to the disbursement schedule. According to 
our interviews, many of  the YIGs expected a one-time disbursement; 
however, the disbursements were made in tranches, as a method 
of  controlling the programme. As some projects developed more 
slowly than expected, while others stalled, late claims for additional 
funding, and failures to claim previously allocated funds, disrupted the 
disbursement and repayment schedules (ibid.).
There were also problems of  external monitoring of  loan recipients’ 
performance by the YLP/YLF administration. The loan recipients were 
supposed to submit a financial and operational report, using a prepared 
format, at least annually. However, in 48 per cent of  cases, this was not 
done. The YIGs were also required to submit a justification and seek 
approval for any significant changes in their business plans. Such changes 
could be common; however, a minority (45 per cent) of  affected businesses 
Table 2 YLP beneficiary survey respondents in the maize value chain
Sector 
Youth 
participants in 
the survey
1 Maize growers 91
2 Transporters 37
3 Agro-processors, distributors, seedling sales, livestock feed, etc. 49
Total 177
Source Makumbi (2018).
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complied with this rule. The YLP/YLF was also subject to problems 
of  fraud and bad faith. Some YIG leaders disappeared with the funds, 
leaving the remainder of  the group with an uncertain future; in most 
cases, this meant that projects were not fully realised (ibid.).
The problems of  budgeting and financial management within the  
YLP/YLF stemmed from weaknesses in the design and implementation 
of  the small business projects proposed by applicants to the scheme. 
The YLP/YLF placed the responsibility on the YIGs to conceive 
and design viable business proposals, such as clear value propositions, 
goals, targets, activities, management plans, financial indicators, and 
monitoring systems. The quality and detail of  the proposals submitted 
by the YIGs were often insufficient, and the youths were inexperienced. 
Fifty-nine per cent of  the youths interviewed for this study felt that 
the guidance they had been given was inadequate to start and grow 
successful businesses (ibid.).
The budgets presented by the YIGs often neglected to take into account 
the effects of  high inflation between the time of  application and the 
time of  loan approval and the first disbursement of  funds. Groups we 
interviewed explained that they had applied for funds in 2014 but had 
not received the money until 2015, by which time the prices of  some 
key business inputs had increased significantly. In general, inflation was 
problematic for all the new businesses. Inflation in Uganda leads to high 
operating costs, reducing business savings considerably. For example, 
one participant in the Bajjo Charcoal Briquette project, which received 
support from the YLP/YLF, complained that continual price increases 
on raw materials created a disincentive to add another value-adding 
activity into their existing business model (ibid.).2
In some cases, YIGs failed to include their basic cost-of-living expenses 
in their business budgets. Since at first they had no other source of  
income other than the YLF loan, they had to live off the project funds 
during the first period of  investment, when the funds should have been 
used to invest in the new business. This was particularly problematic 
in view of  the very small micro-loans awarded in many cases. The 
distribution of  US$17.38 million to 114,471 youths represented a 
modest pay-out of  only US$152 per recipient. This raises questions 
about the YLP/YLF ambition to generate adequate incomes for the 
loan recipients themselves, and to generate additional employment 
opportunities in new business enterprises, at the same time (ibid.).
Some survey respondents and key informants evidently had not 
perceived their business enterprises as ‘projects’, as such, with defined 
goals and timescales. Instead, many participants in YIGs perceived 
their YLF loans merely as a kind of  subsidy or grant to support their 
income-generating activities in general and their cost of  living (ibid.).
As well as insufficient training and guidance in business and financial 
management, many YIGs also complained about the inadequacy of  
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the technical training that was offered by the programme. For example, 
youth leaders in Kampala indicated that their knowledge about quality 
control, storage, and processing of  maize grain was narrow. This 
shortfall in capabilities enabled predatory middlemen within the value 
chain to take advantage of  fledgling enterprises, imposing additional 
costs on their operations (ibid.).
Some informants complained about a general lack of  information and 
advice that could help raise awareness of  business opportunities, as well 
as the capability to engage with them. For example, one youth leader 
referred to the business of  making fuel briquettes from dried maize 
cobs. Briquette-making is an enterprise found in both rural and urban 
areas, with varying levels of  expertise. The youth leader told us, ‘This 
briquette business has potential to grow if  there was awareness among 
potential users who are more familiar with [conventional] charcoal.’3
According to a quantitative analysis carried out by Makumbi (2018), the 
YLP/YLF had a small but positive impact on job creation. Eighty-one 
per cent of  youths surveyed in Kampala and Mukono District agreed 
that well-supervised projects had the potential to generate jobs; however, 
the problems discussed above created obstacles to this outcome. 
Nineteen per cent were sceptical about the potential for job creation 
through small- and micro-enterprise development. Almost 13 per cent 
of  the youths interviewed reported that they were unable to compete for 
jobs due simply to an excess in the supply of  labour. This was common 
among boda (motorbike transporters), who are concentrated in urban 
areas. The FGD in the Rubaga and Kawempe divisions in Kampala 
revealed that those youth fortunate to be employed resorted to working 
late into the night. Others resigned themselves to staying idle until an 
opportunity appeared.
Despite the public investment through the YLP/YLF to support 
small enterprise development and private sector employment, some 
respondents, particularly educated youths, continued to regard the 
public sector rather than the private sector as the ideal source of  
employment, and declined to take work in the private sector. Some 
analysts, such as Holt (2012), have blamed negative attitudes among 
youth for their continued unemployment. Nonetheless, many of  the 
barriers to employment were structural, especially lack of  knowledge 
and inadequate information flows, which shaped perceptions and 
created obstacles to full participation of  youth in employment. This 
insight reflects the finding by Ukachukwu (2014), that inadequate access 
to information contributes to the persistence of  youth unemployment.
5 Conclusion and recommendations
The NYP endeavours to provide strategies for youth employment in the 
private sector. However, the reported study (Makumbi 2018) found that 
the majority of  the youth were involved in relatively low-skilled labour 
activities, such as maize production and transportation. The study also 
identified a number of  problems in the design and implementation of  
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the YLP/YLF programme, thus hindering the successful launch and 
expansion of  viable small- and micro-enterprises that could generate 
employment for rural and urban youth. Launching a successful business 
involves sophisticated skills of  project planning and financial management, 
which are areas where youths may need support. This support would be 
additional to the technical advice and guidance needed to help youths 
engage in specific business sectors, such as the maize value chain.
The majority of  youth-led enterprises supported by the YLP/
YLF remain engaged only at the lowest levels of  the maize value 
chain, where the potential for value addition, and therefore viable 
income generation and job creation, is minimal. Going forward, the 
NYP should be more proactive in identifying potential employment 
opportunities for higher skilled workers within the maize value chain, 
and provide resources that would enable participation therein. In 
addition to funding, the NYP should support youth by raising awareness 
levels about employment opportunities, enhancing vocational and 
entrepreneurial skills, and providing advice and guidance on business 
opportunities and market linkages. The maize value chain as a whole 
also remains undeveloped, comprising only a limited part of  the 
value-adding agribusiness industry in Uganda. Supportive government 
policies should help to develop the maize value chain in the country.
Notes
* This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was produced in partnership with 
Mastercard Foundation.
1 Ndejje University, Kampala, Uganda.
2 Personal interview with YLP fund recipient, December 2016.
3 Personal interview, November 2016.
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Skills Gaps and Mismatches: 
Private Sector Expectations of 
Engineering Graduates in Ethiopia*
Jerusalem Yibeltal Yizengaw1
Abstract This article investigates skills gaps and mismatches of engineering 
graduates. Sustained growth of the Ethiopian economy has created demand 
for construction work, yet despite the labour demand and engineering 
graduates seeking employment, employers identify skills gaps hindering 
their ability to employ them. The study uses key informant interviews 
with engineering graduates, lecturers, and private sector employers, and 
document analysis to collect data on the skills gaps and mismatches. The 
article argues that, while skills gaps are largely caused by poor design of 
the higher education curriculum and corrupted recruitment practices, the 
precarious nature of the construction sector and macroeconomic instability 
limit graduate employment even further. It suggests that education providers 
work collaboratively with employers to make the curriculum fit for purpose, 
and that government both makes more realistic and long-term plans for the 
construction sector, and increases university funding, with an emphasis on 
quality and practice-focused graduate teaching and learning experiences.
Keywords: private sector, construction, youth, graduates, engineering, 
skills gap, higher education curriculum, (un)employment.
1 Introduction
In recent years, Ethiopia has registered a remarkable economic 
performance, with annual growth of  gross domestic product (GDP) 
averaging 10.3 per cent per year from 2005 to 2015. Ethiopia aspires to 
become a middle-income country by 2025 (FDRE 2016) and also aims 
to sustain its current economic growth through its second Growth and 
Transformation Plan (GTP II) (ibid.). A key component of  the GTP II 
is the construction sector, which is at the heart of  enhancing national 
competitiveness and creating employment opportunities. During the 
GTP I period (2010/11–2014/15), the construction industry grew at an 
average of  28.7 per cent per annum, increasing its share of  GDP from 
4 per cent in 2009/10 to 8.5 per cent by 2014/15 (ibid.). The sector also 
employs 11 per cent of  the total formal sector employment (CSA 2014). 
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Given its labour-intensive nature, employment in the construction sector 
is expected to grow. This is reflected in the ambitious GTP II targets 
for the sector; for example, total road length is planned to increase 
from 110,414km in 2014/15 to 220,000km by 2019/20, and a total of  
2,741km of  national railway network is expected to be constructed by 
2019/20 (FDRE 2016). Although most of  the GTP plan is state-led and 
state-financed, a significant portion of  this work is expected to be delivered 
by the private construction sector through contracts (ibid.). The sector, 
however, suffers from a low level of  capacity and skills, weak performance 
of  contractors and consultants, high costs of  construction materials, and 
the prevalence of  rent-seeking behaviours (FDRE 2016; EEA 2008).
This article focuses on skills gaps and mismatches. This is an area 
that the Government of  Ethiopia has also been focusing on through 
expanding higher education which emphasises science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) against the broader areas of  
social sciences (a 70:30 split in favour of  STEM). The number of  
universities in Ethiopia increased rapidly from two in the 1990s to 44 in 
2016, and total enrolment on undergraduate degree programmes grew 
from 420,387 in 2009 to 778,766 in 2016 (FDRE/Ministry of  Education 
2017). However, the quality of  higher education in creating competitive 
graduates has been highlighted as a major problem (Salmi, Sursock 
and Olefir 2017); and the general root of  the problem stems from the 
expansion and dynamism of  the Ethiopian higher education system.
While the number of  graduates has been growing, evidence from a 2013 
survey showed that the unemployed working-age population in Ethiopia 
was 1,981,165, with an unemployment rate of  4.5 per cent (CSA 2014). 
The differentials of  unemployment by gender showed that the female 
unemployment rate (6.5 per cent) was more than double as compared 
to their male counterparts (2.7 per cent) (ibid.).Youth unemployment 
is as high as 20 per cent (Wossen and Ayele, this IDS Bulletin), with 
unemployment particularly concentrated among the 15–29 years age 
group. This is the age range which the Ethiopian youth policy regards 
as ‘youth’ (FDRE 2004), even though non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and civic associations in Ethiopia and other countries use 
various ranges for the concept of  ‘youth’ from the standpoint of  the 
purpose which they represent and activities they undertake. For example, 
the United Nations (UN) defines youth as persons between 15 and 24 
years and the World Health Organization (WHO) defines it as 10–24 
(FDRE 2004). Again, experiences of  other countries indicate different 
age ranges to define youth (see e.g. Ayele, Khan and Sumberg 2017).
Ethiopia has one of  the highest rates of  graduate youth unemployment 
in East Africa (Addis Standard 2017). For example, a 2015 tracer study 
of  Bahir Dar University (BDU) shows that out of  the 1,301 young 
engineers included in the study, 35.4 per cent were unemployed (BDU 
forthcoming, 2018). While data on graduate (un)employment are 
anecdotal, some studies (e.g. Mncayi 2016 and Salmi et al. 2017) suggest 
that graduate engineers are among the growing number of  unemployed 
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youth. The adverse consequences of  youth unemployment on families 
and society at large is evident; for example, partly triggered by the youth 
unemployment crisis, Ethiopia has recently experienced major political 
unrest, which led the government to impose two states of  emergencies 
(Addis Standard 2017; BBC 2018). Though the initial spark for these 
unrests was potential land-grabbing, one of  the causes admitted by the 
government was youth unemployment (Africa Renewal 2017). Besides, 
regional inequalities in infrastructure provision, poor performance of  
flagship projects (such as hospitals), unlawful displacement of  farmers, 
lack of  rule of  law, absence of  civil society fora, and lack of  vibrant 
media have all contributed to the flaring up of  public disappointment 
and hence the unrest (Addis Standard 2017). The government also took 
what appears to be a knee-jerk solution to curb the unrest and allocated 
10 billion birr (around US$400 million) to create job opportunities, 
particularly for young people (ibid.).
Researchers such as Gebremariam (2017) and Gebru (2017) call for 
overhauling the economy and creating better employment opportunities 
for unemployed youths and graduates in the country. Otherwise, if  the 
problem is left to chance, a mismatch between education and employer 
expectations in Ethiopia could have serious long-term repercussions 
– particularly because Ethiopia is the second most populous African 
nation, with over 70 per cent of  its population under the age of  30, and 
with over 150,000 graduates each year (Africa Renewal 2013; Korpela 
2017). In light of  the key role youth are expected to play in the sustained 
political and economic stability of  the country, and the importance of  
taking a closer look at the plight of  the youth and possible solutions to the 
chronic problem of  youth unemployment, there are complaints heard 
from employers in Ethiopia that their expectations are not met in finding 
proper graduates of  tertiary-level education who are both competent in 
theoretical knowledge and also able to practise it efficiently (Salmi et al. 
2017). Under these circumstances, it is therefore imperative to explore 
the causes of  skills gaps and mismatches among graduate engineers and 
identify possible solutions with a view to enhancing employment in the 
sector as well as economic development of  the country.
The remainder of  the article is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews 
the literature on the status of  youth (un)employment and the private 
construction sector. Section 3 outlines the methods used in the study, 
while Section 4 presents and discusses the findings. Section 5 concludes 
and provides policy recommendations.
2 The status of youth (un)employment and the private construction 
sector in Ethiopia
Research shows that Africa’s youth population is rapidly growing 
and is projected to double to over 830 million by 2050 (AfDB 2016). 
Demographic projections also show that 1 billion more young people 
will enter the job market over the next decade (Kilimani 2017). This 
demands for state and non-state actors to expand the social and 
economic sectors and provide employment opportunities progressively 
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for youth (Gebremariam 2017). In developed countries such as the 
USA and Japan, private firms invest more proportionally and are 
more responsive to change in investment opportunities than are public 
firms (UNCTAD 2017). But in developing countries like Ethiopia, 
public sector investment is dominant while the relative role of  private 
investment in economic growth is in its infancy (Melese 2012). Yet the 
Ethiopian construction industry has contributed much to reducing 
poverty (FDRE 2016), for instance through increasing employment 
expansion through small- and medium-enterprise development and 
job creation through the construction of  low-cost houses (Tefera 2013). 
Despite the key roles that the private sector can play to drive economic 
growth and thus eradicate poverty (World Bank 2018), the degree of  
youth absorption in Ethiopia through employment is found to be low 
(Yizengaw 2016).
The notions of  ‘youth bulge’ and ‘demographic dividend’ have also 
become key aspects of  the narrative around youth and employment 
policy (Ayele et al. 2017). While ‘youth bulge’ refers to the situation 
where a large share of  the population comprises children and young 
adults, the notion of  ‘demographic dividend’ is built around the 
potential that the youth can generate social and economic growth (ibid.). 
Alongside these narratives are also concerns about the ‘risky behaviours’ 
among unemployed and underemployed youth who are often exposed 
to unprotected sex, abuse of  alcohol and drugs (ibid.), and political and 
social instability (Gebremariam 2017).
Ethiopia prides itself  on achieving double-digit economic growth over 
the past decade (FDRE 2016). However, this growth has not sufficiently 
addressed the unemployment challenge. While unemployment dropped 
from 20.4 per cent in 2010 to 16.8 per cent in 2016, it still remains 
significant and youth unemployment is even more pronounced (Wossen 
and Ayele, this IDS Bulletin; World Bank 2018).The construction industry 
is labour-intensive and has grown over 20 per cent in the past decade, 
even faster than the overall growth of  the economy (FDRE 2016). Due 
to the fact that it provides jobs, especially for less-skilled labourers, the 
sector’s contribution to poverty reduction has been noted (Tefera 2013). 
What is more, given the booming construction works across the country, 
the sector also visibly provides employment opportunities for engineering 
graduates (CSA 2013). However, as noted above, studies show that over 
35 per cent of  the 2015 engineering graduates were unemployed (BDU 
forthcoming, 2018).
The broader literature suggests that volatile economic growth 
accompanied by a poorly educated workforce and skills shortages 
risks the employability of  graduates (World Economic Forum 2014). 
Further, Aring (2012: 5) underlined that skills gaps are caused by two 
major factors: (1) a qualitative skills mismatch where employers do 
not find graduates with employable skills even when they have the 
right qualifications on paper, and (2) a quantitative mismatch where 
not enough graduates are educated and trained at the required levels, 
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or they out-migrate to countries where they can earn higher wages. 
According to McGuinness, Pouliakas and Redmond (2017), skills 
mismatches are caused by three factors:
1 Macroeconomic skills mismatch: differences between the jobs on offer 
and the broad qualification levels of  the pool of  unemployed people;
2 Specific skills shortages: employers’ inability to find workers with a 
specific skill or occupation; and
3 On-the-job skills mismatch: differences between employed 
individuals’ skills and the skills needed to perform their job.
McGuinness et al. (2017) further refer to ‘vertical mismatch’ – measured 
in terms of  over-education, under-education, or over-skilling and 
under-skilling – and skills gaps – measured in terms of  unfilled and 
hard-to-fill vacancies. Based on the above theoretical background, this 
article thus discusses the causes of  skills gaps and mismatches.
3 Research methodology
This study employed a qualitative research approach. It used document 
analysis and in-depth interviews to generate data on the presence of  
skills gaps and mismatches and the reasons thereof. In total, the study 
draws on 38 interviews conducted over May–June 2018 with:
 l Sixteen university lecturers working at Addis Ababa and Bahir Dar 
universities, both of  which are pioneers of  producing engineering 
graduates in Ethiopia. Based on UNESCO’s (2012) rating scale, 
lecturers’ assessments of  graduate employability were rated as high 
= 3, medium = 2, and low = 1. The lecturers were quizzed on the 
presence of  employable skills among engineering graduates.
 l Twelve owners and/or managers of  eight small to large enterprises 
in the construction sector (drawn from Addis Ababa and Bahir 
Dar). They responded to questions concerning the private sector 
expectations of  engineering graduates alongside the presence of  skills 
gaps and mismatches.
 l Ten engineering graduates who were employed in paving roads and 
streets and undertaking major construction work such as upgrading 
inner roads, roadsides, and walkways. They were asked questions 
regarding the causes of  skills gaps and mismatches.
Finally, the author’s doctoral study (Yizengaw 2016) was also used as a 
secondary source of  data.
4 Data analysis and findings
4.1 Skills gaps and mismatches among engineering graduates
Sixteen lecturers from Addis Ababa and Bahir Dar universities were 
asked to rate the presence of  employable skills among their engineering 
students, ranked from high to low (see Table 1).
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Table 1 clearly shows that except for one highly rated skills area (the 
ability to use new information), the graduates’ skills were rated as 
medium or low, with subject-specific technical skills particularly rated as 
either low (63 per cent) or medium (37 per cent). Graduates were poorly 
rated in terms of  their abilities to apply knowledge to new situations, 
having prior exposure to engineering work, and understanding business 
realities. Graduates’ abilities to execute tasks independently and their 
problem-solving skills were also rated as low. It is also important to 
note that, although the technical demands of  a graduate may vary, an 
engineer, irrespective of  their specialisation, must be equipped with 
soft engineering skills such as negotiation in order to cope with new 
challenges in the changing engineering field. However, the graduates 
were rated poorly even in these soft skill areas.
Moreover, interviews with the lecturers clearly revealed that their 
students had much better theoretical than practical knowledge, which 
meant that students were barely equipped with practical and employable 
skills on graduation. Therefore, at least from the perspective of  university 
lecturers, the skills levels among engineering graduates at both Addis 
Ababa and Bahir Dar universities were either low or medium at best.
In-depth interviews with owners and managers of  private construction 
businesses showed that many of  the graduates who they employed (or 
came to them in search of  employment) hardly had the skills to handle 
budget preparation, contract and subcontract management, material 
requirement plans, or even warehouse management. Many also 
Table 1 Presence of employable skills among engineering graduates in Addis Ababa and Bahir Dar universities, as 
perceived by their lecturers, 2016/17 academic year
Employable skills
Frequency and percentages of responses
High Medium Low
Subject-specific technical ability 6 (37%) 10 (63%)
Ability to use new information 4 (25%) 8 (50%) 4 (25%)
Prior exposure to the work 16 (100%)
Understanding business realities 7 (43.7%) 9 (56.3%)
Ability to construct logical arguments 11 (68.7%) 5 (31.3%)
Ability to execute tasks independently 4 (25%) 12 (75%)
Problem-solving skills 6 (33.3%) 10 (66.6%)
Ability to apply knowledge to new situations 2 (12.5%) 3 (18.7%) 11 (68.7%)
Flexibility in accepting new things 7 (43.7%) 9 (56.3%)
Negotiation skills 3 (18.7%) 13 (81.2%)
Source Author’s own.
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explained that fresh graduates required job-related specific courses 
and trainings before starting work because the level of  skills gained at 
university did not meet their expectations. One of  the construction 
companies’ general managers2 noted that the graduates in question were 
of  ‘high profile on papers [sic] but not in reality’. Another reiterated 
that ‘some of  the newly recruited engineering graduates were unfit to 
perform simple engineering works that we expected graduates to do… 
we had to train them from one to six months to get them [to] make 
a good start’.3 These responses confirm the lecturers’ responses and 
indicate that higher education teaching did not respond appropriately 
to the employers’ expectations and requirements. On paper, some of  
these graduates were ‘over-qualified’ and ‘entitled’ to demand relatively 
higher wages than less-skilled labourers, but they did not do the jobs any 
better. In this regard, one of  the interviewed private company owners 
explained that ‘graduates even with grade points 3.5 and above are 
not found much better as we expected’.4 Others highlighted that such 
graduates add a cost to their businesses because they have to retrain 
them and this affects the performance of  their businesses, including 
producing sub-standard products.
I also asked engineering graduates about their employable skill sets. 
A graduate of  BDU explained the skills mismatch he experienced 
working as a bricklayer in a small business:
Our work specification includes earth work, sub-base construction, drainage ditch 
openings, shade building, etc. What we [fellow graduates and I] studied and 
what we are doing are different. There are also others [engineering graduates] 
who perform totally different jobs than they were trained in, like salesmen and 
saleswomen, hotel receptionists, [and] stores-keepers. Some others are inactive.5
Those engineers who were bricklayers (working on cobblestone 
projects)6 in and around Bahir Dar claimed that they possess ‘more and 
completely different skills than their current job requires’, and that the 
deployment of  engineering graduates to manual work reveals ‘a skills 
mismatch’ where an overly educated graduate does ‘basic and manual 
work’. Almost the entire engineering graduates interviewed stated that 
the jobs they were working on could easily be conducted by trainees or 
graduates of  Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET). 
This, therefore, raises the question as to why the government focuses so 
much on expanding university education that is not addressing quality, 
and I argue that the quality of  higher education has to be looked into as 
an urgent policy matter.
4.2 Causes of skills gaps and mismatches
The findings in the previous section clearly suggest some causal factors 
for skills gaps and mismatches. These include:
Limitations of  the higher education curriculum: When it comes 
to the specific engineering curriculum, its relevance to the world of  
work is of  paramount importance because, as argued by Thi Tuyet 
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Tran (2014), engineers are involved in the implementation, application, 
operation, design, development, and management of  projects and 
processes. This is despite the fact that the type of  work that engineers do 
will vary depending on the chosen field of  study such as chemical, civil, 
electrical, materials, mechanical, or industrial engineering. Regarding 
the relevance of  the curriculum, an owner of  a small firm and former 
graduate of  BDU remarked,
I looked and looked for jobs relevant to my training for years but I [was] unable 
to find it. Even to create my own, the way how I was trained is not supportive to 
think far beyond job searching in public institutions. As a last resort, I organised 
myself  with friends and started working on small-scale inner roads maintenance 
work, initially for subsistence reasons but now it is more rewarding.7
Another former graduate of  Addis Ababa University stated strongly 
how government officials insist that engineering graduates are involved 
in jobs such as cobblestone projects. This, according to the interviewee, 
‘undermines the five-year-long preparations at the university and 
wastes the knowledge and skills obtained at the university’. So far, 
the interviewee is of  the opinion that ‘the concerns of  these higher 
officials may be useful if  it urges universities to revisit their curriculum 
according to the demands of  employers’.8 As curriculum and 
pedagogics matter most of  one’s entire career, higher education needs to 
be responsive in its curriculum and methodologies with the promise of  
teachers in embedding and teaching entrepreneurship courses to their 
students. While some of  the former graduates insisted that they have the 
right skills, some of  the employers do not find them relevant and blame 
the poorly designed curriculum and a lack of  resources to prepare 
graduates for work after graduation. The perceptions held by employers 
and university lecturers and their evaluations of  the graduates’ skills 
are that these are largely based on principles and theories. This clearly 
suggests that the curriculum is poorly designed and does not address the 
expectations of  employers.
Precarious nature of  the construction sector: A large part of  
the construction industry boom in Ethiopia is due to state-led and 
state-financed construction projects such as dams, roads, and railways. 
However, the sector is vulnerable to contract delays and underfinancing, 
and even cancellations of  major projects. Under these circumstances, 
according to one of  the interviewed graduates, ‘private contractors 
struggle to hire and retain graduates’.9 As another employer noted, the 
difficulties in hiring and retaining graduates are even more ‘accentuated 
by the inability or lack of  willingness of  some graduates to take multiple 
positions (or multitasking)’.10 Yet another employer noted that, given 
‘we have to make profits and survive; we expect our staff to take two or 
more simple tasks that are in the domain of  the construction industry’.11 
The view of  the interviewee was that enterprises are able to create more 
spaces for graduates in different positions so long as the latter are willing 
to take them.
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Lack of  quality higher education: One of  the interviewed lecturers 
expressed ‘to think about quality graduates we need to have adequate 
resources in higher education institutions. In the reality, there are 
limitations in resources to increase quality in university educations 
[sic]’.12 The engineering graduates also highlighted insufficiency of  
funding while they were on campus or studying. They noted that their 
lecture theatres and workshops were poorly equipped; for example, 
insufficient tools and equipment to undertake practical learning. They 
also explained that their libraries did not hold relevant and sufficient 
books. Some even went on to say that their teaching staff were not 
properly trained. These, I argue, are plausible reasons that undermine 
quality learning at the universities.
Corrupted recruitment practices: All of  the graduate interviewees 
noted the challenges associated with securing jobs immediately after 
graduation due to lack of  opportunities in both the private and public 
sectors. They also noted that the longer they remain out of  jobs, the 
more likely they are to become deskilled which further reduces their 
chances of  being employed. While this has been a challenge, graduates 
noted what they regarded as unacceptable recruitment practices in 
both the private and public sectors, such as ‘starting to fill vacancies 
from the family circle by those private construction enterprises’13 
but not advertising openly, and procedures that are corrupt and lack 
transparency. Specifically, one of  the interviewed graduates remarked 
that ‘employers should be fair and give equal chances for all job 
applicants while recruiting alongside supporting continued growth of  
their staff by educating them and providing the necessary rewards in 
terms of  pay, benefits, and work environment’.14
Factors related to the macroeconomic condition: Employers noted 
that their business operations often experience shortages of  foreign 
exchange and raw materials, with one business owner stating that, 
‘due to foreign exchange shortages, we were not able to import key 
construction materials… and this affects our operations and the number 
of  staff we hire and retain’.15 On the other hand, one of  the interviewed 
private construction company managers explained that,
the macroeconomic environment tends to fail to use engineering graduates in 
productive sectors as immediately as possible. As a result, those minds and 
hands shaped to contribute a lot for the national and international socioeconomic 
dynamics remain to be idle for some time with the adverse effects of  expired 
knowledge and skills.16
In relation to this, another interviewed private construction business 
owner added,
the macroeconomic situation of  the country was characterised by shortage of  hard 
currencies. Consequently, the inputs for the running projects are inconsistent and 
the numbers of  construction projects appear to shrink from time to time which in 
turn affects the employment of  youth graduates.17
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To add to this reflection, the goal of  achieving full employment among 
other macroeconomic goals is an important one in many developing 
nations where unemployment and underemployment have been a major 
cause and consequence of  widespread poverty (Sodipe and Ogunrinola 
2011). Above all, this research uncovered several strategies that 
employers used to address skills gaps, including:
Outsourcing: Some employers outsourced a significant part of  their 
work, partly due to a shortage of  skilled staff. One of  the companies 
I visited, for example, subcontracted no less than 15 per cent of  its 
operations to another contractor. As it happened, the subcontractors 
were either graduates of  TVET centres or universities. Employers did 
believe that they were contributing to graduate employment generation 
directly or indirectly, through subcontracting as well as through 
involving graduates with quite a range of  activities, including building 
shades and fences, and making bricks.
Skills imports: Employers and graduates alike commented on the 
practice of  ‘skills imports’, particularly by foreign-owned companies. 
These companies bring qualified staff from abroad and hire a 
semi-skilled or unskilled domestic workforce. This was reiterated by 
one of  the general managers of  a foreign-owned company, who said 
‘our company hired engineers from abroad not from the domestic 
ones’.18 This provides a clue that there are situations where foreign 
direct investment may not contribute to the absorption of  youths who 
are graduates but yet unemployed, unless there are mechanisms to urge 
them to leave some positions for local youths. Otherwise, the probability 
of  transferring knowledge and skills of  engineers from developed or 
developing countries to the underdeveloped ones will remain a long-
term vision. This may likely be due to their having less regard for the 
available skills among graduates. I argue that this practice, particularly 
if  widespread, limits the possibilities for skills transfers as graduates do 
not work directly with expatriate staff.
Short-term training: Employers I interviewed noted that they routinely 
provide short-term training for new employees, particularly graduates. 
Often the training they offer helps graduates adjust to the working 
conditions in their respective companies, but this comes at a cost – both 
financially and also because there is no guarantee of  making the new 
recruit commit to the company.
Coaching: I have noted many instances of  skills mismatches where 
graduates are placed in positions that have nothing to do with their 
university training. I have also come across cases where senior staff 
coach new staff, particularly those deployed in areas that they were not 
trained in. Some of  the employers noted that this practice saved them 
time and resources that would have been spent on organising formal 
training for new staff.
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5 Discussion and conclusions
This study explored private construction sector employers’ expectations 
of  engineering graduates, focusing on how these expectations are not 
being met due to skills gaps and mismatches, and the reasons for this. 
I also explored the strategies companies used to bridge skills gaps.
I found that, while employers in the private (as well as public) 
construction sector expect to employ well-equipped and adaptable 
engineering graduates, universities produce graduates mainly 
equipped with theoretical knowledge but short in practical skills. Skills 
gaps manifest in technical skill areas as well as communication and 
teamwork skills, problem-solving skills, and so forth. On the other 
hand, widespread deployment of  graduates to manual works such 
as bricklaying clearly shows the presence of  skills mismatches, which 
undermines years of  university-level training. In a nutshell, expectations 
of  private construction sector employers are found to be unmet, and 
the root cause of  the problem points to weakness of  the university 
engineering curriculum which, it appears, has not been designed 
to address the needs of  employers. It should also be noted that the 
observed new ways of  working and more frequent changes in the world 
of  jobs (by necessity or opportunity) call for a broader set of  skills.
Therefore, the higher education curriculum needs to be responsive to 
the interests of  employers and take planned action to equip graduates 
with the required and up-to-date employability skills. For the most part, 
efforts for the development of  employability skills and attributes should 
be integrated within the curriculum. The fact that teaching and learning 
at the universities has been inadequately funded has also contributed 
to a low level in quality of  graduates. In response to this, emphasising 
and recognising the importance of  teaching quality, it is important 
to encourage teachers to devote time and effort in modern methods 
of  teaching (Salmi et al. 2017). In relation, the most recommendable 
approach to support and reward teaching excellence is the use of  
targeted funding; this is successfully used in a number of  developing 
and developed countries (ibid.). Moreover, private contraction work 
is dependent on government contracts and the availability of  foreign 
exchange to import contraction materials. More often, contracts to the 
private sector were either delayed or underfinanced. These, coupled 
with shortages of  foreign exchange and raw materials, have limited the 
sector’s ability to hire and retain graduates.
Moreover, recruitment practices, particularly within the private 
sector, lack transparency and equal employment opportunities. In this 
regard, it is not uncommon to see many graduates being hired through 
friends and family circles, worsening the unemployment conditions for 
many talented graduates who lack such (it has to be said, unethical) 
connections. Consequently, employers should abide by the merit-based 
code of  conduct upon recruitment of  graduates.
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The strategies employers reported to use to overcome challenges of  skills 
gaps and skills mismatches, are: outsourcing, skills imports, short-term 
training, and substituting or co-coaching. Nonetheless, the study 
highlighted the need to improve the quality of  graduate-level education 
in universities. While the expansion in higher education and in the 
engineering sector in particular is commendable, this has to be matched 
by high graduate standards. Quality has to be a number one priority, 
and students need to be taught practical and entrepreneurial courses. In 
other words, more emphasis should be placed in the higher education 
institutions to bridge skills gaps and mismatches of  the graduates and 
to produce competitive and compatible graduates who can meet private 
sector expectations.
Encouragement of  engineering graduates to seek out jobs by setting up 
their own businesses and providing the necessary support should not 
be left to chance, but is the concern of  policymakers, universities, and 
all other stakeholders. I recommend that the Ministry of  Education, 
universities and faculties, and employers (both private and public sector) 
work collaboratively to create more spaces for graduates and also serve 
society. Further, educators, political leaders, and the media have to 
devote time, resources, and attention towards private sector growth to 
enhance chances for youth employment opportunities.
Notes
* This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was produced in partnership with 
Mastercard Foundation.
1 Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia.
2 Personal interview, May 2018.
3 Personal interview, May 2018.
4 Personal interview, May 2018.
5 Personal interview, June 2018.
6 The youth often organise themselves in micro and small enterprises 
and undertake minor town and city roads, pavements, etc.
7 Personal interview, May 2018.
8 Personal interview, May 2018.
9 Personal interview, May 2018.
10 Personal interview, June 2018.
11 Personal interview, May 2018.
12 Personal interview, June 2018.
13 Personal interview, May 2018.
14 Personal interview, May 2018.
15 Personal interview, May 2018.
16 Personal interview, June 2018.
17 Personal interview, June 2018.
18 Personal interview, June 2018.
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Fostering Agribusiness 
Entrepreneurship for Kenyan  
Youth through Practice-Based 
Education*
John Muchira1
Abstract Approximately 1 million Kenyan youth enter the labour market 
each year, a number which the formal sector has been incapable of 
absorbing. As a result, youth unemployment and underemployment rates 
are high, with two-thirds of youth aged 15–24 not engaged in the labour 
force. The lack of formal wage opportunities pushes these young people 
into entrepreneurial activities; however, due to the theoretical focus 
of the current education system, many secondary school-leavers do not 
possess the practice-based skills to start their own businesses. This article 
argues for building partnerships between secondary schools, largely in 
rural areas, and agribusinesses to foster skills-building that will enable 
young people to start entrepreneurial activities in the agricultural sector. 
It draws on interviews with agribusiness owners and stakeholders in the 
education sector, and survey data from secondary school students and on 
youth employment to identify how to improve youth employability through 
business-led experiential programmes.
Keywords: agribusiness, youth, entrepreneurship, experiential learning, 
education, training, (un)employment, self-efficacy.
1 Introduction
Youth unemployment remains a global challenge, with the percentage 
of  15–24-year-olds who are not in the labour force being as high as 
70.5 per cent, 64.4 per cent, and 50.5 per cent in the Arab States, 
Southern Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa respectively, while the world 
average is 56.8 per cent (ILO 2018). Particularly in Africa, most 
countries continue to experience a ‘youth bulge’ – a situation in 
which more than 40 per cent of  the population is 15–29 years old 
(Evoh 2012; Guengant and May 2013) – and have economies whose 
structure is incapable of  benefiting from this demographic dividend. 
This demographic trend and the resultant economic challenges have 
rendered the formal sector incapable of  absorbing the growing numbers 
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of  young Africans entering the labour market (AfDB and OECD 2012); 
thus, the majority of  young people will likely remain working in the 
informal sector (Filmer and Fox 2014) or unemployed.
Similarly, both Kenya’s overall population, as well as specifically its 
youth population, have been on the rise, with the overall population 
increasing from 29.7 million to 46.6 million in the last two decades 
(GoK 2018b). Approximately 1 million Kenyan youth enter the labour 
market each year without competitive skills (ILO 2014). As a result, 
in 2018, 65 per cent of  youth aged 15–24 are not in the labour force 
(ILO 2018) as there are not enough job opportunities, and it is often 
challenging for young school-leavers to start sustainable micro and small 
enterprises, particularly due to a lack of  the requisite skills. While the 
definition of  who constitutes ‘youth’ varies within and across countries 
and development organisations (Ayele, Khan and Sumberg 2017), here 
I utilise the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census categorisation 
of  youth, which encompasses people aged 15–35 years old (GoK 2010). 
However, the article specifically focuses on those aged 15–24 years old 
because the unemployment rate is most pronounced among this group 
of  youth (ILO 2018).
Cognisant of  the country’s youth bulge and unemployment 
situation, the Kenyan government has shown interest in policy-level 
transformation of  youth empowerment. This transformation has a 
key focus on youth employability, life skills, and entrepreneurship 
development (GoK 2018c) through programmes such as Kazi kwa 
Vijana (Jobs for the Youth) and the Youth Enterprise Development 
Fund (Sikenyi 2017). While these programmes are essential strategies 
for economic development and the realisation of  Kenya’s Vision 2030,2 
they have been crippled by mismanagement and corruption (ibid.), 
and therefore have not contributed much to economic development 
or improvement of  young people’s livelihoods. A further strategy by 
the Government of  the Republic of  Kenya (GoK 2018c) is supporting 
private sector growth through various programmes coordinated by the 
departments of  Devolution, Industrialisation, Enterprise Development, 
and Public Service and Youth Affairs.
Particularly, the Department of  Public Service and Youth Affairs is keen 
to ensure stakeholder collaboration that leverages investment targeted 
at youth empowerment, as well as the integration and mainstreaming 
of  youth intervention programmes in sectoral and macro policies at 
both the county and national levels. It is expected that the private 
sector, especially those specialising in agribusiness, will benefit as the 
government is keen to create a more enabling investment environment 
for this sector (ibid.). I argue that this new government approach 
should support experiential learning – also referred to as ‘learning by 
doing’ – through medium-sized agro-processors, and where possible, 
reinforce practice-based learning among schoolgoing youth by initiating 
collaborations with family-based micro and small agribusinesses.
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Kenya’s economy has experienced continuous growth in the past two 
decades, from the low increases in gross domestic product (GDP) of  
0.6 per cent in the early 2000s to an average annual growth of  5.56 per 
cent between 2013 and 2017 (GoK 2018d). Despite this growth in GDP, 
evident growth in the private sector, and support from the government 
and international organisations, youth unemployment – conceptualised 
in this article as the situation in which an individual is not currently 
working despite his/her efforts in actively looking for a job – is growing 
(ILO 2014), and it is considered a threat to social, economic, and 
political stability.
Thus, this article aims to offer insights on issues of  business-led 
entrepreneurship development and practice-based knowledge 
among Kenyan youth, by exploring the potential of  reinforcing their 
entrepreneurial identity in the agriculture sector. By entrepreneurship, 
I mean the process of  identifying the potential opportunities for 
innovation, and starting and growing a business (Dhliwayo 2008). 
This can be done specifically through developing entrepreneurship 
education and training curricula, with the objective of  equipping 
young people with entrepreneurial skills and knowledge as to how to 
identify business opportunities within the agriculture sector. This would 
enable young people to effectively engage in productive and potentially 
economically viable agricultural activities as a means of  livelihood. 
This can also be done by reinforcing business-led collaboration among 
crucial government institutions to design effective youth experiential 
learning opportunities through apprenticeship programmes. It is also 
important to foster partnerships between secondary school systems 
and key stakeholders within the private sector in order to equip young 
people while still enrolled in secondary schools with modern agricultural 
practices, practical skills for identifying value chains in agribusiness, 
and knowledge on how to market their agricultural products. These 
approaches are conspicuously missing in policy dialogue, the current 
secondary school curriculum, and the development agenda in Kenya, 
and this article therefore seeks to fill this research gap.
The remainder of  this article is structured as follows. Section 2 
presents an overview of  business-led entrepreneurship development 
and experiential learning, and discusses how promoting agribusiness is 
likely to reduce the youth unemployment rate. Section 3 discusses the 
methodology of  the study, while the findings are discussed in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes and presents some policy recommendations.
2 Business-led entrepreneurship development through experiential 
learning
2.1 Experiential entrepreneurship education
Limited and lack of  formal wage employment opportunities push young 
people into entrepreneurship as an alternative option (Amin 2009). 
However, these young people, especially those from developing African 
economies, face a daunting task as they are not equipped with the 
requisite entrepreneurial skills and fundamental knowledge to establish 
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a venture or grow an already established business (Schoof  2006; Shittu 
2017). Thus, it is important to understand how experiential learning – 
‘the process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation 
of  experience’ (Dhliwayo 2008: 330) – enhances young people’s 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy (ESE).
The framework in Figure 1 is an illustration of  how entrepreneurship 
education, entrepreneurial mentorship, and entrepreneurship 
experience develop young people’s entrepreneurial identity, and ESE, 
and consequently trigger their entrepreneurship intentions and actual 
entrepreneurial behaviour.3
Notably, while experiential entrepreneurship learning could be 
gained by the rural youth by engaging in farm activities/agribusiness 
skills, these activities only represent a part of  what is needed because 
entrepreneurship development generally involves innovative practices 
in agribusiness, as well as exposure to other real-life practices. A formal 
education system that utilises practice-based opportunities such as 
using entrepreneurial role models in the agriculture sector or taking 
students on field trips is an equally effective channel to enhance young 
people’s entrepreneurial skills. It is also worth noting that for most of  
the schoolgoing youth who are less likely to have started their own 
businesses, their entrepreneurial experience comes from being involved 
in family business operations. This is important as previous studies show 
that a positive correlation exists between prior entrepreneurial exposure 
gained from working in family businesses and entrepreneurial outcomes 
(Athayde 2009; Carr and Sequeira 2007). It has also been demonstrated 
that intentions are immediate precursors to the creation of  start-ups/
small enterprises (Kickul et al. 2009), and therefore, identifying 
significant predictors of  young people’s ESE is a crucial step towards 
solving Kenya’s high unemployment.
Entrepreneurship 
education
Entrepreneurship 
mentorship
Entrepreneurship 
identity and ESE
Entrepreneurship 
intention
Business creation/ 
development
Prior 
entrepreneurship 
experience
Figure 1 Conceptual framework for entrepreneurship development
Note ESE – entrepreneurial self-efficacy.  
Source Author’s own.
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In addition to the role of  experiential learning in developing young 
people’s rural livelihoods through entrepreneurship capabilities in 
agribusiness (Robinson-Pant 2016), literature on entrepreneurial identity 
has been highlighted as important in agriculture entrepreneurship 
(Fitz-Koch et al. 2018). One of  the strategies that has the potential to 
develop entrepreneurial identity and ESE is mentorship for novice and 
aspiring young entrepreneurs through entrepreneurship education 
(Donnellon, Ollila and Middleton 2014; Rhodes and DeBois 2008). 
However, literature on how exactly youth mentorship works in developing 
countries is very limited, which is a hindrance to public policy, especially 
pertaining to youth entrepreneurship programmes (Shittu 2017). Thus, 
I posit that micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in 
agriculture, especially in agro-processing, have the potential to enhance 
youth entrepreneurship outcomes. Through interactions during 
experiential learning opportunities, the youth will develop partnerships 
and other necessary social networks with those who are already in the 
agribusiness sector. This could enable youth to create more innovative 
and sustainable start-ups in this sector of  the economy. Though youth 
are more likely to create micro-enterprises, these have the capacity to 
eventually grow into small and medium businesses, thus consequently 
creating more employment opportunities for future generations.
Besides the gap in the literature on experiential learning and youth 
mentorship, evidence exists on the significance of  agricultural role 
models in motivating and preparing youth for successful careers in 
agribusiness (Haggblade et al. 2015). Approximately 22 per cent of  
the role models in Haggblade et al.’s (2015) study highlighted the 
importance of  initiating mentorship activities with youth at early 
stages of  their education, in primary and secondary schools. The 
study also recommends that it is important to link students to private 
sector role models who will be able to demonstrate that agriculture 
can be a profitable business opportunity, because ‘large segments of  
Africa’s youth remain dismissive of  agriculture and disinterested in 
agriculturally related careers’ (ibid.: 171). This is despite the fact that 
agriculture has historically been Africa’s largest employer (World Bank 
2007), and that most of  the entry-level jobs which are likely to absorb 
the growing youth population into the labour market are projected to 
come from domestic agriculture and the agribusiness sector (Fine et al. 
2012); this is particularly due to demand for packaged food products 
and value chains over the next few decades to cater for the growing 
urbanisation in most African countries (Haggblade et al. 2015).
Agriculture as well as other technical subjects are only taught as 
elective subjects at secondary school level in Kenya, with only one topic 
dedicated to entrepreneurship. In addition, the current curriculum 
inherited from the colonial system is purely theoretical and thus 
evidently not relevant for the less industrialised Kenyan economy. 
Therefore, the students are not adequately instilled with the practical 
skills and knowledge related to enterprising. However, studies have 
shown that through promoting hands-on training with medium-sized 
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agro-processors and other willing agricultural enterprises, students’ 
entrepreneurial capabilities, problem-solving skills, and other 
non-cognitive abilities will be developed – skills which have been proven 
to greatly enable the identification of  entrepreneurship opportunities 
(Karimi et al. 2016).
2.2 Youth employment and agribusinesses in Kenya
In this article, agribusiness is conceptualised as a sector of  the economy 
that involves agricultural activities such as crop farming, animal rearing, 
processing, adding value to agricultural products, and the trading of  
farm inputs. In Kenya, agribusiness MSMEs operate either formally 
or informally, employing a range of  employees: a micro family-owned 
enterprise may employ five people whereas medium-sized agricultural 
firms and agro-processors may have 100 employees. Agribusiness 
is identified as a crucial economic sector as it has greater youth 
employment potential compared to sectors such as manufacturing and 
some service industries (ILO 2018).
Agriculture therefore continues to be the dominant sector of  
employment for the majority of  youth in Kenya and in other African 
countries (Brooks 2012; see also Wossen and Ayele, this IDS Bulletin). 
Thus, in addition to practice-based entrepreneurship education, 
rural transformation (diversifying rural economies from agriculture 
activities to regional and global agri-food systems and value chains, and 
enhancing urbanisation (Berdegué, Rosada and Bebbington 2014; see 
also Wossen and Ayele, this IDS Bulletin)) is an important pathway for 
youth employment opportunities. This is a particularly fitting strategy 
as most of  the youth in Kenya work in the agricultural and service 
sectors (Brooks et al. 2013; ILO 2018). Nevertheless, the contribution of  
agricultural activities to GDP, specifically those involving crop-growing, 
has increased from 18.4 per cent in 2013 to 24.9 per cent in 
2017 (GoK 2018a).
The agriculture sector has historically provided a large percentage 
of  employment opportunities for Kenyans, but there has been a 
steady decline in the last 15 years, while employment in the industry 
sector has seen a positive increase and the service sector has been 
stable (ILO 2018). Specifically, the general employment rate in the 
agriculture sector stands at 38 per cent in comparison to 46 per cent 
in 2000, while the employment rate in the service and industry sectors 
has averaged 48 per cent and 14 per cent respectively since 2016 
(GoK 2018a). With this notable recent decline in agriculture as the 
main source of  employment in Kenya, it is prudent to re-examine 
the skills and knowledge that youth are exposed to in their early 
stages of  education. This is particularly important since a mismatch 
between the development of  skills and demand in the labour market 
has been identified as a major contribution to youth unemployment 
(Omolo 2012). Youth currently represent 34.1 per cent of  the Kenyan 
unemployed labour force, of  which 19.2 per cent are 20–24 years old 
(GoK 2018a).
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Table 1 shows that between 2013 and 2017, the agriculture sector was 
the leading source of  GDP in Kenya and its contribution surpassed that 
of  other leading economic sectors, including manufacturing, wholesale 
and retail trade, transport and storage, and real estate (ibid.). This 
indicates that agriculture is an area within the private sector that will 
potentially help not only reduce youth unemployment in Kenya but also 
enhance sustainable rural transformation.
Undoubtedly, the acquisition of  practical agro-entrepreneurial skills 
is vital for African youth development, and it is believed that it might 
be ‘what will make the difference between persistent poverty and 
sustainable livelihoods, between widespread frustrated aspirations 
and social stability’ (Moore 2015: 195). These are timely development 
approaches because demand for fresh fruit and vegetables in Kenya has 
increased at an annual rate of  10–12 per cent during the last decade to 
cater for local consumption as well as regional and global value chains 
(ITC 2014; Krishnan 2018).
Furthermore, incorporation of  value-addition mechanisms for 
agricultural products is likely to increase the profit-level margins of  
young rural agro-entrepreneurs, making agribusiness an attractive 
employment opportunity. However, this can only be best achieved 
once the youth have attained reliable experiential skills from MSMEs. 
Youth should therefore be exposed to alternative agribusiness activities 
such as diversification into horticulture, which includes fruits and 
vegetables (Weinberger and Lumpkin 2007). They should also be 
offered information on how they can engage in agro-entrepreneurship 
through contract farming whereby they can supply agricultural products 
to supermarkets, a market opportunity that has come about to cater for 
the rising urban population, with a projected demand of  US$1 trillion’s 
worth of  food by 2030 (Adenle, Manning and Azadi 2017).
3 Methods and data sources
This study uses a mixed-methods approach, utilising surveys and 12 
interviews gathered from key educational stakeholders and owners of
Table 1 Sectoral contributions to GDP, 2013–17 (Ksh)
Economic activity 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Gain since 2013*
Agriculture 1,254,760 1,483,077 1,897,347 2,311,862 2,442,371 1,187,611
Manufacturing 506,612 537,999 588,896 653,839 648,397 141,785
Wholesale and retail trade 380,646 431,985 473,395 524,303 588,540 207,894
Transport and storage 378,525 462,457 510,488 561,757 599,438 220,913
Real estate 375,588 417,829 474,318 532,121 575,347 199,759
Note *Author’s own calculations.  
Source GoK (2018a), quarterly GDP and balance of payments release.
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agribusinesses. Excerpts of  qualitative interviews used in this article 
include:
 l An interview with a secondary school curriculum expert from the 
Kenya Institute of  Curriculum Development (KICD);
 l Two interviews with high school principals;
 l Four interviews with secondary school business teachers;
 l Two interviews with directors of  studies; and
 l Three interviews with agribusiness owners.
The interviews were conducted at different times between September 
2016 and June 2018. The school interviews were used in examining the 
extent to which the formal business education curriculum instils students 
with effective entrepreneurial knowledge. In-depth interviews with owners 
of  agribusinesses examined the current state of  the agribusiness sector 
and the skill levels demonstrated by youth working in the sector, in order 
to inform policy recommendations on how to create more employment 
opportunities for young people. Eleven schools were identified from 
six counties in Kenya (Nairobi, Kirinyaga, Machakos, Uashin Gishu, 
Homabay, and Kakamega) through purposeful and convenient sampling 
techniques. Purposeful sampling was used to best understand the 
current state of  entrepreneurship education in Kenya considering the 
socioeconomic and demographic landscape in the country.
In addition to the qualitative component, quantitative data were 
gathered using a survey methodology. A total of  1,324 students 
completed a five-point Likert-scale questionnaire that was based 
on DeNoble, Jung and Ehrlich’s (1999) measure of  ESE. This 
survey sought to measure young people’s ESE; that is, their beliefs 
about business-related capabilities, which include: developing new 
products and services, recognition of  business opportunities based 
on market demands, and developing relationships with potential 
business partners and human resource personnel to ensure growth of  
their business(es). Students’ prior entrepreneurship experience from 
family-owned enterprises was the predictor and was measured by 
assessing their personal and demographic information as well as how 
they responded to the question: ‘Do you help your parents in running 
their business[es]?’. Using a youth student sample in the study was very 
appropriate because they had less than six months to secondary school 
completion, with the majority highly likely to enter into the labour 
market rather than enrolling in post-secondary institutions.
4 Findings and discussion
4.1 Entrepreneurship education must include practical learning
Evidence from the qualitative data supports the need for practice-based 
entrepreneurship education and training as it identifies that youth do 
not have the appropriate skills required for innovative entrepreneurial 
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activities and value-addition, whereby products are processed to 
increase their economic value in the competitive agricultural sector. 
Specifically, interviews with educational stakeholders reveal the 
deficiency in the current curriculum and present recommendations as to 
how to develop students’ ESE. An interviewee from KICD underlined 
that there is a challenge in the basic education system as the focus is 
on instilling students with theoretical knowledge. He said that students 
‘are not taught practically… they will get very good grades [and] go to 
the university, but they will never get the practical information because 
of  the theory and not practical focus.’4 However, as highlighted by the 
same interviewee, the majority of  the students never go to university but 
join the growing number of  unemployed youth.
The lack of  practice-based learning opportunities was confirmed by 
interviews with the high school principals and teachers. Evidence from 
these interviews revealed that organising experiential activities for youth 
could improve their entrepreneurship interest in the future as well as 
their success in starting their own businesses. For instance, a director of  
studies said:
Maybe if  we change the curriculum in such a way that the teaching techniques 
is [sic] more practical, like Art is more practical, so we do it more experimental, 
more practical, in examples it will totally change students’ capabilities of  starting 
their own businesses in the future.5
Her recommendations were supported by a school principal: ‘If  we 
can be able [sic] to bring in the practical aspect of  these subjects, 
particularly agriculture and business, these are the subjects that 
can make a student develop those skills of  entrepreneurship.’6 Her 
sentiments were supported by another principal who acknowledged the 
need for reforms which are being conducted by KICD as the current 
curriculum is very academic-based. Ensuring that the curriculum 
incorporates practical learning was strongly recommended by most of  
the stakeholders interviewed. For instance, a business studies teacher 
mentioned that ‘the curriculum needs to be reviewed, we need to 
incorporate practical lessons in the curriculum.’7 Without practical 
experiential learning within the education system, youth will not be 
exposed to modern and effective agribusiness activities.
It was evident from the interviews that the curriculum is not relevant to 
the realities of  the business world; for instance, a director of  studies in a 
school in the western region of  Kenya said:
There is no linkage from secondary to the entrepreneurial business world. Students 
are never exposed to know more on how to start a business, how or what are the 
opportunities that are available. So, exposing them [students], maybe in a market 
to see how people make money and how people do business or start businesses or any 
entrepreneurial activities, will be [more] effective rather than teaching theoretically.8
With minimal evidence of  state-led agribusiness entrepreneurship 
development as a strategy to reduce the unemployment rate, MSMEs 
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are a potential agent of  supporting rural transformation and 
experiential learning, as the private sector is more in touch with the 
enterprising aspects of  the agriculture industry. Interviews conducted 
with agribusiness owners pointed out that youth who are transitioning 
into agricultural activities from schools lack innovative strategies and 
the practical skills to engage in agribusiness activities or to successfully 
identify a potential market for their products. A commercial maize 
farmer from Kakamega County with 24 years’ experience in the sector 
therefore recommended practice-oriented training to be supported by 
central government, such as through the Ministry of  Education and 
Ministry of  Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs, as well as the 
county government to improve youth skills. This was confirmed by the 
other two agribusiness owners from Kirinyaga County. One of  these 
owners is a commercial farmer with over 25 years’ experience ranging 
from coffee farming to horticultural and dairy farming, and who has 
more than 15 full-time employees. According to this interviewee, it 
is imperative for youth to be exposed to practice-based agribusiness 
training through apprenticeship opportunities. Participating in 
agribusiness apprenticeship will help the youth ‘learn how to process 
agricultural produce, [which] will make them earn more money.’9 But 
with the minimal evidence of  such experiential learning opportunities 
in Kenya, this agro-entrepreneur thinks that ‘the government should 
partner with successful and experienced agribusiness people to 
offer apprenticeship to the youth such as modern techniques like 
greenhouse farming.’10
It was not evident from the interviews with the agribusiness owners 
whether the youth who acquired practice-based skills were offered 
permanent employment by their employers, but some of  those who 
acquired capital were able to utilise the skills they had gained to start 
their own businesses. While the interviews did not clearly show youth 
employment outcomes through engaging in agricultural activities, the 
three agribusiness owners highly recommended mentorship programmes. 
Nevertheless, they acknowledged the challenge of  having a successful 
youth mentorship programme without a well-structured collaboration 
plan between the private sector and government institutions.
4.2 Experiential learning influences youth entrepreneurial self-efficacy
Though the interviews with agribusiness and educational stakeholders 
highlighted how experiential learning contributes to the development 
of  entrepreneurial skills and identity, the employment outcome was not 
very clear. Thus, I used quantitative data in which ESE is an outcome 
variable and practice-based experience is the predictor variable to 
complement the interview data. The results of  the regression model are 
discussed in this section.
As demonstrated through the regression analysis from a survey 
completed by 1,324 participants enrolled in 11 secondary schools 
in Kenya, experiential entrepreneurship experience gained through 
helping in family businesses influenced students’ ESE. The linear 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 49 No. 5 November 2018 ‘Youth Employment and the Private Sector in Africa’ 71–88 | 81
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
regression model used to show the relationships between the predictor 
variable and the outcome variable is:
ESE=β0+ β1practical entrepreneurial experience + εi, where 
ESE represents entrepreneurial self-efficacy, which is the outcome 
variable, β0 represents the intercept, β1 represents the slope, and εi, 
represents the error term.
The intercept is the expected mean value of  students’ ESE when 
practical experience is zero, and the slope/gradient is the rate of  change 
in students’ ESE with the change in their practical experience.
The results are given in Table 2, with ESE being 92.21 + 4.28 
(practical entrepreneurial experience) + standard error. Results show 
that practical entrepreneurial experience is a statistically significant 
predictor of  students’ ESE, p <.001. The results also show that when 
practice-based experience was used as the outcome variable, the model 
was significant (F1, 1201= 50.06, p < .001) and practice-based experience 
explained 4 per cent of  the statistically significant unique variance of  
ESE. While this is a weak variance, measuring entrepreneurial attributes 
is challenging as it should involve sociological, personal, demographic, 
psychological, and business-related factors (Ruiz, Soriano and Coduras 
2016) and this could be associated with the low variability in the 
model. The higher F value of  50.06 and its associated P value which 
is <.001 for alpha = <.05 indicates that the linear regression model 
has predictive capability, so I reject the null hypothesis because of  that 
statistical significance.
Given a unit increase in practical entrepreneurial experience, ESE is 
equivalent to a score of  approximately 96.49. Therefore, the regression 
model presented shows that practical entrepreneurial experience has 
an influence on students’ ESE. This shows that there exists a positive 
relationship between the predictor and the outcome variable.
Among the independent variables examined in the larger study to 
measure predictors of  students’ ESE among final year secondary school 
students in Kenya – including level of  business studies education,  
tribe/ethnic culture, family entrepreneurship history, family 
socioeconomic status, the type of  school the students are attending 
and their gender – practical entrepreneurship experience gained from 
Table 2 Results of the regression analysis with entrepreneurial self-efficacy as the outcome variable and practical 
entrepreneurial experience as the predictor variable
Predictor variable Β Std. Error Beta t Sig.
Constant 92.21 0.50 185.28 <.001
Practical entrepreneurial experience 4.28 0.61 0.20 7.08 <.001
Source Author’s own.
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helping in family-owned businesses accounted for most of  the variance 
in ESE. Therefore, integrating practical-based (experiential) learning in 
formal youth education and training develops young people’s ESE. This 
is supported by previous studies which have shown that there is higher 
impact on students’ entrepreneurial outcomes when accompanied by 
hands-on training experience (Anderson, Envick and Padmanabhan 
2012; Kassean et al. 2015).
The present study is therefore consistent with prior studies which have 
shown that young people who have grown up in family businesses 
develop practice-based experiences which have an influence on their 
ESE and entrepreneurial intentions (Carr and Sequeira 2007). In 
addition, skills gained from helping in these family-owned businesses 
consequently enable school-leavers to start their own businesses in the 
future or support the already existing family business at later stages in 
life (Athayde 2009).
Developing young people’s ESE is a crucial step in creating 
entrepreneurs. According to DeNoble et al.’s (1999) study, there is a 
significant positive correlation between ESE and intention  
(with r = .37, p < .001). Similarly, our findings support the need for 
practice-based entrepreneurship learning among young people as this 
form of  exposure has an influence on the development of  their ESE. 
Furthermore, the results of  the study reveal the importance of  ESE 
among young people, because without the self-belief  that one can 
be successful in establishing a business, it is daunting to develop any 
entrepreneurial intention and subsequent action.
5 Conclusions and policy recommendations
Lack of  self-employment skills continues to be a major impediment for 
young people in Kenya. With recent government surveys showing that 
there are not enough jobs for youth, there is a need for collaboration 
between the policy drivers in government, stakeholders in the 
private sector, and those in education and training institutions. One 
area that can benefit from such partnerships is agriculture because 
it has the potential to create more employment opportunities and 
improve rural youth livelihoods. Evidence from the data analysed 
in this article suggests the need for business-led entrepreneurship 
development and curricula reforms, whereby young people will not 
only be exposed to entrepreneurship knowledge to identify potential 
agribusiness opportunities, but also how to develop competitive 
businesses within the agriculture sector. As a strategy for solving the 
increasing rate of  youth unemployment, this article also advocates for 
experiential entrepreneurship education and training as it was found 
to be an effective way of  developing young people’s ESE. While the 
above-mentioned strategies have the potential to foster entrepreneurship 
development, in order to ensure a well-structured plan in which 
youth acquire the relevant entrepreneurial skills, I make the following 
policy recommendations.
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First, with the ongoing curricula reforms spearheaded by KICD, I 
recommend the integration of  life skills and experiential entrepreneurial 
elements into the basic education curriculum by involving the relevant 
private sectors because they generally have real entrepreneurship 
experience in various crucial industries. This recommendation is 
supported by prior studies which have shown that when practice-based 
education and training is incorporated into the secondary school 
curriculum, students get opportunities to engage in projects similar 
to experiences in the actual entrepreneurial environment, which 
consequently improves their entrepreneurial outcomes (Bell 2015; 
Hynes, Costin and Birdthistle 2010; Kassean et al. 2015). However, 
for effective entrepreneurial outcomes, I acknowledge that it will be 
prudent to initiate teacher-training programmes to ensure that teachers 
are equipped with the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the 
new curriculum and to positively influence students’ perceptions about 
engaging in agribusiness activities. Also, since just the few students 
taking business studies and agriculture subjects are exposed to the scant 
educational materials on entrepreneurship and agribusiness knowledge 
in the current curriculum, business studies should also be made 
compulsory for all students up to tenth grade and agriculture made 
compulsory for all rural-based secondary schools.
Second, the Ministry of  Education should collaborate with the Ministry 
of  Industrialisation and Enterprise Development, and the Directorate 
of  Youth Affairs in designing experiential learning opportunities for the 
youth through apprenticeship programmes. In rural Kenya, exposing 
youth to real-life entrepreneurial activities offered by agribusiness 
MSMEs will develop their ESE, as demonstrated in the regression 
model and will equip them with the competitive agribusiness skills as 
demonstrated by the interviewed agribusiness owners. Consequently, 
this will enable the youth to start sustainable agribusiness-related micro 
and small enterprises.
Lastly, I recommend the involvement of  successful agribusiness owners 
in youth educational field trips as this will allow young people to acquire 
the relevant entrepreneurship skills such as venture identification, 
teamwork, and problem-solving, as well as life skills and critical thinking 
skills. Through interacting with agribusiness owners, particularly those 
from the local community, some young people will not only develop 
tacit knowledge but also acquire social networks that will potentially 
help them to navigate the competitive agribusiness sector in the 
future. Young people will also develop strategies as to how to venture 
in agribusiness, ranging from establishing micro-enterprises to small 
enterprises. These collaborative strategies with stakeholders within the 
business world will enhance students’ analytical skills and instil them 
with an entrepreneurial mindset.
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Notes
* This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was produced in partnership with 
Mastercard Foundation.
 This research was partially supported by a grant from the Jim Moran 
Institute for Global Entrepreneurship, Florida State University. The 
author is grateful to the study’s participants, the two anonymous 
reviewers for their insightful comments, feedback from research 
mentors and editors, and support from peers.
1 Florida State University.
2 Kenya’s Vision 2030 (GoK 2008) is a government programme that 
was launched in 2008 with the aim of  transforming the country into 
a globally competitive and industrialised middle-income economy.
3 Note that business creation is not always a linear process as Figure 1 
may suggest. For example, entrepreneurial intentions could be 
reinforced by entrepreneurial education or mentorship but those with 
entrepreneurial intentions could also seek mentorship to enhance 
their capability to create and grow businesses.
4 Interview, September 2016.
5 Interview, May 2017.
6 Interview, June 2017.
7 Interview, May 2017.
8 Interview, June 2017.
9 Interview, June 2018.
10 Interview, June 2018.
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Navigating Precarious Livelihoods: 
Youth in the SME Sector in 
Zimbabwe*
Simbarashe Gukurume1
Abstract Since the late 1990s, Zimbabwe has experienced a protracted 
socioeconomic and political crisis. This crisis was marked by unprecedented 
unemployment rates, company closures, retrenchments, and rapid 
informalisation. In the face of employment uncertainties, many youth joined 
the burgeoning small and medium enterprises (SME) sector. This article 
explores private SME growth in Harare and shows how it enables young 
people to navigate the unemployment crisis. Based on the lived experiences 
of youth working in the retail and clothing SME sector in Harare, the article 
argues that young people deploy their agency and resourcefulness in grappling 
with unemployment by devising creative and inventive ways of ‘getting by’ 
through engagement with SMEs. Although SME sector growth can help 
create employment for youth, the nexus is complex. Both the number and 
quality of jobs created remain problematic. The SME sector is also politically 
sensitive, so young people have to navigate partisan politics as well.
Keywords: SMEs, youth employment, decent work, social navigation, 
private sector, youth bulge.
1 Introduction
This article examines how urban youth in Harare have responded 
to Zimbabwe’s ‘unemployment crisis’. The problem of  youth 
unemployment in post-colonial Zimbabwe is well documented (Bennel 
and Ncube 1994; Grant 2003; Chirisa and Muchini 2011; Kang’ethe 
and Mafa 2015). According to some sources, unemployment rates have 
reached over 94 per cent (Langa 2016; Gukurume 2017; ILO 2015; 
Dekker 2009). Young people under the age of  35 years constitute 
the majority of  the unemployed and underemployed in the country 
(Zinhumwe 2012). The economy is failing to absorb a growing 
number of  graduates seeking employment (Garwe 2014; Mahiya 
2016). Many young Zimbabweans have been pushed into precarious 
strategies of  survival in the informal economy. The concept of  precarity 
relates to contemporary forms of  work organisation epitomised by 
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meagre salaries, lack of  representation, job insecurities, poor working 
conditions, and casualisation (Allison 2013; Standing 2015). Scholars 
use the concept of  precarity to refer to precarious employment, jobs 
that are unstable and lowly paid (see e.g. Standing 2015).
This article makes three related arguments. First, the burgeoning 
small and medium enterprises (SME) sector not only enables youth to 
navigate the challenges of  everyday life, but also has great potential to 
create jobs for young people. Second, although the SME sector has a 
huge potential to create employment, the quantity and quality of  jobs 
created remain insufficient to satisfy the demand for decent and secure 
work among young people. Finally, the SME sector is fraught with 
ambiguities, where young people are earning a living, but giving up on 
their aspirations due to the precarities in the sector.
The article contributes to debates on challenges facing young people 
across sub-Saharan Africa, by examining how young Zimbabweans 
engage with employment and livelihood opportunities in the SME 
sector. It unpacks the precarities and political dynamics in the sector 
and how young people navigate them. The article draws on the lived 
experiences of  young people in Harare, the capital, to understand 
the potential value of  the booming SME sector in tackling youth 
unemployment in the country.
The rest of  the article is organised as follows. Section 2 conceptualises 
and discusses the SME sector in Zimbabwe. Section 3 addresses the 
methodology of  the study. Section 4 discusses how engagement in 
the SME sector enables young people to navigate socioeconomic 
uncertainties and the nature of  jobs created in the SME sector. While 
Section 5 addresses the socioeconomic and political context that shapes 
the workings of  the SME sector in Zimbabwe, Section 6 deals with the 
politicisation of  the SME sector and its implications for job creation. 
Finally, Section 7 provides the conclusions.
2 The SME sector in Zimbabwe
The SME sector has great potential to create more jobs for youth, and 
is the most thriving sector in Africa (Odero 2006; Zindiye, Chiliya and 
Masocha 2012; Ngek and van Aardt Smit 2013) and beyond (Lukács 
2005; Mandl 2017). Evidence from the European Union suggests that 
small businesses contribute more significantly towards job creation than 
do large firms (de Wit and de Kok 2014). In Zimbabwe, the SME sector 
represents the largest employer, especially of  young people (Nyamwanza 
2014; Nyoni and Bonga 2018). In 2017 alone, 13,000 SMEs registered 
with the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority to pay taxes (Nsingo 2017). 
Overall, there are over 60,000 registered SMEs in Zimbabwe, which 
contribute up to 60 per cent to the country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) (Mangudya 2017).
SMEs operate in diverse sectors, such as textiles, agribusiness, information 
and communications technology (ICT), and construction. Some of  these 
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sectors are potentially labour-intensive (Makumbi, this IDS Bulletin). 
SMEs are also flexible and rooted in local economies, meaning that they 
have the potential to create jobs in both rural and urban areas. For these 
reasons, the character and quality of  SMEs make them central in the 
private sector and youth employment creation puzzle.
Unemployment in many African countries is alarming and often 
framed as a serious ‘ticking time bomb’ (Shindler 1997). This has seen 
the emergence of  problematic discourses relating to youth ‘dividends’ 
and ‘bulges’, which instrumentalise young people and construct them 
as security threats (Flynn et al. 2017). Many scholars writing on and 
about young people in Africa have engaged with such discursive frames 
like the ‘youth bulge’ (Oosterom et al. 2016; Ayele, Khan and Sumberg 
2017) and the ‘demographic dividend’ (Eastwood and Lipton 2012; 
Ayele et al. 2017). The youth bulge concept refers to demographics 
characterised by a large youth population living in an area. This body 
of  work views the youth bulge as both an opportunity and a threat 
to stability, security, and economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Proponents of  the ‘demographic dividend’ discourse are optimistic that 
the ‘youth bulge’ may be a potential asset for youth to drive economic 
growth and development in Africa and globally (DFID 2016; AfDB 
2016). Like many African countries, Zimbabwe’s experience reflects a 
wider African situation characterised by youth bulge, jobless growth, 
and unemployment, albeit with its own unique dynamics.
In Zimbabwe, unemployment occurred side by side with the emergence 
of  multiple ways of  getting by. Mwaura (2017) and Namuggala 
(2017) have also noted similar trends among Kenyan and Ugandan 
youth respectively. As Mwaura (2017) found, ‘side-hustling’ was 
a popular way of  survival and wealth accumulation. Side-hustle 
denotes income-earning activities young people engage in ‘on the 
side’, normally over weekends or during their spare time, not only to 
supplement their income, but also to accumulate capital in anticipation 
for more livelihood opportunities. In Zimbabwe, a country fraught 
with protracted political and economic crisis, this attempt to make do 
and get by gave impetus to the rapid growth of  SMEs in many cities 
(Maunganidze 2016). According to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Zimbabwe has the second largest informal economy in the world 
and the informal sector is the country’s biggest labour market (Medina 
and Schneider 2018).2 The informal sector has been called a ‘livelihood 
haven’ for many urbanites in the country (Kamete 2017). In 2017, Bell 
and Mawadza (2017) described Zimbabwe as increasingly ‘an SME 
economy’, in which small business activities have become dominant in 
the country’s economic and commercial landscape. The Zimbabwean 
government has pursued a long-term strategy of  support for SMEs, 
having established the Small Enterprises Development Corporation 
(SEDCO) in 1983 and a ministry for SMEs in 2005.
At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe possessed one of  the strongest 
economies in Africa, with large-scale investment inflows in domestic 
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manufacturing and agriculture, and a GDP growth rate averaging 
5.5 per cent from 1980 to 1990 (Kanyenze 2003). However, the 
adoption of  the neoliberal Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP) prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank in the 
early 1990s exacerbated Zimbabwe’s economic meltdown (Kanyenze 
2003) and from the late 1990s, Zimbabwe confronted an unprecedented 
socioeconomic and political crisis (Gukurume 2015). This crisis 
accelerated due to the government’s controversial policies, and poor 
macroeconomic and fiscal management (Magure 2012; Gukurume 
2015). It worsened in 2008, when Zimbabwe experienced a serious 
hyperinflation akin to the 1922–23 Germany inflation. Young people 
were the hardest hit by this economic crisis (Chirisa and Muchini 2011). 
More than 60 per cent of  them endured protracted unemployment, and 
political and economic marginalisation (Gukurume 2017). This pushed 
them into the SME sector.
The SME sector now generates over half  of  the private sector 
employment in the country and generates close to 60 per cent of  the 
country’s GDP (Mangudya 2017; Nyoni and Bonga 2018). According to 
Mangudya (2017), the sector comprises over 2.8 million enterprises of  
different sizes and employs more than 5.7 million people, approximately 
4.2 million of  these being young people under the age of  35. Estimates 
of  SMEs’ aggregate scale, turnover, and number of  employees continue 
to rise (Mangudya 2017).
In Harare, SMEs support the livelihoods of  nearly 1 million youth who 
struggle to be absorbed into the dwindling public sector job market. In 
the context where job opportunities hardly keep pace with the number 
of  college graduates, the sector has become an alternative space for 
generating livelihoods. SMEs are evidently playing a crucial role in 
securing and maintaining household incomes (Nyoni and Bonga 2018; 
Maunganidze 2016).
The SME sector is composed of  firms of  varying sizes and diverse types. 
The definitions and conceptualisation of  SMEs vary from one sector 
to another. SMEs are normally defined based on firm size, the amount 
of  profits, and number of  workers a firm employs (Zindiye et al. 2012; 
Nyamwanza 2014). Popular definitions of  SMEs involve formal and 
informal enterprises and are measured against the perceived or estimated 
size of  the sector (Nyoni and Bonga 2018). This article focuses on formal 
SMEs. The most widely used definition of  SMEs in Zimbabwe is that of  
SEDCO (2010) which defines SMEs as registered firms which employ 
a maximum of  100 workers and with an annual turnover in sales of  a 
maximum of  US$830,000 (see also Zindiye et al. 2012).
In post-2000 Zimbabwe, SMEs grew rapidly due to economic collapse 
and the adoption of  controversial anti-investor policies such as the 
indigenisation and empowerment policies that compelled foreign 
companies to cede 51 per cent of  their shares to locals (Magure 2012). 
Maunganidze (2016) argued that the government acts as an obstacle 
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and an engine of  SME growth simultaneously. Although the SME 
sector has the potential to promote economic growth and create 
employment, it has remained largely underfunded and unsupported 
(Odero 2006). There has been a clear lack of  adequate support for the 
SMEs in Zimbabwe, which is largely due to lack of  coordination within 
the organisations responsible for SME growth (Maunganidze 2016).
3 Methodology
This article is based on qualitative ethnographic fieldwork with youth 
in the SME sector in Harare between 2016 and 2018. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with 40 participants (22 male and 18 female) 
aged between 18 and 35, and ten key informant interviews were 
conducted with retail and clothing SME owners. Semi-structured 
interviews were supplemented with data from key informant interviews, 
focus group discussions, and numerous informal conversations 
with informants. Informants were identified through snowballing 
and purposive sampling techniques, to select information-rich 
cases. Interviews were largely conducted in English, although some 
participants preferred to use Shona – a local language – exclusively or 
mixed with English. The interviews focused on young people’s lived 
experiences and perceptions on the quality of  work in the SME sector. 
Key informant interviews with SME owners solicited their perspectives 
on decent work in the sector. Some of  the participants had tertiary-level 
education, many had a bachelor’s degree, and a number had diplomas 
from vocational/polytechnical colleges.
This article is based on youth in retail and clothing SMEs in Harare. 
Clothing and retail SMEs were selected because most of  them are not 
only thriving, but also constitute the majority in the SME sector. All the 
SMEs that I engaged with were formally registered and were selected 
based on their real and perceived potential to create more jobs. These 
SMEs employed between 20 and 100 workers and were growth-oriented.
4 Young people and the SME sector: navigating between opportunity 
and precarity
In analysing youth engagement in the SME sector, the concept of  
social navigation (Vigh 2009; Utas 2005; Honwana 2012; Oosterom 
forthcoming, 2019) unpacks the ways through which youth grapple with 
unemployment and related livelihood uncertainties. Social navigation 
entails a specific dialogical engagement and relationship between  
agents/actors (youth) and their socio-political and economic 
environment (Arnaut 2012), akin to Bourdieu’s ‘field’. In framing the 
SME sector as a ‘field’, the article adopts Arnaut’s (2012) argument 
that young people’s ‘tactical agency’ is embedded in, and textured by, 
opportunities and precarities contained in the field. In Zimbabwe, 
where chronic crisis and endemic uncertainties (Vigh 2008; Cooper 
and Pratten 2015) are common, the concept of  social navigation 
is a compelling analytical category to understand young people’s 
everyday life.
94 | Gukurume Navigating Precarious Livelihoods: Youth in the SME Sector in Zimbabwe
Vol. 49 No. 5 November 2018 ‘Youth Employment and the Private Sector in Africa’
In his analysis of  youth navigation in war contexts, Vigh (2009) showed 
how young people use their agency to orient themselves towards 
imagined futures. Chronic crisis compels youth to consider how they can 
navigate constraining socioeconomic and political spaces. In Zimbabwe, 
party politics in the SME sector texture young people’s subjectivities, 
yet enable them to reimagine their aspirations, time, and temporality 
(Masquelier 2013). I use the concept of  social navigation to assert that 
young people find a way to manoeuvre uncertainties and unemployment. 
Social navigation enables us to understand youth agency in negotiating 
the prevailing socioeconomic and political realities. From this section 
onwards, empirical data on young people’s experiences in the SME 
sector are used to discuss and unpack their agency, creativity, and 
ingenuity in navigating unemployment and attendant anxieties.
Young people are not only employees in the SME sector, they also own 
SMEs in their own right, employing other youth. Young employees 
and small business owners in Harare explained that engagement in the 
SME sector enables them to navigate socioeconomic uncertainties and 
hardships. Joseph,3 who was working in a clothing shop, said:
It is definitely better than just being idle and jobless at home. If  I compare 
myself  with my colleagues who are just seated at home, I can pay my rentals, 
buy some food and save some money to remit to my parents in the rural areas.4
Joseph explained that since he started working in the clothing shop 
he is no longer regarded as a rovha (loafer), a derogatory label given 
to young people who are doing nothing and who depend on their 
parents for housing, finances, and food. The term rovha is often linked 
to juvenile delinquency, laziness, petty crime, drug abuse, and violence. 
Many informants shared Joseph’s dislike of  being called a ‘rovha’. Even 
though they aspired to white-collar office jobs, the potential stigma 
and labelling motivated them to take up anything to earn some money. 
By taking up any available and multiple forms of  generating income, 
young people engage in the logic of  kukiya kiya (Jones 2010). Kukiya kiya 
relates to multiple ways of  making do and getting by, which are often 
at the margins of  the economy and legality. Kukiya kiya is epitomised by 
goal-oriented improvisational economic actions. Literally, kukiya means 
locking up, but people use it metaphorically to refer to the many ways 
and activities people engage in to survive. By engaging in any sort of  
work, even kukiya kiya (Jones 2010), young people can earn respect and 
avoid name-calling. Though kukiya kiya can be viewed as a technique 
used by the unemployed (rovha), for my interlocutors, kukiya kiya is an 
alternative form of  employment. This echoes the argument (Namuggala 
2017) that there is a need to rethink essentialist and formalised 
conceptualisations of  work in tandem with the meanings youth attach to 
what they do to survive. Irvine explained:
I had to take up a job as a till operator even though I have a sociology degree. 
I graduated in 2010, but my frantic efforts of  getting a job were in vain. People 
in my neighbourhood started calling me names. I could not stand being called 
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‘rovha’. People think that you are lazy, so that is why I took up this short-term 
contract-based job in the shop as a till operator.5
Irvine noted that the job is insecure, the pay is meagre, and the working 
conditions are poor, but he will continue to do it to contribute to the 
family income.
Although the work is often precarious, employment in the SME sector 
enabled social mobility for some young people in Harare. Diversifying 
and acquiring livelihood assets is one of  the myriad of  strategies 
through which youth working in the SME sector navigate and negotiate 
the perceived vagaries of  precarious employment. For instance, Tapiwa, 
who worked in a small retail shop in Harare, explained that through 
his savings, he managed to purchase land in Epworth (a dormitory 
town close to Harare) and a small car that he used as an informal taxi 
(mushikashika) in the city centre. Tapiwa’s experience is exceptional, 
as through working in the SME sector he has managed to diversify 
his sources of  income, improve his ‘ontological security’ by buying 
a property, and invest in other assets. Ontological security refers to 
the feeling of  mastery and control over the chaotic, uncertain, and 
threatening conditions of  everyday life (Giddens 1991; Grenville 2007; 
Maguire and Murphy 2016).
Ontological security strengthens young people’s belief  that they have 
the capacity and urge to fight off uncertainties and existential anxieties, 
which make their everyday life meaningless (Maguire and Murphy 
2016). Tapiwa’s income also enabled him to help with the family income. 
He paid his young brother’s tuition fees at a local secondary school and 
he hoped that a better-paying job would enable him to cover the school 
fees for all of  his siblings; this was an expectation of  his parents. Other 
informants’ work also allowed them to meet expectations. Josphat, a 
graduate of  marketing was able to pay lobola/roora (bride wealth) and 
get married. He did so with the money he was making as a shop floor 
supervisor at the Red Bull retail shop and as a taxi driver.
Although Tapiwa was doing relatively well, with his national accounting 
diploma he still harboured hopes of  getting a better-paying job in one 
of  Harare’s big firms:
This is not what I want to be doing for the rest of  my life, I want to be a 
chartered accountant but as things are now I have to support my family and 
also try to make some money. My parents sacrificed for my education, they sold 
livestock to send me to school and so now it is my turn to help them even though 
formal and better-paying jobs are hard to come by.6
Tapiwa’s friend, Timothy, also juggled two jobs in a bridal shop in town 
and a grocery shop during weekends at his home area in Glen View.
Tapiwa and Timothy engaged in survival strategies that involve 
multiple income-earning activities, hustling (Thieme 2013), and 
side-hustling (Mwaura 2017). In Ghana, ‘hustling’ is a rational strategy 
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used by young people to increase their income and insure against 
any non-payment by employers (Yeboah 2017). Josphat co-owned a 
clothing shop with a business partner, Patrick. They decided to start 
the business together after failing to get jobs for several years. They 
travel to Tanzania, South Africa, and Botswana to buy clothes for resale 
in Harare. Before starting this business, Josphat was staying with and 
dependent on his parents for everything. However, through the income 
from his business, Josphat moved out, started renting, and got married. 
Josphat’s experience demonstrates how SMEs allow some young people 
to progress and establish themselves within society. Josphat managed 
to navigate ‘waithood’ and attain the social markers of  adulthood 
(Mwaura 2017) through engagement with the SME sector. The labour 
market is an important ‘rite of  passage’ to adulthood (Honwana 2012; 
Oosterom et al. 2016). Without jobs, youth remain stuck/in limbo, 
between youthhood and adulthood (Honwana 2012; Gebremariam 
2017; Mwaura 2017).
The opportunities offered by SMEs enabled young people to fulfil family 
responsibilities and to move on socially by renting their own home, 
marrying, etc. The relative success of  Josphat and Patrick’s business 
shows the centrality of  social networks and collaborative potential in 
SME sector growth. While their case represents entrepreneurship, I 
contend that this is made possible through working in SMEs to raise 
start-up capital and expand such businesses. Importantly, their business 
is also a space for potential job creation for other youth. The pooling of  
resources and ideas helped Josphat and Patrick to boost their capital to 
establish their own business, overcome financial limitations, and advance 
their aspirations and social mobility. Indeed, the majority of  participants 
noted that engagement with the SMEs empowered them to be active 
social and economic actors in their communities. The SME sector clearly 
plays an important role in allowing young people to navigate difficult 
work environments, and sometimes escape poverty and unemployment.
5 Precarity, decent work, and the SME sector
Although many of  the participants (in semi-structured interviews) noted 
that the SME sector is an important avenue for alternative employment, 
the majority of  them raised concerns about the nature of  jobs created 
in SMEs. Locardia, a 23-year-old woman working as a till operator 
in a retail SME in Mbare explained that she and other workers have 
short-term contracts and are not paid well. After completing her 
sociology degree, she spent 18 months looking for a job and joined a 
retail shop when her friend recommended her. Although Locardia was 
happy to have a job, she plans to start up her own business and employ 
other youth. The job was to raise enough capital to start her own 
business. While aware of  the economic and political constraints that 
come with forming and running an SME, Locardia said she was willing 
to take up the challenge.
The experiences of  Locardia and other participants showed that the 
SME sector is associated with insecure and/or undesirable jobs. There 
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is a very complicated relationship between young people’s aspirations, 
employment preferences, and the nature of  jobs available and created in 
the SME sector.
Similarly, poor working conditions in some of  the SMEs emerged 
as a major issue about the level of  decent work. Tadiwa highlighted 
exploitative practices at his workplace. When it comes to the question of  
‘decent work’, the efficacy of  SMEs in creating desirable and sustainable 
jobs for the youth is questionable.
6 Politicisation of the private and SME sector
The SME sector in Harare is deeply politicised. Politics, particularly 
the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) 
heavily interfere with the operations of  the private sector and SMEs 
in Harare. The partisan influence and control of  the economy is not 
new. The partisan allocation of  resources such as jobs and market stalls 
was part of  ZANU-PF’s political mobilisation strategy (Kamete 2017; 
Maringira and Gukurume forthcoming, 2018; Oosterom forthcoming, 
2019). For instance, Maringira and Gukurume (forthcoming, 2018) 
show how ZANU-PF used commercial space as a way of  cementing 
political patronage and garnering political mileage. This study confirms 
these findings. In fact, during fieldwork, ZANU-PF deployed violent 
youth militia to control the private sector and more particularly SMEs 
in the Mbare and Glen View neighbourhoods in Harare. ZANU-PF 
uses SMEs as a way of  rewarding youth who do the work of  violence 
for the political party. Politics has played a critical role in mediating who 
is included and excluded in the private sector. Partisan actors mediate 
opportunities in SMEs (Oosterom forthcoming, 2019). Indeed, some of  
the participants asserted that the ZANU-PF membership card mediated 
access to, and ownership of, an SME. For instance, Adam explained:
For you to get a market stall in here in Mbare you have to be ZANU-PF, if  you 
are not then there is nothing for you. They make it a point that only ZANU-PF 
supporters get space here. My boss is a well-known ZANU-PF supporter, so 
ZANU-PF politicians control everything here.7
Patrick, a member of  the ZANU-PF youth league who owns a shop in 
Mbare also explained:
This is our stronghold; we have targeted the SME sector for our youth 
empowerment and indigenisation programme. As the architects of  youth 
empowerment, we, the ZANU-PF youth, are the primary beneficiaries. We give 
space to patriotic youth; MDC [Movement for Democratic Change] people 
are sell-outs and we cannot reward sell-outs, can we?8
Patrick’s narrative is part of  ZANU-PF’s broader discourse of  ‘patriotic 
history’ (Ranger 2004). This patriotic history creates a binary of  
‘patriots’ and ‘sell-outs’. In this framing, patriots, the ZANU-PF 
youth, are rewarded by the political ‘big man’ (McCauley 2012), while 
perceived ‘sell-outs’ are excluded from benefits in the SME sector. My 
findings reveal a deep-seated patrimonialism and patronage politics in 
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the everyday workings of  SMEs, and in the ways in which young people 
gain employment and navigate the dynamics of  SME politics.
Political capital was central for some young people in their entry into 
the SME sector in Harare. This was particularly relevant in Mbare and 
Glen View where ZANU-PF aligned with youth militia and vigilante 
groups such as Chipangano who controlled access to operating space 
and entrance into the SME landscape. Margret explained:
Here the passport to own a shop is to have a ZANU-PF membership card and 
to attend all ZANU-PF activities such as rallies and solidarity marches as well 
as welcoming the president at the airport from his foreign trips. If  you do this, 
no one questions you.9
Judith also echoed Margret’s views and explained, ‘You have to be 
ZANU-PF supporter to get and maintain your business or be employed 
here.’10
Although partisan politics constrained some young people’s entry into 
the SME sector, some devised innovative ways of  navigating these 
constraints. Takunda explained:
I do not support ZANU-PF and I have never voted for them, but because I need 
to survive and access resources, I bought the membership card and I chant their 
slogans and attend their activities to make life easy for me in the market.11
My findings confirm the argument that young people’s livelihood 
activities are intricately linked to their social lives and politics, 
particularly the politics that shape how SMEs operate (Kamete 2017; 
Oosterom et al. 2016; Maringira and Gukurume forthcoming, 2018). 
Indeed, since young people are embedded in social and political 
relationships, the ways in which they pursue opportunities for work will 
also be mediated by more than just their skills and demand for labour, 
but by how they navigate divisive national and local-level politics which 
(re)shape the nature of  the local labour market and economy (Oosterom 
et al. 2016).
Many SME owners (from the study) felt that the government should 
provide an enabling environment for the growth of  the SME sector. 
Some bemoaned the challenge of  political interference and rent-seeking 
behaviour of  the state. Many emphasised that to unlock the great 
potential of  the SMEs in tackling youth unemployment, there has to be 
minimal political interference in the sector. One of  the SME owners, 
Mr Jambo, explained: ‘The problem we have is that the SME sector 
in this country is heavy political involvement and influence in how 
we operate.’12
For SME owners, the political climate is also important for how they 
start, access, or run an SME. The political interference has negative 
implications on the growth of  the SME sector and affects its capacity to 
contribute meaningfully to economic growth and job creation.
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Although the SME sector is by far the largest employer in Zimbabwe 
(Enste and Schneider 2000; Mbiriri 2010), there is a conspicuous lack 
of  recognition and support from the state and other stakeholders, such 
as banks (Zindiye et al. 2012). Findings showed that many SMEs are 
financially excluded and lack access to financial services. An SME 
employer explained, ‘We would want to improve the working conditions 
and remuneration of  our workers but without enough financial support, 
it is very difficult.’13
Most SMEs do not have collateral to access bank loans and other forms 
of  credit. This undermines their capacity for growth. For the majority 
of  SMEs, without support, labour demand will remain low, and so will 
the creation of  more jobs. SMEs in Zimbabwe also face stiff competition 
from Chinese SMEs that sell cheap products (Gukurume 2018). Some 
interlocutors bemoaned lack of  protection from unfair competition. To 
them, cheap Chinese products are pushing them out of  business.
7 Conclusion
This article has explored the complex dynamics of  the growing SME 
sector in addressing the youth employment crisis in Zimbabwe. It 
has looked in-depth at how the SME sector can help young people 
to navigate socioeconomic uncertainties. While participation in the 
sector can enable young people to escape poverty, the nature of  
the jobs created are insecure and poorly paid. These jobs are often 
not compatible with the dreams and aspirations of  the majority of  
the young people. Therefore, I contend that the SME sector offers 
opportunities for young people, but these opportunities are often 
precarious. As such, for the SME sector to realise its full potential in 
job creation, such precarities have to be managed and addressed. Some 
of  the precarities emanate from constant political interference, which 
means that young people not only have to navigate the precarious 
job market, but partisan politics as well. This is compounded by the 
operational constraints that SMEs (despite their potential) face in 
providing decent and non-precarious employment. Thus, there is 
the need for approaches to mitigate this downside of  SME-driven 
economies, through support for private sector SME growth and strict 
monitoring of  labour practices in the sector.
Notes
* This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was produced in partnership with 
Mastercard Foundation.
1 PhD candidate at the Institute for Humanities in Africa (HUMA), 
University of  Cape Town.
2 https://www.herald.co.zw/zim-has-worlds-second-largest-informal-
economy-imf/.
3 Pseudonym and all the other names used in this article are 
anonymised.
4 Interview 10, 15 June 2017.
5 Interview 11, 17 June 2017.
6 Interview 3, 10 May 2017.
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7 Interview 1, 10 November 2016.
8 Interview 38, 3 March 2018.
9 Interview 20, 4 March 2017.
10 Interview 26, 12 May 2017.
11 Interview 23, 10 May 2017.
12 Interview 8, 14 June 2017.
13 Interview 35, 10 December 2017.
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Assessing the Effectiveness of 
Employment Programmes for 
Ex-Combatants: A Case Study 
of Nigeria’s Post Amnesty 
Programme (PAP)*
Tarila Marclint Ebiede1
Abstract Employment of ex-militants is an important part of disarmament, 
demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes in societies emerging 
from armed conflicts. In this article, I examine the potential of Nigeria’s 
Post Amnesty Programme (PAP), a locally designed DDR programme, to 
contribute to the employment of ex-militants in the oil-rich Niger Delta 
region. I show that although the programme has focused on training, its 
design and implementation has not been informed by a clear understanding 
of the private sector environment where ex-militants are expected to find 
work in the Niger Delta. I demonstrate empirically how programmes that 
are designed to address employment of ex-militants can easily fall short of 
expectations. I suggest that a baseline understanding of the needs of private 
sector employers is an essential part of youth employment programmes in 
fragile and conflict-affected societies.
Keywords: youths, ex-militants, jobs, private sector, peace-building.
1 Introduction
Youth employment is one of  the most urgent development challenges 
facing policymakers in sub-Saharan Africa. Youth unemployment in 
this region is about 11 per cent (ILO 2017), a proportion that seems 
relatively small when compared to other regions of  the world but 
which, in the context of  sub-Saharan Africa’s large population, clearly 
designates a very large number of  unemployed youth. Approximately 
12 million young people enter into the workforce each year, but only 
about 3 million jobs are created annually (AfDB 2017). The challenge 
of  youth employment is particularly urgent in societies that have been 
affected by violent conflicts, where economic development is low, 
infrastructure is absent, and the private sector, in which youths are 
expected to seek employment, is weak.
106 | Ebiede Assessing the Effectiveness of Employment Programmes for Ex-Combatants: Nigeria’s Post Amnesty Programme (PAP)
Vol. 49 No. 5 November 2018 ‘Youth Employment and the Private Sector in Africa’
In societies recovering from violent conflicts, the unemployment 
problem is particularly prevalent among youths who have been involved 
in fighting and have become ex-combatants in the post-conflict phase. 
This is one of  the specific problems that reintegration programmes are 
designed to address (Munive 2014). Reintegration is a process whereby 
ex-combatants acquire civilian status through sustainable employment 
and incomes (United Nations 2010). The reintegration process is 
supposed to be facilitated by vocational skills training, job creation, 
entrepreneurship support, psychological reorientation, and family 
support (Berdal 1996). However, the available evidence suggests that 
reintegration programmes often fail to create sustainable employment 
for ex-combatants (Blattman and Ralston 2015).
Policymakers in Nigeria face the challenge of  generating employment 
for ex-militants in the country’s oil-rich Niger Delta region. In 2009, 
the Nigerian government implemented a disarmament, demobilisation, 
and reintegration (DDR) programme for armed groups in the Niger 
Delta, which is known locally as the Post Amnesty Programme (PAP). 
The PAP includes programmes designed to support knowledge and 
skills acquisition, financial empowerment, internships, microcredit, and 
education to facilitate long-term employment for ex-militants.2
The Nigerian government claims that the PAP has successfully 
addressed the challenge of  youth unemployment among ex-militants 
in the Niger Delta. However, in this article, I argue that the PAP has 
largely failed to facilitate the rehabilitation through employment of  
large numbers of  ex-militants in the region. There is a gap between 
the government’s claims and verifiable figures on the employment rates 
of  former militants. For example, the government has claimed that it 
registered 30,000 ex-militants in the PAP (Gist Magazine 2013), yet it 
has only provided training for 15,459 individuals (PAP 2015). Data on 
actual levels of  employment resulting from the programme are scarce, 
but the last official figures show that only 2,072 participants in the PAP 
have found jobs (Omonobi 2014).
I identify three factors that account for this failure: (1) the lack of  an 
assessment of  the needs of  private sector employers, (2) a flawed incentive 
structure for PAP participants, and (3) the lack of  a politically feasible 
strategy for winding up the programme. As a result, the PAP has become 
a disguised subsidy programme for unemployed and underemployed 
youth in the Niger Delta, representing an open-ended burden on public 
finances. To improve this outcome, I argue that the PAP requires reform 
to achieve a better targeting of  the skills and capabilities needed by 
employers, more effective implementation, and a clearly identified route 
to transition from the PAP into sustainable employment.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of  the PAP. Section 3 discusses the focus on the private sector as a 
potential employer of  youth in the Niger Delta. Section 4 analyses the 
implementation of  the PAP and explores the available evidence on 
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the employment of  ex-militants in the Niger Delta. It explains how 
a realistic assessment of  the needs of  the private sector is a missing 
ingredient within the PAP. This has undermined the programme’s 
principal objective to facilitate youth employment in the Niger Delta. 
Section 5 summarises the argument and concludes.
2 An overview of the Post Amnesty Programme (PAP)
Protests, agitations, and civil disobedience by youths in oil-producing 
communities have characterised Nigeria’s Niger Delta in the last three 
decades (Omotola 2009). The underlying driver of  these agitations is 
that communities are not benefiting from the oil extraction that takes 
place on their land. Beginning in the late 1990s, youths demanding 
increased development and an end to environmental degradation 
in the Niger Delta organised mass protests against international oil 
companies (IOCs) and the Federal Government of  Nigeria (FGN). 
These protests evolved into an armed militant struggle in 2005. Youths 
belonging to different militant groups focused on sabotaging oil industry 
infrastructure and critical assets, and kidnapping expatriates working in 
the oil industry (Ibaba 2011). These attacks led to a significant reduction 
of  crude oil production in Nigeria, from 2.5 million barrels per day in 
2005 to about 2 million barrels per day in the first quarter of  2006. 
Nigeria’s oil production did not rise above 2.2 million barrels per day 
throughout the period of  the insurgency.
Table 1 The disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration components of the Post Amnesty Programme
Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration
Duration: 6 August–4 October 2009 Duration: 6–12 months Duration: Up to 5 years
Collection of arms, ammunition and 
explosives, etc.
Documentation and biometrics
Ex-militants report to camp
Verification and documentation
Transformational training
Peace-building and conflict resolution
Counselling
Career guidance
Wellness assessment
Reintegration classification
Education and vocational placement
Graduation and demobilisation
Knowledge and skills acquisition
Financial empowerment
Placement programmes
Microcredit
Education
Reconciliation with local community
Conflict resolution framework/
mechanism
Monitoring and evaluation
Exit of programme
Disarmament camps
Media campaign
Transformational training centres
Rehabilitation camps
Partnering government agencies, 
NGOs, and private organisations
Tracking and support framework
Source PAP (2009). First Plan of the Presidential Committee for Amnesty, Abuja.
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Another steep decline in production occurred in 2008, and in the third 
quarter of  2009, production stood at only 1.75 million barrels per day. 
Industry and government revenues from crude oil sales fell during this 
period. The government came under pressure to find solutions and 
bring the armed insurgency to an end (Ukiwo 2016). In May 2007, a 
new government, led by President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, opened 
negotiations with armed groups in the Niger Delta. In May 2009, the 
President proclaimed an amnesty for all armed groups in the Delta. As 
part of  the peace process, the PAP was designed as a DDR programme 
for militants who agreed to renounce violence and accept an amnesty 
(see Table 1).
Disarmament exercises were carried out by the Nigerian military in the 
major cities of  Warri, Yenagoa, and Port Harcourt from the beginning 
of  August to the end of  October 2009. At the end of  the disarmament 
exercise, the FGN claimed that it had identified and registered 30,000 
participants in the PAP. Many ex-militants signed up for the programme 
when leaders of  militant groups endorsed it. The former militants 
were accommodated in camps, in a bid to separate them from their 
former armed groups. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
were contracted by the FGN to carry out reorientation programmes, 
which taught ex-militants peaceful methods of  conflict resolution, 
human rights, and the rule of  law. Career counselling was provided, in 
preparation for the reintegration phase. The first phase came to an end 
in 2010, having prepared the stage for former militants to reintegrate 
into their communities.
The committee constituted by the  to oversee the PAP proposed 
a reintegration plan that focused on offering bespoke courses of  
vocational skills acquisition (PAP 2009). It was estimated initially that 
this plan would cost the Nigerian government US$360 million. Over 
time, the cost of  the training component of  the PAP has increased 
to more than US$1 billion. According to a PAP official, this increase 
resulted from changes in the design of  the programme. The initial 
plan envisaged the provision of  bespoke training exercises by the PAP 
itself, whereas the revised programme provided access to training 
opportunities, extending beyond nine months’ duration, which would 
lead to international certifications.3
PAP participants were placed in educational institutions and training 
centres in Europe, North America, Asia, South Africa, and West 
Africa, as well as private institutions in Nigeria. Vocational training was 
arranged in areas such as marine technology, heavy duty equipment 
operations, welding, diving, agriculture, boat building, aviation, fashion 
design, hotel and catering, cosmetology, and hair dressing (Gist Magazine 
2013). Academic training focused on undergraduate degrees such as 
law, political science, business management, mass communication, 
international relations, public administration, medicine, engineering, 
applied sciences, building and construction, and information and 
communications technology (ICT) (ibid.).
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Youth unemployment in the Niger Delta has often been blamed on 
a lack of  education and skills. Indeed, many youths who took part 
in armed militancy blamed the lack of  employment opportunities 
as a reason for joining armed groups (Oyefusi 2008). The enhanced 
provision of  educational and vocational training in the PAP was 
intended to address this problem (Ajibola 2015). In particular, it was 
expected that these training programmes would enable ex-militants to 
find work in the private sector (Kuku 2012).
Although the PAP was designed to enable youths participating in the 
programme to find work in the private sector as a whole, the programme 
focused heavily on the oil and gas sectors, in particular. According to PAP 
officials, this emphasis was designed in response to the interest expressed 
by local youths to engage in the oil and gas industry in the Niger Delta.4 
As will be shown in the analysis, the majority of  ex-militants selected 
training opportunities that could enable them to seek employment in the 
oil industry. However, while private companies within the oil industry 
are the dominant private sector interests in the Niger Delta, the extent to 
which they are able to provide employment for youths remains contested.
3 The private sector and youth employment in the Niger Delta
Youth unemployment is a general challenge across Nigeria (Ismail 
2016). Recent data indicate that about one third of  Nigerian youths 
have been unable to find gainful employment (NBS 2018). The issue 
cuts across the country’s 36 states, including the oil-rich Niger Delta. 
Youth unemployment rates in Rivers State (41.82 per cent) and 
Akwa Ibom State (36.58 per cent) are significantly above the national 
average, while the state of  Bayelsa is slightly below the national 
average at 30.36 per cent. The data on youth unemployment in the 
Niger Delta are not a surprise as youth employment is generally a 
challenge in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS). There is a 
general concern that high levels of  youth unemployment contribute 
to criminality or mobilisation for armed violence (Izzi 2013); however, 
there is no confirmed relationship between unemployment and crime 
in the long term (Janko and Popli 2015). Nonetheless, tackling youth 
unemployment and underemployment are seen as important objectives 
for building peace and stability in FCAS (Enria 2014).
The Niger Delta is a fragile and conflict-affected region. Fragility 
and violence in the Delta have been driven largely by the exploration 
and extraction of  crude oil resources, which are carried out as a 
joint venture between the Nigerian government and private sector 
operators. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 
represents government interests in the oil sector, alongside a number 
of  international and national oil companies which play a significant 
role, especially in the exploration and extraction of  crude oil, as well 
as the construction and operation of  oil production facilities. However, 
while the private sector is a major player in the oil sector in the Delta, 
the region’s dependence on oil and gas has not helped private sector 
growth in other areas of  the economy. The Niger Delta is an example 
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of  the resource curse thesis, which argues that an abundance of  natural 
resources stifles economic growth and development, and can lead to 
violent conflict. Scholars that have theorised on the resource curse thesis 
have drawn empirical evidence from sub-Saharan African countries 
such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of  Congo, Zimbabwe, and 
Angola (Badeeb, Lean and Clark 2017).
The negative impact of  natural resource conflicts on private sector 
growth in FCAS has significant implications for job creation and youth 
employment. The private sector faces particular challenges in FCAS, 
which are typically characterised by a weak regulatory and judicial 
environment, hard-to-enforce property rights, a lack of  policy and fiscal 
frameworks, criminality and corruption, a lack of  basic infrastructure 
and services such as electricity, high business risks, and security threats, 
which make it challenging for private enterprises to thrive (Eriksson 
Baaz, Olsson and Verweijen 2018; Mac Sweeney 2009; Peschka, Emery 
and Martin 2011). According to Peschka et al.:
The impact of  conflict, violence, and prolonged fragility is 
particularly pervasive on the legitimate formal private sector. Foreign 
and local investors alike flee the country, taking with them longer-
term capital, skills, jobs, and technology and further undermining 
local private sector support institutions (such as chambers of  
commerce)… The businesspeople who do stay face difficulty in 
accessing finance, are often harassed or co-opted by increasingly 
corrupt government and military and/or by militias, and may find it 
harder to import necessary goods or export their products (2011: 15).
Unsurprisingly, FCAS occupy the bottom rungs of  the World Bank’s 
Ease of  Doing Business Index (World Bank 2018: 4). In FCAS, political 
logics often overtake the production logics that shape private sector 
activity in more stable societies (Castel-Branco, Cramer and Hailu 
2001). Private actors may even be involved in political and economic 
relationships and practices that help to sustain conflict, violence, and 
instability (Oetzel, Getz and Ladek 2007). They may profit directly from 
involvement in war as providers of  services and equipment to warring 
parties, or they may be involved in the extraction of  natural resources, 
which is often at the heart of  such conflicts.
Some analysts have identified these negative dynamics in relation to the 
involvement of  businesses in the Niger Delta (Frynas 2001). The armed 
militancy that characterised the Niger Delta region was directly linked 
to contestation over the oil industry’s activities. Key actors in this conflict 
were armed militants, local politicians, the FGN, and IOCs operating in 
the Delta. The corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices of  IOCs 
fuelled conflicts and empowered armed militants in some communities 
(Ebiede 2017). IOCs reformed their CSR practices to address some 
of  these shortcomings (Ite 2007). However, recent analysis suggests 
that contestation over oil resources and the activities of  the oil industry 
continue to fuel conflict in the Niger Delta (Bendana et al. 2018).
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Revenues of  regional government in the Niger Delta are derived almost 
exclusively from the oil sector. The government’s focus on oil revenues 
has also limited the development of  appropriate policies that can 
facilitate private sector growth. Oil revenues have been lost to corruption 
within government. Even where government funds infrastructure 
development, there is no evidence to suggest that such investment leads 
to private sector growth in the region. There is also no evidence that such 
investments form part of  an overarching strategy to foster the emergence 
of  private sector-led economic development in the region.
IOCs dominate the oil and gas industry in the Niger Delta. Although 
the industry is profitable, hydrocarbon extraction and the associated 
value chains do not generate many jobs for young people. In 2005, it 
was estimated that the oil and gas industry accounts for only about 
65,000 direct and 250,000 indirect jobs in Nigeria as a whole (Fajana 
2005). In 2017, the National Bureau of  Statistics, Nigeria (NBS) 
estimated that the oil industry and extractive sector in the country 
employ only about 1 per cent of  the entire labour force of  Nigeria. This 
illustrates that the oil industry is not the type of  private sector activity 
that can generate wide-scale employment in the Niger Delta.
According to the NBS, the key employers of  labour in Nigeria and 
the Niger Delta are mainly small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in 
the agricultural, hotel, tourism and entertainment, food and catering, 
education, and transport sectors. While these sectors are flourishing, they 
are not fully developed. Formal private sector service delivery in the Niger 
Delta remains weak and is largely confined to the urban areas. The lack 
of  infrastructure in rural areas of  the Niger Delta makes it difficult for 
private sector actors to thrive. Even in urban areas, companies involved in 
manufacturing, hospitality and tourism, food, and catering lack basic and 
fundamental infrastructures, such as electricity supply.
The exploration and production of  crude oil has polluted the 
environment, reducing the productivity of  agricultural activities in the 
region (Opukri and Ibaba 2008). Yet, agriculture is the single largest 
employer of  labour in the Delta (Nextier Advisory and SDN 2016). The 
absence of  a thriving non-oil private sector is said to limit the ‘creation 
of  markets, and access to other factors of  economic progress’, which are 
essential to the provision of  jobs for youths in the Niger Delta (ibid.: 4).
Despite these challenges, scholars and policymakers remain adamant 
that the private sector has an important role to play in stabilising 
FCAS, through the creation of  jobs and the provision of  financial and 
other resources to support local entrepreneurs (Bray 2009; Peschka 
et al. 2011). It is argued that development actors, including aid donors 
and the state, can build an effective market system with space for 
private sector players to operate, as part of  their efforts to strengthen 
the economic systems of  FCAS (Batley and Mcloughlin 2010). These 
strategies are supposed to enhance job creation in the private sector, as a 
contribution to the stabilisation of  FCAS.
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The private sector remains the largest employer of  labour in the Niger 
Delta. Entrepreneurial individuals still seek to engage in private business 
activities in various sectors of  the economy. The training component of  
the PAP makes clear that the programme was designed to steer youths 
towards employment in the private sector, yet this aspiration has not 
been achieved. It is therefore important to examine why the PAP has 
not been able to achieve this objective.
Table 2 Reintegration training provided to ex-militants under the Post Amnesty 
Programme
Area of specialisation Number trained
Education:
• Nigerian universities
• Foreign universities
1,620
1,454
Welding and fabrication 5,194
Entrepreneurship 2,798
Maritime 1,086
Crane and heavy duty 1,030
Pipefitting 250
Boat building 299
Agriculture 239
Automobile 207
Electrical installation 89
Aviation:
Engineers
• Pilot (fixed wing)
• Helicopter
• Instructors
138
71
21
5
Diving 230
Drilling 197
Health, safety and environment 104
Industry automation 86
Entertainment 60
Instrumentation 46
Total 15,224
Source Office of the Special Adviser to the President on the Niger Delta, 
October 2015 (unpublished).
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4 The Post Amnesty Programme and youth employment in the 
Niger Delta
Institutions of  the Nigerian government in the Niger Delta have 
implemented various programmes to address the youth employment 
challenge, including several skills acquisition and training programmes 
led by the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the 
Ministry of  Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA). In addition to these are 
programmes implemented by IOCs and the Nigerian Local Content 
Management Board (NLCMB). These programmes are meant for all 
youths in the Niger Delta. However, the PAP was specifically designed 
to address the challenge of  employment among youths who have been 
involved in armed militancy in the Niger Delta.
The design of  the PAP reflected arguments that unemployment was one of  
the reasons for the mobilisation of  youths into militant groups (Oluwaniyi 
2010). Former militants were expected to undertake both vocational and 
educational training. The vocational training component focused on 
agriculture, agro-allied processing, transportation, cold-room management, 
ICT, maritime services, building and construction professionals, oil and gas, 
and environment and sanitation. By 2015, it was estimated that 15,459 out 
of  30,000 registered ex-militants had undergone various PAP-sponsored 
training programmes, both in Nigeria and overseas (see Table 2).
With a few exceptions, such as entrepreneurship and entertainment, 
most of  the types of  training offered were aimed at skills needed 
within the oil industry, including welding and fabrication (5,194), 
entrepreneurship (2,798), maritime (1,086), and crane and heavy duty 
machinery operation (1,030). As well as responding to the participants’ 
own demands, the array of  training opportunities provided was informed 
by government officials’ assumption that oil companies would provide 
jobs for ex-militants.5 However, the oil industry is not a major employer 
of  labour within the private sector in the Niger Delta. Interviews with 
PAP officials revealed that the programme’s training component was 
not informed by a baseline study of  employment opportunities actually 
available within the private sector in the Niger Delta. As a result, the 
focus on the oil industry did not capture the economic realities of  the 
employment situation in the region. A study by the Foundation for 
Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND), an NGO focused on 
community development, made the following assertions:
The strong presence of  the oil industry in the Delta has resulted in 
the relative shrinkage of  other local industries, such as manufacturing. 
That is, the lure of  high salaries perceived to be associated with oil 
sector jobs, makes all other forms of  employment less desirable. 
Unstable markets and wide-scale importation have likewise worked to 
stifle other economic sectors, including agriculture, aquaculture and 
construction. With poor linkages between the market and vocational 
training (i.e. matching demand for labor with appropriately trained 
supply of  labor) the result is a large, youthful population that is unable 
to find decent work (PIND 2011: 16).
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The PIND report also noted that ‘in terms of  skills and competencies, 
youth tend to fall below the required expectations of  employers’ 
(ibid.: 19). This situation reflects wider debates in the youth employment 
literature about balancing demand and supply factors (Darvas and 
Palmer 2014). Employers seek human capital that is capable of  
increasing their business output. However, while labour is abundant in 
societies with high unemployment, the specific skills needed by thriving 
businesses are often scarce. This mismatch between labour demand 
and supply is a key factor underlying the youth employment challenge 
in FCAS. The gap persists in programmes such as the PAP, which are 
designed to help youths into paid work.
The PAP incentive structure also failed to take into account the realities 
of  the local job market. To support the livelihoods of  ex-militants 
while they underwent training and awaited gainful employment, the 
PAP paid a monthly stipend worth about US$400 to participants in 
the programme, from the moment they enrolled and for an indefinite 
period. To the young former militants, this financial incentive was 
one of  the key attractions of  the PAP.6 However, the stipend was set 
at a level higher than the monthly wages available locally to artisans 
and skilled workers. Currently, the minimum wage in Nigeria is only 
US$60 per month. Although formal employment in private sector jobs 
is likely to pay more than the minimum wage, the types of  jobs for 
which ex-militants have been trained are unlikely to attract monthly 
salaries that can compete with the monthly stipends paid by the PAP. 
As a result, the stipend has tended to act as a disincentive rather than 
an incentive to seek employment. This was recognised by a PAP official, 
who told me ‘skilled labour can hardly really pay that much… it makes 
no sense to accept a job that will pay less than the monthly stipend. This 
is a disincentive for most of  them to take up regular employment.’7
The PAP was supposed to end after five years, in December 2015, 
but it has continued to receive government funding and support. In 
2016, President Buhari extended the programme to December 2017 
(Daily Post 2016). The FGN later announced that it would provide up 
to US$86 million in additional funds to extend the PAP throughout 
2018 (THISDAY 2017). These extensions were prompted by protests 
by ex-militants, who claimed that they had not been successfully 
reintegrated. Their protests intensified when the government briefly 
suspended payments of  monthly stipends in 2016 (Daily Post 2016). 
Many former militants continue to depend on the PAP for their 
livelihood, and while this situation continues there is no indication that 
it will be politically possible for the Nigerian government to terminate 
the PAP without jeopardising the peace and rehabilitation process.
5 Conclusion
The lack of  an exit plan for the PAP and the failure to achieve the 
objective of  facilitating employment for ex-militants has created a 
conundrum for the FGN. I argue that the lack of  an exit strategy 
has occurred largely because the programme failed to give adequate 
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attention to the needs of  private sector employers in the non-oil and gas 
sector, both qualitatively (the types of  skills required) and quantitatively 
(the potential to create job vacancies and absorb workers), or to the 
prevailing wage rates offered by private sector employers in the region. 
To a large extent, the PAP has become a disguised subsidy programme 
for unemployed and underemployed youth in the Niger Delta. This 
flaw in the programme’s detailed design and implementation has made 
it difficult to achieve a sustainable benefit. Instead, both ex-militants 
and successive governments have used the PAP as leverage in political 
bargaining in the Niger Delta.
The article has also shown that there is a mismatch between the needs 
of  the private sector and the ambitions of  young people in the Niger 
Delta. Youths in the region aspire to be engaged in the oil industry, but 
that sector is unable to meet the demand for jobs in the region. This 
analysis suggests that an overarching strategy is urgently needed to 
diversify economic development in the Niger Delta, creating a space for 
other kinds of  private enterprise besides the oil and gas industry, and 
an expansion of  job opportunities. In the meantime, there is a need 
for programmes that seek to facilitate a transition into employment to 
be informed by robust evidence of  the economic and business realities 
on the ground. It is not enough for the government to set out to train 
young people, welcome though such opportunities may be. These 
trainings must be based on a clear needs assessment of  private sector 
employers as well as the aspirations of  young people.
Despite the challenges that have been identified with Nigeria’s PAP, 
the need for these types of  programmes remain urgent. However, the 
design and implementation of  such programmes needs to be innovative 
and grounded in empirical understanding of  the context of  societies 
that have experienced armed conflicts. Programmes that are not based 
on this detailed analysis cannot guarantee employment for youths, 
including those who have experienced armed conflict. While it remains 
important to mobilise the private sector as a generator of  employment 
for youths in FCAS, it is important to clarify how this mechanism 
would work in practice. Any programme that seeks to stimulate youth 
employment, in which the private sector will be a key player, should 
focus on both the demand and supply sides of  the labour relationship 
between business employers and youths seeking employment.
Notes
* This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was produced in partnership with 
Mastercard Foundation.
1 Centre for Research on Peace and Development, KU Leuven, 
Belgium.
2 www.osapnd.gov.ng/ndap.
3 Interview with DDR official, 13 February 2014, Abuja, Nigeria.
4 Interview with DDR official. In addition, the PAP established an Oil 
and Gas Committee to facilitate the employment of  ex-militants in 
the oil industry.
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5 Interview with DDR official, 13 February 2014.
6 Interview with ex-militant, 5 November 2014.
7 ibid.
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ACODE Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment 
[Uganda]
ACP African, Caribbean, and Pacific
ADRA Adventist Development and Relief  Agency [USA]
AfDB African Development Bank [Côte d’Ivoire]
APRA Agriculture Policy Research in Africa [UK]
AUC African Union Commission [Ethiopia]
BDU Bahir Dar University [Ethiopia]
BIAT Boosting Intra-African Trade
CBS community-based security
CFTA Continental Free Trade Area
CIAT International Center for Tropical Agriculture [Colombia]
CSA Central Statistical Agency [Ethiopia]
CSF critical success factor
CSR corporate social responsibility
DCED Donor Committee for Enterprise Development [UK]
DDR disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration
EDRI Ethiopian Development Research Institute
EEA Ethiopian Economic Association
EHPEA Ethiopian Horticulture Producer Exporters Association
EPRC Economic Policy Research Centre [Uganda]
EPZ export processing zone
ERP Economic Recovery Programme
ESAP Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
ESE entrepreneurial self-efficacy
ESRC Economic and Social Research Council [UK]
ESS Ethiopian Socioeconomic Survey
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of  the United Nations [Italy]
FCAS fragile and conflict-affected states/settings
FGD focus group discussion
FGN Federal Government of  Nigeria 
GDP gross domestic product
Ghc Ghanaian cedi
GoK Government of  Kenya
GTP Growth and Transformation Plan [Ethiopia]
ha hectare
HUMA Institute for Humanities in Africa (University of  Cape Town) 
[South Africa]
ICE International and Comparative Education
ICT information and communications technology
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development [Italy]
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute [USA]
IITA International Institute of  Tropical Agriculture [Kenya]
ILO International Labour Organization [Switzerland]
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ILRI International Livestock Research Institute [Kenya]
IMF International Monetary Fund [USA] 
IOC international oil company
ISSER Institute of  Statistical, Social and Economic Research [Ghana]
ITC International Trade Centre [Switzerland]
K4D Knowledge, Evidence, and Learning for Development
KICD Kenya Institute of  Curriculum Development
Ksh Kenyan shilling
LACA Land and Agriculture Commercialisation in Africa [Ghana]
LSMS-ISA World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study-
Integrated Surveys on Agriculture
MDC Movement for Democratic Change [Zimbabwe]
MNDA Ministry of  Niger Delta Affairs
MoE Ministry of  Education [Ethiopia]
MoP Migrating out of  Poverty [UK]
MSE micro and small enterprises
MSMEs micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises
MT metric tonne
NBER National Bureau of  Economic Research [USA]
NBS National Bureau of  Statistics [Nigeria]
NDDC Niger Delta Development Commission
NGO non-governmental organisation
NGPS National Governance, Peace and Security
NLCMB Nigerian Local Content Management Board
NLFS National Labor Force Survey
NNPC Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
NYP National Youth Policy [Uganda]
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
[France]
PAP Post/Presidential Amnesty Programme [Nigeria]
PIF project interest form
PIND Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta
PSFU Private Sector Foundation Uganda
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme
SEDCO Small Enterprises Development Corporation [Zimbabwe]
SME small- and medium-sized enterprises
SOC state-owned company
SSA sub-Saharan Africa
STEM science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
STEPS Social, Technological, and Environmental Pathways to 
Sustainability
TVET Technical Vocational Education and Training
UBOS Ugandan Bureau of  Statistics
UEUS Urban Employment Unemployment Survey
UGX Ugandan shilling
UN DESA United Nations Department of  Economic and Social Affairs 
[USA]
UNDP United Nations Development Programme [USA]
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa [Ethiopia]
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UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization [France]
UNU-WIDER United Nations University World Institute for 
Development Economics Research [Finland]
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WDI World Bank Development Indicators
WESO World Employment and Social Outlook
YIG youth interest group
YLF Youth Livelihood Fund [Uganda]
YLP Youth Livelihood Programme [Uganda]
ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
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